On 24 Sep, 18:17, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
> >> But this is the very hinge of disagreement. CTM's Trojan Horse is the
> >> incoherence of its posit of materialism.
> > Accordign to whom?
> >>It's demonstrably as
> >> dependant on AR as comp is;
> > What is dependent on AR? Materialism?
> CTM. But you still won't accept this; perhaps this is not resolvable.
If ti was demonstrable, i woudl accept it.
> >>there's no difference - that's Bruno's
> >> point. As to committing ontologically, whether to materialism or AR,
> >> this is surely merely a linguistic distinction.
> > Really ???? If I say I'm gopig to give you the £100 I owe you,and
> > give you a 3-day old haddock instead, is that a merely
> > lingusitic distinction?
> Thanks, Peter - that genuinely made me LOL! I think that we're
> diverging again in our use of RITSIAR. You want any theoretical
> entities proposed to be cashable as RITSIAR, and that's why you insist
> on the ontological commitment.
I don't think reality can spring from unreality.
> I see what you mean, but I think that
> this is perhaps to be in too much of a rush to close the gap. In my
> view, we just don't have a viable strategy for closing it, so why not
> wait and see where the theories and their empirical consequences lead?
Why not start by rejecting what is blatantly wrong? Otherwise
we will never make progress.
> If comp could get us near enough, that might be the time to resolve
> exactly how AR = RITSIAR.
> > This message is part of the topic "Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology"
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