On 24 Sep, 02:28, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sep 22, 1:10 pm, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a
> > > x86
> > > computer than on an ARM based one ?
> > There's a difference between being independent of any
> > specific instantiation and being independent of all instantiations.
> Computational supervenience is not equivalent to no instantiation.
> Its realisation is derived from AR - i.e. the posit that all phenomena
> are consequential on a specific subset of mathematics and
> computational theory.
> It is motivated by the inadequacy of physical
> supervenience as a basis for the computational theory of mind. Its
> explanatory worth as a theory is to be judged abductively and
> > Platonism is not proved by multiple realisability.
> AFAICS nobody is trying to prove Platonism but you.
You just posited it above.
> Could you either
> state clearly what work this label is supposed to do, beyond the posit
> of AR on an abductive basis that we have already agreed on, or drop
> your insistence on it?
I have explained that several times. It clarifies the issue
that AR needs to be an ontological commitment, not
just a commitment to mathematical truth. Platonism
is not an uncontroversial entailment of CTM or CT, hence
"comp" is not the only premise needed. Hence the need
to distinguish between comp, which embeds Platonism like
a Trojan horse, and CTM which doesn't.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at