2009/10/6 John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com>: > Good morning, Stathis, > thanks for the friendly early-bird detailed reply - I like almost all of > it. > Just to keep the tradition of the list: > > "...billions of other people could observe, record and share about you, > given the opportunity, even if there are individual differences..." > > this is like a 'democratic voting' (what I deny) where everybody has > different interests, yet vote for one (the best liar) - just to have a > consensus. Those "individual differences" may be devastating beyond the > boundaries we usually limit our opinios to. Show me ONE instant where the > personal input of adjustment does not enter - even public - understanding of > any 'opinion'. And thanks for the 1st par. last sentence's "somehow" - a > landmark for me<G>.
The billions of observers would agree on such things as your height, weight, colour of your jacket, frequency spectrum of sound emitted by your vocal cords, and so on. These things are public and there could be unanimous agreement on them, even if the observers were aliens who have never seen a human before. On the other hand, guesses as to your subjective experience would remain guesses, and moreover would be guesses based on the possible subjective experience of the individual observer. > If the experiment keeps the instantiations so that they > > "...remain close enough that S1=S2 at all times..." > > then I reject the reality of those experimental conditions. A clone is > different from it's original even at a most careful identity measure, if not > otherwise by some different (spatial? etc.) (co)-ordinates for environmental > impacts. > Such instrumental differences also arise from (sub?)molecular built of > structure, the origin of atoms (if I condone such physicalistic figments at > all). > I stand corrected: No clone can be "identical", not even at the > instantiation level. (My fundamental objection to any 'teleportational' > replication as well). A digital clone would be exactly identical. We rely on this fact when we run computer software: the software should behave in exactly the same way whatever hardware it is running on, given the same inputs. If the brain is Turing emulable, the same should apply to minds; if not, then perhaps not. > "We start off assuming a physicalist comp ..." > > Not me, sorry, I stay with the 'assumption' that our physicalist ideas are > at best scientifically (math? etc.) supported figments. And I would say "NO" > to the doctor (sorry, Bruno) because I don't know how good that new brain > would be in comparison to my present (incompletely functioning, but not > digitally limited) primitive brain - the TOOL for my (beloved! ha ha) mind. So your position is, simply, that you don't agree with computationalism, which invalidates any subsequent argument taking computationalism as a starting point. That's OK, as long as we are clear that this is the case. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
