On 11 Dec 2009, at 02:40, Jason Resch wrote:

>
>
> On Thu, Dec 10, 2009 at 4:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>  
> wrote:
>
>
> >
> > But if numbers can "just exist", and matter can "just exist", then  
> why
> > can't conscious experiences "just exist"?
>
> Numbers can just exist, and this is the last unsolvable mystery. Yet
> we can explain (assuming comp) why this mystery is absolutely
> unsolvable. It is not possible to explain numbers without assuming
> numbers (or combinators, etc.)
> Matter cannot exists primitively, but can exist as appearance for some
> numbers, and those appearance obeys laws, reducible to the math of
> universal numbers.
> Consciousness also, but is more fundamental than matter: NUMBER =>
> CONSCIOUSNESS => MATTER, is the probable "causal" (in some precise
> number theoretical sense) relation.
> (probably even NUMBER => CONSCIOUSNESS => MATTER => HUMAN
> CONSCIOUSNESS => HUMAN NUMBERS). Here the last two steps would explain
> why we don't accept easily (intuitively) the origin).
>
>
> That is interesting, why would you say NUMBER => CONCIOUSNESS =>  
> MATTER is more probable than NUMBER => MATTER => CONSCIOUSNESS?  Is  
> it related to Boltzmann's theory of independent brains being more  
> probable than whole universes?


It follows from UDA, but is even clearer in AUDA, or in Plotinus where  
matter is the "last thing" emanating from the ONE, almost despite its  
will. Matter is almost described as what even God cannot control. Bit  
frightening given that matter = evil, in the mindset of the antic  
platonician.

But matter is never created by the Universal Dovetailer. If your  
current mental state can be described by the digital information S,  
what you can can call "matter" is the result of 2^aleph_zero infinite  
computations which completes below your level of substitution. A  
priori, some equivalence relation can lower that number.

Of course this is still an open problem. It may be possible that this  
magma of computations appears to be emulable itself (which is not very  
plausible, but not yet discarded). This would mean that a special  
particular universal dovetailing would win on all the others (quantum  
universal dovetailing?).
Also, pure number theory seems to have some strange relation with  
theoretical physics, so it may be true that "physics" is deeper, and  
that again some number relations would described the winning  
dovetailing. This is speculation. A priori matter is "just" a first  
person (plural) view of the infinitely many computations which  
appears, by UDA, in the bottom, or in anything isolated from  
"me" (like already in quantum mechanics).




>
> To your second point, about NUMBER => CONSCIOUSNESS => MATTER => HUMAN
> CONSCIOUSNESS => HUMAN NUMBERS, what is the purpose/role of the  
> consciousness step prior to matter?  How does consciousness support  
> matter that supports human consciousness?

Consciousness is the normal state of the universal person or löbian  
machine, as captured for example by the 8 "hypostases". It is a  
mathematical fixed point of some universal transformation. It exists  
independently of time, matter, and those things.
Matter, if you want, is a collective "creation" of all Löbian  
machines. Humans are Löbians (in the optimist hypothesis), but it  
seems they have entangled themselves in very long and deep histories,  
which add many "colors" to the consciousness experience. We are  
relatively big and relatively rare, but globally we are a continuum,  
as far as we multiplies (apparently in different dimensions). (I use  
the rule Y = II, that is bifurcation of the future multiplies the  
past). Unfortunately this is intuitive, and far from being translated  
in the AUDA part. This seems to involved knots, braids, Temperley  
algebra, and may be related to "natural" graded Kripke structures  
related to Z1 and Z1* (the seventh and eigth arithmetical hypostases).



>
> >
> > Why do my conscious experiences have the particular contents that  
> they
> > do?
>
> Again, here we can explain why we cannot explain this. Like we can
> explain that no one can explain why it has been reconstituted in
> Washington and not in Moscow (or vice-versa). This is what we can call
> geography/history, by opposition to physics which studies laws (of the
> observable by universal machine). Laws are universal. In my youth I
> thought that physics was a sort of geography. Now I know that comp
> preserve a big body of physical laws. The multiverse is the same for
> all observers, (machine and non machine, really, except those 'quite
> close to the unique "one")
>
> That is very interesting, what do you mean by those close to the  
> unique one?  Would these be observers which appear early on in the  
> Dovetailer Algorithm?


By the "unique one" I was referring to "God", or to the ONE of  
Plotinus. I still have no clue if there is a sense to look at this as  
if it was a person or a thing. For a simple lobian machine like Peano  
Arithmetic, the ONE is arithmetical truth. This is an object without  
any name for the machine PA, but with no recursive name at all, (for  
any machine or entity) and so it is never generated effectively by the  
universal dovetailer (despite it will appears in the machine  
experience. those result from the first person indeterminacy on all  
computations. We have to keep this in mind all the time (when we  
reason on the subject).
Now, if you add non effective axioms to PA, to get an entity which is  
still well defined in mathematics, but no more in computer science, it  
happens that the logic of G and G*, and the whole AUDA, still apply on  
that entity. They are sound and complete.
Much richer and abstract notions of "provability", like being true in  
all transitive models of ZF, obey G and G*, (G and G* are still sound)  
but G and G* are no more complete, and needs new axioms (Solovay found  
such axioms for the rich "abstract provability" I have just  
described). So G and G* remains sound even for "gods" very close to  
the truth. But apparently only god, (truth itself) and vague cousins,  
escapes from the G/G* self-referential constraints.

Bruno Marchal
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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