On 13 Dec 2009, at 16:40, Rex Allen wrote: >> >> I diagnostic you have still some some trouble grasping completely the >> 7th and 8th step of UDA, to be frank. It is OK, take it easy. > > Well, I think I grasp those points. I just don't think that they show > that they are the source of conscious experience. > > Again, it seems very plausible that what I experience can be > represented by physical objects (electrons moving through silicon and > copper) or numbers. And by developing an algorithm that adjusts these > representations in the right way you can ALSO represent how my > experience changes over time. > > But I don't see WHY doing so would produce first person conscious > experience. And so I reject it as an explanation for conscious > experience.
OK, you think that comp is false. I really don't know. From biology and quantum physics, and computer science, I would say that there are some clues that comp is true, but there are many remaining problems, and even clues that it may be false. All my point is that if we make the Digital Mechanist hypothesis (DM = comp), then the mind body problem is two times more difficult than materialist are thinking. Indeed with DM, we have to explain how matter arise from numbers, not just mind. Then computer science gives, by itself, through universal machine self- reference, a theory of mind, which explains rather well the difference between qualia and quanta. But this needs AUDA, and, although you don't need DM, you need an open mindness for the "strong AI " thesis, for the idea that a machine can think. This may be true, and yet comp is false. My goal was in showing that comp, which an hypothesis in philosophy of mind/theology, is refutable empirically, and thus is amenable to the scientific study. That's all. I dunno if comp is true or not. I don't even know if I should hope of fear it. It is too complex for that. What I do believe (prove), is that comp + weak materialism is inconsistent. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
