On 17 February 2010 07:28, Diego Caleiro <[email protected]> wrote:
> You guys should Read Chalmers: Philosophy of Mind, Classical and > contemporary Readings > and > > Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Richard Rorty > > In particular "The Concepts of Counsciousness" By Ned Block and "Mental > Causation" by stephen Yablo will get you nearer to where you are trying to > get. Thanks. I've already read quite a bit of Chalmers, Rorty, Block, etc, and before committing to a comprehensive re-perusal I would appreciate your view on the specific nature of the corrective to be gained. What I guess I'm trying to suggest here is that I think we may have retreated too hastily from an "interactionist" relation between 1-p and 3-p because of its association with an apparently outmoded dualism. The problem is that current "identity" assumptions leave us stuck with a causally-closed 3-p world in which the very nature of our apparent access to 1-p phenomena is opaque, leave alone its (lack of) causal relevance. I'm hesitant to commit too strongly here to what a deeper and genuinely illuminating resolution to the "identity" issue might look like, partly because I have only a vague intuition, and because it would probably jump-start one of the endless circular debates on the topic. Perhaps I'm trying to tempt others away from current standard positions to re-consider what would have to be the case for it to really make a difference in the world that we *experience* (say) pain, rather than merely observing that its 3-p correlates mediate our behaviour. David > You guys should Read Chalmers: Philosophy of Mind, Classical and > contemporary Readings > and > > Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Richard Rorty > > In particular "The Concepts of Counsciousness" By Ned Block and "Mental > Causation" by stephen Yablo will get you nearer to where you are trying to > get. > > Best wish for all > > Diego Caleiro > > Philosopher of Mind > University of São Paulo. > > > > On Wed, Feb 17, 2010 at 12:39 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> > wrote: >> >> David Nyman wrote: >>> >>> On 17 February 2010 00:16, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>>> But suppose we had a really good theory and understanding of the brain >>>> so >>>> that we could watch yours in operation on some kind of scope (like an >>>> fMRI, >>>> except in great detail) and from our theory we could infer that "David's >>>> now >>>> thinking X. And it's going to lead him to next think Y. And then he'll >>>> remember Z and strenghten this synapse over here. And..." Then >>>> wouldn't >>>> you start to regard the 1-p account as just another level of >>>> description, as >>>> when you start you car on a cold day it "wants" a richer fuel mixture >>>> and >>>> the ECU "remembers" to keep the idle speed up until it's warm. >>>> >>> >>> In short, yes. But that doesn't make the problem as I've defined it >>> go away. At the level of reconciliation you want to invoke, you would >>> have to stop putting scare quotes round the experiential vocabulary, >>> unless your intention - like Dennett's AFAICS - is to deny the >>> existence, and causal relevance, of genuinely experiential qualities >>> (as opposed to "seemings", whatever they might be). At bottom, 1-p is >>> not a "level of description" - i.e. something accessed *within* >>> consciousness - it *is* the very mode of access itself. >> >> I think "accessed" creates the wrong image - as though there is some "you" >> outside of this process that is "accessing" it. But I'm not sure that >> vitiates your point. >> >> >>> The trouble >>> comes because in the version you cite the default assumption is that >>> the synapse-strengthening stuff - the 3-p narrative - is sufficient to >>> account for all the observed phenomena - including of course all the >>> 3-p references to experiential qualities and their consequences. >>> >>> But such qualities are entirely non-computable from the 3-p level, >> >> How can you know that? >> >>> so >>> how can such a narrative refer to them? And indeed, looked at the >>> other way round, given the assumed causal closure of the 3-p level, >>> what further function would be served by such 1-p references? >> >> "Function" in the sense of purpose? Why should it have one? >>> >>> Now, if >>> we indeed had the robust state of affairs that you describe above, >>> this would be a stunning puzzle, because 1-p and 3-p are manifestly >>> not "identical", nor are they equivalently "levels of description" in >>> any relevant sense. Consequently, we would be faced with a brute >>> reality without any adequate explanation. >>> >>> However, in practice, the theory and observations you characterise are >>> very far from the current state of the art. This leaves scope for some >>> actual future theory and observation to elucidate "interaction" >>> between 1-p and 3-p with real consequences that would be inexplicable >>> in terms of facile "identity" assertions. For example, that I >>> withdraw my hand from the fire *because* I feel the pain, and this >>> turns out to both in theory and observation to be inexplicable in >>> terms of any purely 3-p level of description. Prima facie, this might >>> seem to lead to an even more problematic interactive dualism, but my >>> suspicion is that there is scope for some genuinely revelatory >>> reconciliation at a more fundamental level - i.e. a truly explanatory >>> identity theory. But we won't get to that by ignoring the problem. >>> >> >> My intuition is that once we have a really good 3-p theory, 1-p will seem >> like a kind of shorthand way of speaking about brain processes. That >> doesn't mean you questions will be answered. It will be like Bertrand >> Russell's neutral monoids. There are events and they can be arranged in 3-p >> relations or in 1-p relations. Explanations will ultimately be circular - >> but not viciously so. >> >> Brent >> >>> David >>> >>> >>>> >>>> David Nyman wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 16 February 2010 22:21, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the >>>>>> computation, you have the experience. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, but that's precisely not the sense I was referring to. Rather >>>>> the sense I'm picking out is that neither the existence, nor the >>>>> specifically experiential characteristics, of any 1-p component over >>>>> and above the 3-p level of description is accessible (computable) in >>>>> terms of any such 3-p narrative. Consequently any reference to such a >>>>> component at the 3-p level seems inexplicable. This leads some (e.g. >>>>> Dennett, if I've understood him) to try to finesse this by claiming >>>>> that 1-p experience only "seems" to exist - IOW that when 3-me refers >>>>> to 3-my "conscious experience" this is merely a 3-p reference to some >>>>> equivalent computational aspect which is fully sufficient to account >>>>> for all the resultant 3-p phenomena. The 1-p "seeming" is then >>>>> supposed to be, in some under-defined sense, "identical" to this >>>>> computation. >>>>> >>>>> But for two manifestly distinct levels of description to have any >>>>> prospect of being seen as "identical", they must be capable of being >>>>> discarded individually, in order to be jointly reconciled in terms of >>>>> a single more fundamental level clearly compatible with both - this is >>>>> the only manoeuvre that could validate any non-question-begging >>>>> ascription of "identity". >>>>> >>>> >>>> But suppose we had a really good theory and understanding of the brain >>>> so >>>> that we could watch yours in operation on some kind of scope (like an >>>> fMRI, >>>> except in great detail) and from our theory we could infer that "David's >>>> now >>>> thinking X. And it's going to lead him to next think Y. And then he'll >>>> remember Z and strenghten this synapse over here. And..." Then >>>> wouldn't >>>> you start to regard the 1-p account as just another level of >>>> description, as >>>> when you start you car on a cold day it "wants" a richer fuel mixture >>>> and >>>> the ECU "remembers" to keep the idle speed up until it's warm. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> ISTM that the Dennettian approach is merely >>>>> to *assert* - given the undeniable "seeming" of conscious experience - >>>>> that this *must* be the case, whilst offering no glimmer of what the >>>>> nature of such a transcendent level of reconciliation could possibly >>>>> be. >>>>> >>>>> David >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 17 February 2010 05:07, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is old hat, but I've been thinking about it on awakening every >>>>>>> morning for the last week. Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first- >>>>>>> person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third- >>>>>>> person perspective? The only rationale for adducing the additional >>>>>>> existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that >>>>>>> we >>>>>>> possess it (or "seem" to, according to some). We can't "compute" the >>>>>>> existence of any 1-p experiential component of a 3-p process on >>>>>>> purely >>>>>>> 3-p grounds. Further, if we believe that 3-p process is a closed and >>>>>>> sufficient explanation for all events, this of course leads to the >>>>>>> uncomfortable conclusion (referred to, for example, by Chalmers in >>>>>>> TCM) that 1-p conscious phenomena (the "raw feels" of sight, sound, >>>>>>> pain, fear and all the rest) are totally irrelevant to what's >>>>>>> happening, including our every thought and action. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But doesn't this lead to paradox? For example, how are we able to >>>>>>> refer to these phenomena if they are causally disconnected from our >>>>>>> behaviour - i.e. they are uncomputable (i.e. inaccessible) from the >>>>>>> 3- >>>>>>> p perspective? Citing "identity" doesn't seem to help here - the >>>>>>> issue is how 1-p phenomena could ever emerge as features of our >>>>>>> shared >>>>>>> behavioural world (including, of course, talking about them) if they >>>>>>> are forever inaccessible from a causally closed and sufficient 3-p >>>>>>> perspective. Does this in fact lead to the conclusion that the 3-p >>>>>>> world can't be causally closed to 1-p experience, and that I really >>>>>>> do >>>>>>> withdraw my finger from the fire because it hurts, and not just >>>>>>> because C-fibres are firing? But how? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the >>>>>> computation, you have the experience. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups >>>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> [email protected]. >>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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