On 04 Feb 2011, at 10:29, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
In step seven what is proved is that
MEC + 'big universe' entails that physic is a branch of computer
science.
Do you see that?
I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of
computer science.
?
The point was that MEC + "big universe' entails that PHYSICS (not
psychology) is a branch of computer science.
Step 5 plays the big role there. You don't need to be annihilated
for having your continuations determined by the first person comp
indeterminacy on UD*, once a UD, a fortiori an omega point, is in
the physical universe.
In step eight, the assumption of the existence of a big universe is
eliminated. Roughly because no universal machine at all can
distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else. This throws
away the need of any universe. Physics has to be justified by
number relations only (numbers or any elementary terms of a Sigma_1
complete theory).
OK?
OK in that 'no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical
reality from anything else.' We cannot tell if we are in a
simulation, obviously.
It is more subtle than that. I actually said the contrary somehow: we
can tell if we are in a simulation. We cannot tell if we are in a
simulation for some finite time, but if we have the time to
contemplate and the freedom to explore, we can see if we are in the
natural emulation provides by the sum on all UD's fictions. That is
why mechanism is testable, and the test (QM) confirms that we are in a
simulation. The quantum weirdness can be seen as the trace of the
infinitely many digital simulations occurring in arithmetic. If that
simulations gives a different physics, it means that
- either we are in a secondary simulation (like in some alien made
matrix or simulacron, but the first person probability of this
happening is of the type white rabbit, by comp indeterminacy),
- or, much more probable in *that* case, that comp is not correct.
This leaves us with the white rabbit problem.
OK. Then. We have to solve it.
With the whole UDA1-8, you should understand that all what has been
done, by the use of MEC, is a reduction of the mind body problem to
a body problem in computer science.
This seems straightforward.
So, you do agree UDA1-8 does reduce the mind-body problem to the
problem of deriving the quantum equation (well the real physics, to be
exact) from elementary arithmetic/computer science/machine theology?
I am not sure it is that straightforward, although certainly simpler
for quantum many-worlders. Even the few people who get it took a long
time to understand this.
Many academic people still reject the first person indeterminacy (like
some reject the notion of consciousness, or even of MW).
Straightforwardness is not straightforward in the inter or trans-
disciplinary fields. What is obvious for some is not for others and
vice versa!
If you understand this, you know that no fundamental theory (even on
just matter) can still rely on anything inferred from observation. The
TOE is already numbers + addition and multiplication (or anything
recursively equivalent and of similar complexity).
At first sight we might think that we are just very close to a
refutation of comp, because, as I think you have intuited, there
might be an avalanche of first person 'white rabbits' that is
aberrant, or just "white noisy" experiences.
To find a proper measure on the consistent continuations is very
difficult, and that is why I have restricted myself to the search
of the logic of the certainties, for Löbian machines. Löban
machines are chosen because they have enough introspection power
and cognitive abilities to describe what they can prove about their
certainties, and what they can infer interrogatively. That is not
entirely trivial and relies mainly on the work of Gödel, Löb and
Solovay (and Post, Turing, Kleene, etc.)
Perhaps you can explain the principle on which there is a
restriction of white rabbits.
The possibility of such a restriction is provided by the non
triviality of computer science, and of any notion of machine's point
of view, and thus of Gödel, Löb solovay provability logic and their
intensional variants. In practice computer science should augment the
domain of indeterminacy allowing enough relative computation for
stabilizing deep linear (self-multiplying computations). The quantum
does it by linearity (mainly thanks to Gleason theorem, as Everett
understood), but comp lacks his 'Gleason theorem". For this the
arithmetical quantum logics (related to the Bp & Dt hypostases) have
not been studied enough. To be sure other intensional variants could
be at play, and when asked, I explain that all the B^n p & D^m p, with
m > n, and with A^np meaning AAAA...Ap (iterated modal operator) are
playing some role. We do have graded "quantum logics" there.
Our experience, apparently of the phsyical world, is entirely devoid
of white rabbits.
Well, I will say yes. But quantum mechanics show them to exist. They
are just rare. QM says nothing on the first person singular white
rabbits
Thus, at each moment, the range of possible next observations is
always observed to be constrained precisely according to the quantum
formalism.
Not really, because pure QM uses comp (more or less explicitly, or you
are back to Böhm who is more or less explicitly against comp, or
Penrose, or Copenhagen, etc.). But that constraint by the quantum
formalism has to be justified by the laws of numbers and the idea that
we are turing emulable. That's the problem. With comp, and if QM is
correct, we have to justify that the quantum formalism is the *only*
solution of the white rabbit problem in the MEC frame. This gives us
also an hope to understand where the quantum reality come from.
Given that the only definition of the history of the observer is the
record of observations, I am greatly intrigued to know how one can,
at each moment, even in principle, derive the sensory specific next
moment, according to quantum rules, from this structure of
information.
Because by the first person indeterminacy you have to take into
account the infinity of computations going through your mental states,
and take into account the non trivial (by computer science,
provability logic) structure of the set of consistent continuations.
If you believe this is not possible, then you have to abandon comp, or
find an error in the "straightforward" reasoning.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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