On 04 Feb 2011, at 20:34, Andrew Soltau wrote:

On 04/02/11 19:22, David Nyman wrote:On 4 February 2011 18:44, AndrewSoltau<andrewsol...@googlemail.com> wrote:From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost inlanguageproblems. Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all*experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how doyouaccount for our endlessly repeated observations of an experientialrealitythat corresponds *precisely* not only with ordinary every dayobservationsof a physical quantum reality, but also all quantum experiments todate.Forgive me butting in, but occasionally I find it helps to reconsider the problem using less technical language (since I'm not very technical). I tend to think about this from a One-Many perspective.Essentially, in talking about "consciousness" or observation, thecompassumption implies that our perspective is always from the "point of view" of the One. The infinity of computation, in this analogy the Many, is somehow "seen" from the point of view of the One. So thenthe question is - how can any particular set of experiences emerge,orbe filtered, from the totality of the Many, from such a perspective? Simple ideas of "measure" may indeed seem to give the wrong answer, very quickly. It seems that we have to think combinatorially, in terms of higher orders of "filtration" - perhaps an infinity of them. The "Goldilocks enigma" of cosmology may be suggestive here - the 20-or-so free parameters, their sometimes exquisite degree of adjustment, and their possible inter-dependence, seems to imply a pitiless winnowing of the Many such that vanishingly few experiential realities with the observed characteristics can survive. Hence the remainder subside into non-experiential oblivion. I suppose that was as clear as mud. But it may give a flavour. DavidFrom my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost inlanguageproblems. Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all*experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how doyouaccount for our endlessly repeated observations of an experientialrealitythat corresponds *precisely* not only with ordinary every dayobservationsof a physical quantum reality, but also all quantum experiments todate.--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups"Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.Thank you David, 'butting in' very welcome!It seems quite inevitable that any ordinary concept of measure mustgive the wrong answer. And it seems to me that since what isproposed is at least radically counter-intuitive, it requires somepowerful rationale to support it. I am not clear what possible basisis provided for this rationale.Yes indeed, 'the 20-or-so free parameters, their sometimes exquisitedegree of adjustment, and their possible inter-dependence' doesindeed imply, surely to all of us, that there is 'a pitilesswinnowing of the Many such that vanishingly few experientialrealities with the observed characteristics can survive' but surelythis implies, or tends to imply, a physical basis, a relativisticand quantum mechanical basis, to reality - it is the physicalparameters, and their place in physics, which provides this brutalfiltering. Or is there a point here with respect to computationalmind that I am missing?

`If the primitively physical universe does the filtering, then it`

`cannot contain an omega point, given that it will reproduce, as you`

`said, a universal dovetailing, and so the indeterminacy on my`

`computational continuations will bear on that dovetailing, and again`

`physics has to be emerging on the arithmetical dovetailing. That's the`

`point seven. You did miss this in a previews post, and I hope you have`

`well understood this now (tell me please).`

`So, a primitively physical reality can do the 'brutal filtering' only`

`by being 'little'. But then you are facing the movie graph problem,`

`you will have to make consciousness dependent on the primitively`

`physical nature of the running machine and this means you can no more`

`say "yes" to the doctor for any *digital* substitution which conserves`

`the functionality of your brain: in other word comp is false. That's`

`the point 8. We cannot distinguish an arithmetical emulation from a`

`"real, or primitively physical" one. The arithmetical creatures are`

`not zombies.`

`So if comp is true, we are led to that "radically counter-intuitive`

`conclusion" that the laws of physics *have to* emerge from the laws of`

`computation, that is on addition and multiplication. We might believe`

`at this stage that we have just refuted comp, because we might think`

`that there will remain too much white rabbits.`

`But that's not true. The mechanist are lucky, because once you try to`

`get a theory of computational observers, the computer theoretic self-`

`reference constraints show that the different points of view definable`

`(or meta-definable for a simpler machine than oneself) leads to`

`counter-intuitive propositions too, which counterbalance the counter-`

`intuitive nature of reality of comp.`

`Provability (Bp), knowability (Bp & p) and observability (Bp & Dp),`

`and feelability (Bp & Dp & p) obeys radically different logics,`

`despite proving the same arithmetical propositions. Indeed the`

`computationalist logic of observation appears to be quantum-like, and`

`appears to reorganize the structure of the computations space into a a`

`totally non trivial 'physical' reality.`

`In passing we have already derived from comp that, whatever the`

`physical reality is, it has to be indeterminist (nature confirms), non`

`local as a whole (nature confirms), made, in appearance, of non`

`clonable pieces of reality (nature confirms), and obeying a quantum-`

`like logic with many-worlds semantics (nature arguably confirms). What`

`remains astonishing for the computationalist is the simplicity of the`

`hamiltonians, but this might be related with our depth (à-la Bennett).`

`Little programs, like the M set, seems to play a role at the start.`

`In passing we have also got a notion of Universal Turing Person,`

`already conscious, and we have come back to a view of reality closer`

`to the Platonists and the Pythagoreans than to the Aristotelian.`

`You have to understand that the universal dovetailing is extremely`

`redundant, and highly structured by the self-referential constraints`

`when seen from inside. Our state of mind are big numbers, resulting`

`from deep computations, probably linear and thus relatively multiplied`

`(by at least 2^aleph_0) so that a measure of probability or`

`credibility makes sense, after all. Comp is not yet refuted. Comp is`

`saved by Gödel's theorem and Everett quantum mechanics, up to now.`

`And it is possible (even probable) that some oracle are at play, so`

`that David's fine tuning argument could also play a role. The UD`

`dovetails on all (Turing) oracles, and some might take the shape of`

`irreducible non algorithmic constant. After all pure number theory has`

`also many fundamental real constant, and it would be astonishing that`

`they don't interfere with the physical.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.