From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Sunday, February 13, 2011 3:48 AM
Subject: Re: Multisolipsism
On 13 Feb 2011, at 09:23, Stephen Paul King wrote:
I am very interested in this question as it directly relates to my
questions about how interactions between multiple and separable 1- p. I
continue to be confused by this term "body problem in computer
science". Could you discuss it in some greater detail?
The body problem and the white rabbit problem are variant of the
general problem of explaining the belief in a physical universe from
numbers and computer science, without the assumption that there is a
primary physical reality (or that there is no primary physical
reality). The UD Argument is supposed to justify this in detail. (And
AUDA justifies the non boolean and quantum nature of the logic of what
is observable by asking a 'Löbian number' her opinion on the matter
(no pun intended).
OK, sure, but that about considerations of one 'Löbian number'
communicating with another? That is what my questions are about.
DM + ~solipsism can be shown to entail the coherent multiplication of
shared computations, that is first person plural shared dreams. To
show that DM entails ~solipsism by itself, you have to solve the body
problem first. The other minds problem should be easily soluble from
the solution to the body problem, and the key notion is interaction.
But interaction is still problematical even in quantum logic, and a
fortiori in the arithmetical logic. I think you need the "degenerate"
material hypostases: the 'B^n p & D^m p' nuances. With m > n, you get
arithmetical quantum logics, and you almost get the tensor needed for
the interactions. Unfortunately those tensors don't behave so well.
Those tensors arise from a Temperley-Lieb like structure related to
the arithmetical modal projection operators (B^n p & D^m p). This, if
it works, could explain how space arise from numbers, and why the
dynamic is governed by a unitary transformation. Space seems to be
defined only by the conditions of making multi-observers interaction
Just remember that we have to extract this from arithmetical self-
reference only, in a very special particular way, so that we don't
loose the qualia in the process. Indeed the qualia, including the
quanta, are provided by the intensional variant of the Solovay G/G*
Ok, but cannot you see that "fist person plural shared dreams" is
exactly (or close enough!) to what we see in the Many world interpretation
for each and every notion of an observer but does not solve the question of
"how is it that I experience this particular reality and not some other"?
Yes, there is a correlation between the observer as a memory within all of
the related parallel worlds such that we do not have empty memories/ Zombie
observers, but this does not get us far enough toward answering the
question. ~Solipsism alone is necessary but not sufficient. DM + ~solipsism
works but only because the definiteness of properties (that is the key
feature of physicality) is hidden in the Yes Doctor! DM assumes all of
features of Physicalism and but throws again the word physical. One needs to
stop looking at the words and consider the properties and features that the
word refers to! What does it mean to be physical as opposed, for example, to
mental or ideal?
To bet on the Yes Doctor is to bet that there is something definite in
the sense that the outcome either is or is not a continuance of
consciousness upon digital substitution. It is the feature of persistence of
properties over time. Physicality refers to a set of invariances under
transformations such that those transformations or dynamics exist separate
and independent of any 1-p cogitation. be it via Bp & D or whatever
modality. It is the root of the idea of Machine and is implicit in the
Turing Theorem and its variants. There must be something that is like a tape
and something that is like a read/write device for the Turing Machine to
exist as a model and the properties of being a tape and being a read/write
device must be such that they persist under the continuation from one
operation to the next. One cannot extract change from changelessness unless
one extends Existence into a continuum of possibility and allows the further
existence of methods that can contrast one subset of that continuum with
some other, but this can only happen within finite and improper subsets of
the continuum and this the ideals that we propose to be the case at the
continuum level do not faithfully translate into the finite filters. It is
in the finite filter levels that we obtain the persistence of properties
under time translations and thus time - the ordering of succession - emerges
at that level. Time does not and cannot exist at the level of the Continuum
of Existence itself. It is, as Russell Standish pointed out, a
zero-information set. The duality that I propose for finite filters vanishes
and we obtain a neutral monism that is neither mind (ideal) nor matter
Quantum Mechanics has this definiteness only with the inclusion of the
vehicle of the Born Rule and is the source of the measurement problem: How
do we cross the chasm between linear superpositions of possible properties
to the definiteness of properties such that we can have a definite set of
alternative to bet upon. We cannot bet upon superposed properties because
there is no "or" between them, the properties form a continuum that can only
be cut from the outside.
The answer is interaction via Pratt's proposed state transition of Chu
spaces and it is what I am investigating. My proposal is that we drop the
insistence on tensor products since they require the equivalent of a global
synchronization and consider alternatives. The alternative that I propose is
the way that time is treated as a local variable in Hitoshi Kitada's
Interpretation of QM. This makes the variable of time in QM consistent with
Relativity, but this idea requires that we treat quantum mechanical systems
as asynchronous and non-pre-harmonized Leibnizian monads and thus require an
alternative definition of interaction which I have developed as bisimulation
via quantum pseudo-telepathy.
BTW, the empty spots between objects in a space could be defined as "the
places an event could occur but does not" such that the entire space is an
undivided whole. So on one hand a space can be seen as a distribution of
dust as the dual of a Boolean algebra, and a complete whole object that is a
single speck of dust within a larger space, this is a non-Archimedean
extension. This is just a matter of figuring out the mereology that we are
using in our ontology. I am proposing that we use non-well founded sets and
ultrametrics as a basis for ontology and thus have self-reference build into
our logics and their duals, but we could instead take your modal extensions
and dualize them via the proper extension of the Stone Representation
Theorem. The hard part is to not impose global flatness on our structures,
we should never treat our hypostases as all existing on the same ontological
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