On 09 Feb 2011, at 20:51, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 2/9/2011 8:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Feb 2011, at 21:28, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 2/8/2011 9:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Answer precisely my question in my last post. I recall it:

Could you explain to me how you predict what you will see (qualia) when you abandon an apple free in the air, in a big universe with a running UD in it? How do you predict your experience? If you agree with step 1-6, you don't have much choice, and you will understand the reversal.

?? Obviously I would predict seeing the apple fall. This is a consequence of my inference from past experience and even my evolutoinary ancestry. Even babies expect unsupported objects to fall. Do you claim you can predict that apples should be seen to fall from comp+arithimetic alone?

Not really.
My claim is far more modest, albeit radical.
I claim that IF comp is true THEN we HAVE TO derive from comp +arithmetic alone any physics allowing the apple to get its usual falling behavior.

More precisely, if you have no objection with UDA steps 1-6, then to predict the behavior of the apple in UDA-Step 7, you have to consider all the computations made by the UD, and going through you current first person mental state, (of seeing your hand with the apple),

How is my first person mental state instantiated in the computations made by the UD? It can't be a single step of one or more computations. It must be some kind of equivalence class.

That is a very difficult and tremendously interesting question. The arithmetical notion of knowledge and observation can only scratch the surface here. But an answer to that question is not needed to understand that we have to derive physics from comp, if comp is true. It is needed to extract the physics, and to solve the mind-body problem, that's for sure. But let me insist: you don't need to solve this to understand the comp *necessity* of reducing the mind body problem to to the body problem in computer science.



and take into account the first person indeterminacy on all those computations.

If this contradicts the "usual prediction" then comp is false. Comp might seem to contradict the usual prediction, due to the many aberrant dreams, the white noise, the white rabbits ..., but the space of computations is highly structured, even more so when we take into account the many possible "person views", so that we just cannot conclude that the usual predictions refute comp.




You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to