On 09 Feb 2011, at 20:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 2/9/2011 8:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Feb 2011, at 21:28, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 2/8/2011 9:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Answer precisely my question in my last post. I recall it:
Could you explain to me how you predict what you will see
(qualia) when you abandon an apple free in the air, in a big
universe with a running UD in it? How do you predict your
experience?
If you agree with step 1-6, you don't have much choice, and you
will understand the reversal.
?? Obviously I would predict seeing the apple fall. This is a
consequence of my inference from past experience and even my
evolutoinary ancestry. Even babies expect unsupported objects to
fall. Do you claim you can predict that apples should be seen to
fall from comp+arithimetic alone?
Not really.
My claim is far more modest, albeit radical.
I claim that IF comp is true THEN we HAVE TO derive from comp
+arithmetic alone any physics allowing the apple to get its usual
falling behavior.
More precisely, if you have no objection with UDA steps 1-6, then
to predict the behavior of the apple in UDA-Step 7, you have to
consider all the computations made by the UD, and going through you
current first person mental state, (of seeing your hand with the
apple),
How is my first person mental state instantiated in the computations
made by the UD? It can't be a single step of one or more
computations. It must be some kind of equivalence class.
That is a very difficult and tremendously interesting question. The
arithmetical notion of knowledge and observation can only scratch the
surface here. But an answer to that question is not needed to
understand that we have to derive physics from comp, if comp is true.
It is needed to extract the physics, and to solve the mind-body
problem, that's for sure. But let me insist: you don't need to solve
this to understand the comp *necessity* of reducing the mind body
problem to to the body problem in computer science.
Bruno
Brent
and take into account the first person indeterminacy on all those
computations.
If this contradicts the "usual prediction" then comp is false. Comp
might seem to contradict the usual prediction, due to the many
aberrant dreams, the white noise, the white rabbits ..., but the
space of computations is highly structured, even more so when we
take into account the many possible "person views", so that we just
cannot conclude that the usual predictions refute comp.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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