Hi Stephen,
On 10 Feb 2011, at 16:33, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Hi Bruno and Brent,
-----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2011 9:35 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Multisolipsism
On 09 Feb 2011, at 20:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 2/9/2011 8:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
snip>
How is my first person mental state instantiated in the
computations made by the UD? It can't be a single step of one or
more computations. It must be some kind of equivalence class.
That is a very difficult and tremendously interesting question. The
arithmetical notion of knowledge and observation can only scratch the
surface here. But an answer to that question is not needed to
understand that we have to derive physics from comp, if comp is true.
It is needed to extract the physics, and to solve the mind-body
problem, that's for sure. But let me insist: you don't need to solve
this to understand the comp *necessity* of reducing the mind body
problem to to the body problem in computer science.
Bruno
***
I am very interested in this question as it directly relates to my
questions about how interactions between multiple and separable 1-p.
I continue to be confused by this term "body problem in computer
science". Could you discuss it in some greater detail?
The body problem and the white rabbit problem are variant of the
general problem of explaining the belief in a physical universe from
numbers and computer science, without the assumption that there is a
primary physical reality (or that there is no primary physical
reality). The UD Argument is supposed to justify this in detail. (And
AUDA justifies the non boolean and quantum nature of the logic of what
is observable by asking a 'Löbian number' her opinion on the matter
(no pun intended).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
