On 08 Feb 2011, at 08:52, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 07/02/11 21:28, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If, and only if, you *assume* existence without needing a physical
universe! But this is what you are trying to demonstrate.
On 07 Feb 2011, at 19:22, Andrew Soltau wrote:
The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points:
1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy
in a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result
that I published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference
on this in the seventies). Many academics have criticize this,
but their argument have been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it
at the ASSC4.
2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first person
indeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step
3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has
been more developed in my thesis, long and short version are in
my web page). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of
place), but is developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the
1998 short version, recently published).
4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from
virtual implementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye,
and it is a comp version of the old dream argument in the greek
chinese and indian antic literature). Step six. In particular
indeterminacy and non locality does not depend on the real or
virtual nature of the computation.
All good so far.
Step seven itself shows the reversal between physics and
arithmetic (or any first order theory of any universal system in
post Church Turing sense) in case the physical universe exists
primitively and is sufficiently big.
Because if you universe is as big as running a UD, and containing
UD*, if by luck you were here and now in a physical universe, at
the next instant you are in the UD* with any reasonable measure of
first person uncertainty. Even multiplied by 2^aleph_0.
Not at all. The role of the big universe consists in getting the
reversal before showing we don't need the physical running.
The big universe elimination is step 8. Only after step 8 we can
understand the big universe is not needed, nor any universe, to
explain why machine believes in a physical universe, indeed most
probably in a quantum universe.
In what sense does step seven demonstrate the reversal between
physics and arithmetic a priori, as opposed to a working assumption?
Answer precisely my question in my last post. I recall it:
Could you explain to me how you predict what you will see (qualia)
when you abandon an apple free in the air, in a big universe with a
running UD in it? How do you predict your experience?
If you agree with step 1-6, you don't have much choice, and you will
understand the reversal.
NO. I agree that "A theory which want to explain and unify quanta
and qualia, and respect comp, has to derive quanta and qualia
without postulating them.", which is, of course, the tricky bit!
So UDA1-7 is the one of the main result of the thesis. A theory
which want to explain and unify quanta and qualia, and respect
comp, has to derive quanta and qualia without postulating them.
So you agree we cannot postulate the quanta? We cannot postulate
the physical ? That's the point.
But that is wrong. Without comp, I could keep materialism and keep
quantum mechanics as explaining the quanta. But with comp, and the
understanding of the qualia problem, we can understand that we have no
other choice than to explain both the quanta and the qualia from
arithmetic. It might not work, and comp can be false (and thus CTM
Take it easy.
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