On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote: > > >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >>>> On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote: > > >>>>> On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >>>>>> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote: > > >>>>>>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >>>>>>>> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or > >>>>>>>> false? If > >>>>>>>> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, > >>>>>>>> which is > >>>>>>>> enough for the comp consequences., > > >>>>>>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore > >>>>>>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't. > > >>>>>> That's my point. > > >>>>> Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that > >>>>> I am an immaterial dreaming machine. > > >>>> It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with > >>>> the > >>>> philosophy you want. > > >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number" > > >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me > >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not > >> real, > > > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that? > > I meant "in general".
I don't need anything more than 1) I am real 2) Unreal things don't generate real things I think both of those are hard to dispute. > >> which is a bit absurd at the start. > >> Could you define what you mean by "real"? > > > i can point to my own reality. > > To your own consciousness. I grant that. But nothing else. Wake up! > >>> That doesn't tell me anything about what I am. > > >> Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a > >> memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body > >> such > >> that .... " (see the paper). > > > I am not a description. I for descriptions. > > I am not a description too. Neither from the first nor the third > person view. > The difficulty of logic consists in the understanding of the > difference between a fact which might be true, like 1+1=2, and a > description of that fact, like "1+1=2". Modern tools makes it possible > to handle that difference in purely formal ways. > The difficulty in MGA consists in understanding the difference between > a computation (be it immaterial or material) and a description of a > computation (be it immaterial or material). existence > > >> I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a > >> conclusion > >> related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the > >> "arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A > >> arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true > >> independently of me, you, etc. > > > You cannot come to conclusions about my existence > > with a merely formal statement of bivalence > > I use bivalence but also "yes doctor". But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing to a physical substitution > Then after concluding, we can > take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is > explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other > things) from that. > >>>> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the > >>>> fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft. > > >>> I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical > >>> medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number > > >> It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being > >> reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand > >> that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is > >> just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains > >> all the emulation of all programs, > > > As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual > > running programmes. > > Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers' configurations. If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make and indexical judgement of actuality. > >>>>>> You contradict your self, > > >>>>> No I don't. How many times have I explained that > >>>>> mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive > >>>>> sense that doesn't imply real existence > > >>>> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes > >>>> doctor + > >>>> occam gives the ontological conclusion. > > >>> No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion. > > >> That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as you > >> want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the > >> testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge). > > > If it is testable, it is false. > > Why? Not enough WR's. > >>>>> What does "comp nothing exists" mean? > > >>>> Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists." > > >>> Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known > >>> computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical. > > >> You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which use > >> the notion of primary matter. > > > They all do. Physicists think matter/energy exists. > > Some does not. John A. Wheeler is open to the idea that physics emerge > from something non physical (cf It from Bit). And everyone else doesn't. > Anyway, to refer to a what people think is not an argument. Then why is it refer to books? > >> You will not find any book on computers which mention the notion of > >> matter. > > > They don't mention pixie dust either. One cannot > > conclude from that that anyone has a background > > assumption that computers are made of pixie dust. > > The point is that the notion of computer used in the proof is the > traditional mathematical notion. There is no mathematical notion such that you can run a programme on it. > >> That is why I make those things precise through the MGA. But it helps > >> people to understand that we are immaterial before learning the MGA > >> stuff. I am immaterial with comp in the sense that I can in principle > >> chose a different body at all times, so I am not my body. > > > That is misleading for the usual reasons. > > Klein on Maudlin? No: "not dependent on a particular body" does not mean "capable of existing with no body" -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
