On 2/15/2011 12:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


2011/2/15 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com <mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>

    On 2/15/2011 11:28 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


    2011/2/15 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com <mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com>>



        On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be
        <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
        > On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        > > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be
        <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
        > >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
        >
        > >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be
        <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
        > >>>> On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
        >
        > >>>>> On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be
        <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
        > >>>>>> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
        >
        > >>>>>>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal
        <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
        > >>>>>>>> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either
        true or
        > >>>>>>>> false? If
        > >>>>>>>> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical
        realism,
        > >>>>>>>> which is
        > >>>>>>>> enough for the comp consequences.,
        >
        > >>>>>>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule
        and therefore
        > >>>>>>> not as a claim that some set of objects either
        exist or don't.
        >
        > >>>>>> That's my point.
        >
        > >>>>> Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
        > >>>>> I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
        >
        > >>>> It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you
        want, with
        > >>>> the
        > >>>> philosophy you want.
        >
        > >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a
        number"
        >
        > >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
        > >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and
        what is not
        > >> real,
        >
        > > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you
        know that?
        >
        > I meant "in general".


        I don't need anything more than
        1) I am real
        2) Unreal things don't generate real things

        I think both of those are hard to dispute.


    You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument
    that prove that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The
    principle is sound, the choice is not without arguments. You say
    numbers don't exist... but as I said before, I can think about
    them in my mind...

    Actually I don't think you can.  You can think of the symbol "7"
    and the word "seven" and you can probably think of seven things,
    xxxxxxx,  but I doubt you can think of the number seven.  I'm
    pretty sure you can't think of the set of all sets with seven
    members.  And I'm quite sure you can't think of all the integers
    or all arithmetic.


    I exist, hence they transitively exist through my mind at the
    least. I do not chose if a number is prime or not hence I'm not
    inventing them as I'm not inventing the world around me.

    Can you think of Sherlock Holmes?  a pink unicorn?   Can you think
    of a number that is one bigger than the biggest number you can
    think of (which per Peano must exist)?

    Brent


The difference is I can choose what are/who are/the behavior of... Sherlock holmes/pink unicorn/whatever... not the numbers once an axiomatic system is chosen.

No, it's only a difference of degree. You can't choose Sherlock Holmes to be an American or a bus driver. He "exists" in a looser axiomatic system than integers, but he is still defined by being consistent with the character in the stories by Conan Doyle. Similarly, you can't imagine a pink unicorn that is blue and has two horns.

Brent

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