On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
> On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:
> > On Feb 15, 9:22 pm, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com>  wrote:
> >     Whatever question you can
> >> ask about a number has a factual answer, although you may not know it or
> >> how to find it...numbers are wholly defined by a set of axioms, it seems 
> >> that
> >> they are more real than fictional characters.
> > But being able to answer question is essentially epistemic. It doesn't
> > imply any ontology in itself. The epistemic fact that we can , in
> > principle, answer
> > questions about real people may be explained by the existence and
> > perceptual accessibility
> > of real people:
> So the epistemic facts have an ontological implication.  If I describe a
> man who lives at 10 Baker Street, smokes dope, and works as a detective
> you won't know whether he's real or not.  But if I tell you there is no
> fact of the matter about whether he has a mole on his arm, then you'll
> know he's a fiction.

If I can figure out information I haven't been given
from information I have been given, I don't need to suppose
that I didn't figure it out and instead perceived it  by by some
sixth sense.

> > but our ability to answer questions about mathematical
> > objects
> > is explained by the existence of clear definitions and rules doesn't
> > need to posit
> > of existing immaterial numbers (plus some mode of quasi-perceptual
> > access
> > to them).
> I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with synasthesia
> apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual properties.

Some people "perceive" pink elephants too. However, other people don't
"perceive" them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
really being perceived at all.

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