On Feb 15, 8:39 pm, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > On 2/15/2011 12:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > > > 2011/2/15 Brent Meeker <[email protected] > > <mailto:[email protected]>> > > > On 2/15/2011 11:28 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > >> 2011/2/15 1Z <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > > >> On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >> > On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote: > > >> > > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >> > >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote: > > >> > >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >> > >>>> On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote: > > >> > >>>>> On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >> > >>>>>> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote: > > >> > >>>>>>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal > >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >> > >>>>>>>> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either > >> true or > >> > >>>>>>>> false? If > >> > >>>>>>>> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical > >> realism, > >> > >>>>>>>> which is > >> > >>>>>>>> enough for the comp consequences., > > >> > >>>>>>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule > >> and therefore > >> > >>>>>>> not as a claim that some set of objects either > >> exist or don't. > > >> > >>>>>> That's my point. > > >> > >>>>> Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that > >> > >>>>> I am an immaterial dreaming machine. > > >> > >>>> It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you > >> want, with > >> > >>>> the > >> > >>>> philosophy you want. > > >> > >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a > >> number" > > >> > >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me > >> > >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and > >> what is not > >> > >> real, > > >> > > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you > >> know that? > > >> > I meant "in general". > > >> I don't need anything more than > >> 1) I am real > >> 2) Unreal things don't generate real things > > >> I think both of those are hard to dispute. > > >> You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument > >> that prove that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The > >> principle is sound, the choice is not without arguments. You say > >> numbers don't exist... but as I said before, I can think about > >> them in my mind... > > > Actually I don't think you can. You can think of the symbol "7" > > and the word "seven" and you can probably think of seven things, > > xxxxxxx, but I doubt you can think of the number seven. I'm > > pretty sure you can't think of the set of all sets with seven > > members. And I'm quite sure you can't think of all the integers > > or all arithmetic. > > >> I exist, hence they transitively exist through my mind at the > >> least. I do not chose if a number is prime or not hence I'm not > >> inventing them as I'm not inventing the world around me. > > > Can you think of Sherlock Holmes? a pink unicorn? Can you think > > of a number that is one bigger than the biggest number you can > > think of (which per Peano must exist)? > > > Brent > > > The difference is I can choose what are/who are/the behavior of... > > Sherlock holmes/pink unicorn/whatever... not the numbers once an > > axiomatic system is chosen. > > No, it's only a difference of degree. You can't choose Sherlock Holmes > to be an American or a bus driver. He "exists" in a looser axiomatic > system than integers, but he is still defined by being consistent with > the character in the stories by Conan Doyle. Similarly, you can't > imagine a pink unicorn that is blue and has two horns. > > Brent
The ontology of fiction can be true of mathematics even if the methodology isn't. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
