On 06/03/11 17:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:17, Andrew Soltau wrote:


On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Chalmers defines a 'Computational Hypothesis'

You might attribute this to Putnam or Fodor, or many others, including Galouye. That's CTM. I argue that the computationalist hypothesis is already in the "King Milinda" text, which is a greec-hinduist text from before JC. You can see CTM as an ancestor of the more precise modern comp (TC + yes doctor). The "yes doctor" is a belief in a level of description, where CTM believes implicitlt that we know the level (neuron level, for example). But as Colin explains we might take into account the EM fields. I argue that we have to take into account the glial cells (100 time more numerous than the neurons). No problem with comp, the level might be as low as the 101000 rational cut of the heisenberg matrix of the milky way at the dimension of the superstrings.



The Computational Hypothesis says that "physics as we know it is not the fundamental
level of reality."

Give me the reference.
http://consc.net/papers/matrix.html

(first google hit for Chalmers Computational Hypothesis)

Thanks.
OK, I know that article. I will not explain why I find it rather unfair in the references, it would involve other people, and no one is really interested in priority issue. The paper is interesting, and makes good points. Yet it still misses the point that I am trying to explain to you (and other people on this list). We will come back on this.

I will insist on this, though: you cannot quote a reference without explaining the context:

The statement just before the statement you quoted, i.e.: "the Computational Hypothesis says that 'physics as we know it is not the fundamental level of reality'." looks like the consequence of comp. That's was astonishing for me and that's why I asked you the reference. But in fact, in Chalmers paper, it is preceded by "The Computational Hypothesis says: Microphysical processes throughout space-time are constituted by underlying computational processes." So, what Chalmers call "The computational hypothesis" is what is often called "digital physics". It is not the same thing.
Aha. Thanks. Much clearer.
A priori the computational hypothesis is incompatible with "digital physics". Chalmers is a bit ambiguous though, due to the 'computational process' wording". In my work it is a result that IF I am a machine, then physics is a (a priori non computable) sum on infinities of computation, so there are no "underlying computational processes", except in some extended sense of "underlying".
Do you simply mean that there is no single computational process giving rise to this 'I' that is a machine?

There is a widespread confusion between digital physics, and the comp hyp. in cognitive science. Digital physics see the world as a computation,
Meaning, if I understand you rightly, that the quanta are simply emulations on some digital machine, giving rise to the reality we encounter.
comp assumes only that "I" is Turing emulable, in the 3-person sense.
I understand this to mean that "I" cannot be told from a simulation on a Turing machine. And, from your concept of replacing increasing amounts of the bodymind of the observer with machine, I understand this to mean that it is "I" at the experiential level, in other words, "I" in terms of the sensations (in the broadest sense, as defined by Page in CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE QUANTUM) experienced, that cannot be told from a simulation on a Turing machine.
Digital physics implies comp, but comp does not imply digital physics,
Understood
and imply the negation of digital physics
Why so? why should not the emulation of "I" be taking place in an apparently physical universe which is actually an emulation on a digital machine. That would be peculiarly double layered emulation, but I can see no reason why it is ruled out.
(comp might be coherent with some notion of "super-digital" physics).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>



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