Andrew and Bruno: (Re: Andrew's discussion below): according to what I pretend to understand of Bruno's position, the "math' universe (numbers and what they 'build' as the 'world') is more fundamental than the application we call physics. I wrote "more" because the real fundamental is based on the rel everything, still hidden from our knowledge and only parts transpire continually (since many millennia ago). We arrived at a stage, different from the one 1000 or 3000 years ago and devised a logic (or more) which is different from those applied earlier. Yet it is not the ultimate - or should I say not "all of them". There may be different logical ways in our future development (you may call it evolution, I don't) just as different arithmetics as well of which we state today "impossible". So was the spherical Earth or molecular genetics.
A problem (in my mind) about "compute": does 'computing' include an evaluation of the result automatically, *by the device itself*, or does it need a *"thinking" mind* to valuate the computation? Does 'comp' *act* upon the result of its own computation? ( H O W ? ) Also the word *"automatically"* raises the question whether it requires some homunculus(?) - (call it a factor or any presently unknown dynamics?) instigating it for us rather than - or even BUILT IN as - a not-yet discovered intrinsic part of the functionality to be discovered? With my agnosticism (ignorance about the not-yet disclosed parts of the wholeness) it is hard to agree with any proof, truth, or evidence. The most I can do is a "potentially possible". John Mikes On Sun, Mar 6, 2011 at 8:16 AM, Andrew Soltau <[email protected]>wrote: > On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> Comp makes precise that saying to be a machine is equivalent with saying >> that there is a level of functional substitution where my (first person) >> consciousness is invariant for a substitution made at that level. Comp can >> show that we can never known our level of substitution, and my reasoning >> works whatever I mean by my brain (it could be the entire galaxy or the >> entire observable universe if someone asks for it). CTM is vague on the >> level, and miss the point that we cannot know it, if it exists. >> Comp is also much more general than CTM, which relies usually on some >> amount of neurophilosophy, or on representationalist theory of the mind, and >> CTM is often criticized by 'externalist', like brent Meeker for example. But >> comp is not annoyed by externalism, given that it defines the (generalized) >> brain by the portion of universe you need, like possibly the matrix above. >> So comp is a very weak, and thus general, hypothesis. And the result is >> easy to describe: physics is not the fundamental branch. >> > You say "And the result is easy to describe: physics is not the fundamental > branch.". This is the leap of yours I never understand. Do you posit that a > mathematical universe with no physical content somehow automatically > computes? > > Andrew > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
