Andrew and Bruno:
(Re: Andrew's discussion below): according to what I pretend to understand
of Bruno's position, the "math' universe (numbers and what they 'build' as
the 'world') is more fundamental than the application we call physics.
I wrote "more" because the real fundamental is based on the rel everything,
still hidden from our knowledge and only parts transpire continually (since
many millennia ago).
We arrived at a stage, different from the one 1000 or 3000 years ago and
devised a logic (or more) which is different from those applied earlier. Yet
it is not the ultimate - or should I say not "all of them". There may be
different logical ways in our future development (you may call it evolution,
I don't) just as different arithmetics as well of which we state today
So was the spherical Earth or molecular genetics.
A problem (in my mind) about "compute": does 'computing' include an
evaluation of the result automatically, *by the device itself*, or does it
need a *"thinking" mind* to valuate the computation? Does 'comp' *act* upon
the result of its own computation? ( H O W ? )
Also the word *"automatically"* raises the question whether it requires
some homunculus(?) - (call it a factor or any presently unknown dynamics?)
instigating it for us rather than - or even BUILT IN as - a not-yet
discovered intrinsic part of the functionality to be discovered?
With my agnosticism (ignorance about the not-yet disclosed parts of the
wholeness) it is hard to agree with any proof, truth, or evidence. The most
I can do is a "potentially possible".
On Sun, Mar 6, 2011 at 8:16 AM, Andrew Soltau <andrewsol...@gmail.com>wrote:
> On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Comp makes precise that saying to be a machine is equivalent with saying
>> that there is a level of functional substitution where my (first person)
>> consciousness is invariant for a substitution made at that level. Comp can
>> show that we can never known our level of substitution, and my reasoning
>> works whatever I mean by my brain (it could be the entire galaxy or the
>> entire observable universe if someone asks for it). CTM is vague on the
>> level, and miss the point that we cannot know it, if it exists.
>> Comp is also much more general than CTM, which relies usually on some
>> amount of neurophilosophy, or on representationalist theory of the mind, and
>> CTM is often criticized by 'externalist', like brent Meeker for example. But
>> comp is not annoyed by externalism, given that it defines the (generalized)
>> brain by the portion of universe you need, like possibly the matrix above.
>> So comp is a very weak, and thus general, hypothesis. And the result is
>> easy to describe: physics is not the fundamental branch.
> You say "And the result is easy to describe: physics is not the fundamental
> branch.". This is the leap of yours I never understand. Do you posit that a
> mathematical universe with no physical content somehow automatically
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