Hi John

On 06/03/11 21:10, John Mikes wrote:
A problem (in my mind) about "compute": does 'computing' include an evaluation of the result automatically, *_by the device itself_*, or does it need a /*_"thinking" mind_*/ to valuate the computation? Does 'comp' */_act_/* upon the result of its own computation? ( H O W ? ) Also the word _"automatically"_ raises the question whether it requires some homunculus(?) - (call it a factor or any presently unknown dynamics?) instigating it for us rather than - or even BUILT IN as - a not-yet discovered intrinsic part of the functionality to be discovered? With my agnosticism (ignorance about the not-yet disclosed parts of the wholeness) it is hard to agree with any proof, truth, or evidence. The most I can do is a "potentially possible".
John Mikes
This is exactly the point I am pursuing with Bruno in recent posts. If there is to be change, time evolution, how does this come about?


Intuitively, I find myself drawn towards the simple existence of all possible numbers in a Platonic realm. Equally, by extrapolation, all possible information structures, and even all computations - meaning computational operations on numbers or structures of information, would exist. But nothing happens.

This parallels the same, or similar, paradox in the physical world. If we accept that the block universe of relativity is static, then we have Weyl's statement as a perfect expression of the situation.

The world simply is, it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my consciousness, crawling up the life-line of my body, does the world fleetingly come to life. (1949, p. 116)

I reckon that consciousness is a rather neat explanation. Neat, but of course hardly simple, since it begs an explanation of consciousness. That is the subject of Transtemporal Phenomenal Consciousness and Logical Types in Quantum Mechanics if anyone is interested.

Sorry about the plug, but this really is directly apropos.

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5073/
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5554/

Best

Andrew

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