Bruno, I don't think I ever got your reply to my message below... I am interested in your thoughts on this.
Thanks, Terren terren wrote: > > Bruno, > >> I think that comp might imply that simple virgin (non programmed) >> universal >> (and immaterial) machine are already conscious. Perhaps even maximally >> conscious. > > This sounds like a comp variant of panpsychism (platopsychism?)... in > which consciousness is axiomatically proposed as a property of > arithmetic. Are you saying that comp would require such an axiom? If > so, why? > > On Wed, Jun 15, 2011 at 9:56 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> Then adding induction gives them Löbianity, and this makes them >> self-conscious (which might already be a delusion of some sort). > > I'm not sure how an unprogrammed, immaterial universal machine could > be self-conscious, since self-consciousness requires the rudimentary > distinction of self versus other. What is the 'other' against which > this virgin universal machine would be distinguishing itself against? > >> Unfortunately the hard task is to interface such (self)-consciousness >> with >> our probable realities (computational histories). This is what we can >> hardly >> be sure about. > > Perhaps I'm just confused about your ideas - wouldn't be the first > time! - but this seems to suffer from the same problem as panpsychism > - that although asserting consciousness as a property of the universe > sidesteps cartesian dualism, we are still left without an explanation > of why human consciousness differs from ant consciousness differs from > rock consciousness. In your case, we are left wondering how the > consciousness of the virgin universal machine "interfaces" with > specific universal numbers, and what would explain the differences in > consciousness among them. > > That's why I favor the idea that consciousness arises from certain > kinds of cybernetic (autopoeitic) organization (which is consistent > with comp). In fact I think it is still consistent with much of what > you're saying... but it is your assertion that comp denies strong AI > that implies you would find fault with that idea. > >> I still don't know if the brain is just a filter of consciousness, in >> which >> case losing neurons might enhance consciousness (and some data in >> neurophysiology might confirm this). I think Goertzel is more creating a >> competent machine than an intelligent one, from what I have read about >> it. I >> oppose intelligence/consciousness and competence/ingenuity. The first is >> needed to develop the later, but the later has a negative feedback on the >> first. > > I think I understand your point here with regard to consciousness - > given that you're saying it's a property of the platonic 'virgin' > universal machine. But if you assert that about intelligence, aren't > you saying that intelligence isn't computable (i.e. comp denies strong > ai)? This would seem to contradict Marcus Hutter's AIXI. You're > saying that our intelligence as humans is dependent (in the same way > as consciousness) on the fact that we don't know which machine we are? > That creativity is sourced in subjective indeterminacy? > > Terren > >> Bruno >> >> On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 4:53 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Hi Colin, >> >> On 07 Jun 2011, at 09:42, Colin Hales wrote: >> >> Hi, >> >> Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', >> >> International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. >> >> 1-35. >> >> http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 >> >> >> The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! >> >> >> Congratulation Colin. >> >> Like others, I don't succeed in getting it, neither at home nor at the >> >> university. >> >> From the abstract I am afraid you might not have taken into account our >> >> (many) conversations. Most of what you say about the impossibility of >> >> building an artificial scientist is provably correct in the (weak) comp >> >> theory. It is unfortunate that you derive this from comp+materialism, >> >> which >> >> is inconsistent. Actually, comp prevents "artificial intelligence". This >> >> does not prevent the existence, and even the apparition, of intelligent >> >> machines. But this might happen *despite* humans, instead of 'thanks to >> >> the >> >> humans'. This is related with the fact that we cannot know which machine >> >> we >> >> are ourselves. Yet, we can make copy at some level (in which case we >> >> don't >> >> know what we are really creating or recreating, and then, also, >> >> descendent >> >> of bugs in regular programs can evolve. Or we can get them >> >> serendipitously. >> >> It is also relate to the fact that we don't *want* intelligent machine, >> >> which is really a computer who will choose its user, if ... he want one. >> >> We >> >> prefer them to be slaves. It will take time before we recognize them >> >> (apparently). >> >> Of course the 'naturalist comp' theory is inconsistent. Not sure you take >> >> that into account too. >> >> Artificial intelligence will always be more mike fishing or exploring >> >> spaces, and we might *discover* strange creatures. Arithmetical truth is >> >> a >> >> universal zoo. Well, no, it is really a jungle. We don't know what is in >> >> there. We can only scratch a tiny bit of it. >> >> Now, let us distinguish two things, which are very different: >> >> 1) intelligence-consciousness-free-will-emotion >> >> and >> >> 2) cleverness-competence-ingenuity-gifted-learning-ability >> >> "1)" is necessary for the developpment of "2)", but "2)" has a negative >> >> feedback on "1)". >> >> I have already given on this list what I call the smallest theory of >> >> intelligence. >> >> By definition a machine is intelligent if it is not stupid. And a machine >> >> can be stupid for two reason: >> >> she believes that she is intelligent, or >> >> she believes that she is stupid. >> >> Of course, this is arithmetized immediately in a weakening of G, the >> >> theory >> >> C having as axioms the modal normal axioms and rules + Dp -> ~BDp. So Dt >> >> (arithmetical consistency) can play the role of intelligence, and Bf >> >> (inconsistance) plays the role of stupidity. G* and G proves BDt -> Bf >> >> and >> >> G* proves BBf -> Bf (but not G!). >> >> This illustrates that "1)" above might come from Löbianity, and "2)" >> >> above >> >> (the scientist) is governed by theoretical artificial intelligence (Case >> >> and >> >> Smith, Oherson, Stob, Weinstein). Here the results are not just >> >> NON-constructive, but are *necessarily* so. Cleverness is just something >> >> that we cannot program. But we can prove, non constructively, the >> >> existence >> >> of powerful learning machine. We just cannot recognize them, or build >> >> them. >> >> It is like with the algorithmically random strings, we cannot generate >> >> them >> >> by a short algorithm, but we can generate all of them by a very short >> >> algorithm. >> >> So, concerning intelligence/consciousness (as opposed to cleverness), I >> >> think we have passed the "singularity". Nothing is more >> >> intelligent/conscious than a virgin universal machine. By programming it, >> >> we >> >> can only make his "soul" fell, and, in the worst case, we might get >> >> something as stupid as human, capable of feeling itself superior, for >> >> example. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> >> "Everything List" group. >> >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> >> [email protected]. >> >> For more options, visit this group at >> >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> >> -- >> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> >> "Everything List" group. >> >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> >> [email protected]. >> >> For more options, visit this group at >> >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> >> "Everything List" group. >> >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> >> [email protected]. >> >> For more options, visit this group at >> >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Mathematical-closure-of-consciousness-and-computation-tp31771136p31886482.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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