On 20 Jun 2011, at 17:04, terren wrote:


Bruno, I don't think I ever got your reply to my message below... I am
interested in your thoughts on this.

Thanks,
Terren


Thanks for reminding me. Apologies for forgetting your post.






terren wrote:

Bruno,

I think that comp might imply that simple virgin (non programmed)
universal
(and immaterial) machine are already conscious. Perhaps even maximally
conscious.

This sounds like a comp variant of panpsychism (platopsychism?)... in
which consciousness is axiomatically proposed as a property of
arithmetic. Are you saying that comp would require such an axiom? If
so, why?


The term "arithmetic" is ambiguous. It means sometimes the set of arithmetical truth, sometimes the set of theorems of some theory, sometimes some theory (that is the axioms+inference rules).

I can understand the attribution of consciousness to the theory (axioms +inference rules) because this describes an abstract machine which is usually universal (= Turing universal = sigma_1 complete, etc.).

Comp requires only that you can imagine surviving with an artificial digital brain. Then a reasoning shows that your consciousness is "more attached" to all the possible 'implementations' of that digital brain in the arithmetical truth (or just the sigma_1 tiny part, from inside this changes nothing). Then, if you allow thought experiences with amnesia, you can understand that a non trivial form of consciousness can be attached to the universal machine or relatively universal number.








On Wed, Jun 15, 2011 at 9:56 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Then adding induction gives them Löbianity, and this makes them
self-conscious (which might already be a delusion of some sort).

I'm not sure how an unprogrammed, immaterial universal machine could
be self-conscious, since self-consciousness requires the rudimentary
distinction of self versus other. What is the 'other' against which
this virgin universal machine would be distinguishing itself against?

That is why the machine should not be just a virgin universal machine, but a Löbian machine. Both are virtually in all possible environments/computational histories. Both are conscious (I think currently), but only the Löbian one has the cognitive ability to introspect and to give sense to other machines/environment. So, as examples, the Robinson arithmetic theory (basically logic + laws of addition and multiplication) is a Turing universal machines, and thus is conscious, but not self-conscious. The Peano arithmetic theory, which is the same as Robinson + the axioms of inductions (which are very powerful) is self-conscious. But, without further programs/instructions, their first person indeterminacy bears on all state of consciousness. Our own consciousness is their consciousness, somehow. Reasonably, self-consciousness grows a lot and get much more intricate when meeting other selves.




Unfortunately the hard task is to interface such (self)- consciousness
with
our probable realities (computational histories). This is what we can
hardly
be sure about.

Perhaps I'm just confused about your ideas - wouldn't be the first
time! - but this seems to suffer from the same problem as panpsychism
- that although asserting consciousness as a property of the universe
sidesteps cartesian dualism, we are still left without an explanation
of why human consciousness differs from ant consciousness differs from
rock consciousness.

A rock is not a person. In fact a rock or any piece of matter is a pattern *we* make from a infinite sum of computational histories. That exists only as a stable appearances. It might eventually "contains" universal dovetailing, and thus, trivially, all consciousness of all persons. But the rock is none of those person, so it makes no sense to say that a rock is conscious. The same for the whole physical universe: it is a projection that *we*, or all Löbian machines are making. Thus, comp is quite the opposite to panpsychism. Only person, incarnated by relations among natural numbers (or combinators, java program, etc.) can be conscious or self conscious.




In your case, we are left wondering how the
consciousness of the virgin universal machine "interfaces" with
specific universal numbers, and what would explain the differences in
consciousness among them.

The difference will come from their different experiences relatively to the different computational histories which supports them. This will entail different memories, personalities, characters, etc.




That's why I favor the idea that consciousness arises from certain
kinds of cybernetic (autopoeitic) organization (which is consistent
with comp).

Sure. Given that everything is defined through self-reference, comp should have friendly relationship with autopoiesis. Self-reference and self-organization is crucial for the development of consciousness and self-consciousness. I talked to Varela and he was aware and interested by the work of Judson Webb on mechanism, and very open to comp and comp's consequences.



In fact I think it is still consistent with much of what
you're saying... but it is your assertion that comp denies strong AI
that implies you would find fault with that idea.

The only fault is related to the idea that we can build an AI , *AND* give some proof that it is an AI. The same for an artificial brain. You need to do some act of faith. Most pausibly, we and nature do instinctively or automatically such act of faith, for example in believing in other people. The real question is not "can a machine think", the real question is "are you OK if your son or daughter decides to marry a machine?".





I still don't know if the brain is just a filter of consciousness, in
which
case losing neurons might enhance consciousness (and some data in
neurophysiology might confirm this). I think Goertzel is more creating a competent machine than an intelligent one, from what I have read about
it. I
oppose intelligence/consciousness and competence/ingenuity. The first is needed to develop the later, but the later has a negative feedback on the
first.

I think I understand your point here with regard to consciousness -
given that you're saying it's a property of the platonic 'virgin'
universal machine. But if you assert that about intelligence, aren't
you saying that intelligence isn't computable (i.e. comp denies strong
ai)?

Comp implies strong AI (but not vice versa: machine can think does not entail that only machine can think). Comp => STRONG AI: If I am a machine, then some machine can think (assuming that I can think). But comp denies that "we can prove that a machine can think". Of course we can prove that some machine has this or that competence. But for intelligence/consciousness, this is not possible. (Unless we are not machine. Some non-machine can prove that some machine are intelligent, but this is purely academical until we find something which is both a person and a non-machine).




This would seem to contradict Marcus Hutter's AIXI.  You're
saying that our intelligence as humans is dependent (in the same way
as consciousness) on the fact that we don't know which machine we are?

I use "intelligence" is the large sense (it is close to being conscious). So it is related to the first person indeterminacy, which is infinite. You need this to stabilize consciousness, and attach it to a notion of normal computational history. You don't need this for one instant of intelligence, but you need it for two instants, so to speak.



That creativity is sourced in subjective indeterminacy?

I don't think so. The universal machine is already creative, but its creativity needs some histories to bring stable results. Note that the machine can lose its creativity in some histories, like bad education can discourage students. But at the start, both consciousness and creativity are "maximal" in some way. The more we are aware of our universality (like Löbian machines/numbers already are), the more we can use our initial creativity (if society and contingencies allow it). Creativity might be encouraged, and some heuristics can be taught (like with de Bono), but creativity per se is at the heart of universality. I think that the Mandelbrot set is creative, and that Emil Post "creative sets" are too. That is why he called those set creative, and it has been proved that creativity in the sense of Post is just a set theoretical mathematical characterization of (Turing) universality or sigma_1 completeness.

Bruno




Terren

Bruno

On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 4:53 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Hi Colin,

On 07 Jun 2011, at 09:42, Colin Hales wrote:

Hi,

Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature',

International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011.

1-35.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613


The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic!


Congratulation Colin.

Like others, I don't succeed in getting it, neither at home nor at the

university.

From the abstract I am afraid you might not have taken into account our

(many) conversations. Most of what you say about the impossibility of

building an artificial scientist is provably correct in the (weak) comp

theory. It is unfortunate that you derive this from comp +materialism,

which

is inconsistent. Actually, comp prevents "artificial intelligence". This

does not prevent the existence, and even the apparition, of intelligent

machines. But this might happen *despite* humans, instead of 'thanks to

the

humans'. This is related with the fact that we cannot know which machine

we

are ourselves. Yet, we can make copy at some level (in which case we

don't

know what we are really creating or recreating, and then, also,

descendent

of bugs in regular programs can evolve. Or we can get them

serendipitously.

It is also relate to the fact that we don't *want* intelligent machine,

which is really a computer who will choose its user, if ... he want one.

We

prefer them to be slaves. It will take time before we recognize them

(apparently).

Of course the 'naturalist comp' theory is inconsistent. Not sure you take

that into account too.

Artificial intelligence will always be more mike fishing or exploring

spaces, and we might *discover* strange creatures. Arithmetical truth is

a

universal zoo. Well, no, it is really a jungle. We don't know what is in

there. We can only scratch a tiny bit of it.

Now, let us distinguish two things, which are very different:

1) intelligence-consciousness-free-will-emotion

and

2) cleverness-competence-ingenuity-gifted-learning-ability

"1)" is necessary for the developpment of "2)", but "2)" has a negative

feedback on "1)".

I have already given on this list what I call the smallest theory of

intelligence.

By definition a machine is intelligent if it is not stupid. And a machine

can be stupid for two reason:

she believes that she is intelligent, or

she believes that she is stupid.

Of course, this is arithmetized immediately in a weakening of G, the

theory

C having as axioms the modal normal axioms and rules + Dp -> ~BDp. So Dt

(arithmetical consistency) can play the role of intelligence, and Bf

(inconsistance) plays the role of stupidity. G* and G proves BDt - > Bf

and

G* proves BBf -> Bf (but not G!).

This illustrates that "1)" above might come from Löbianity, and "2)"

above

(the scientist) is governed by theoretical artificial intelligence (Case

and

Smith, Oherson, Stob, Weinstein). Here the results are not just

NON-constructive, but are *necessarily* so. Cleverness is just something

that we cannot program. But we can prove, non constructively, the

existence

of powerful learning machine. We just cannot recognize them, or build

them.

It is like with the algorithmically random strings, we cannot generate

them

by a short algorithm, but we can generate all of them by a very short

algorithm.

So, concerning intelligence/consciousness (as opposed to cleverness), I

think we have passed the "singularity". Nothing is more

intelligent/conscious than a virgin universal machine. By programming it,

we

can only make his "soul" fell, and, in the worst case, we might get

something as stupid as human, capable of feeling itself superior, for

example.

Bruno





http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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