On 11 Jul 2011, at 20:08, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2011/7/11 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
On 7/10/2011 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You confuse perhaps with Schmidhuber's position, or some digital physicist (DP). But as I have explained many times here that this position does not work. Computationalism or digital mechanism (DM) is the idea that "I" am a machine, and by the first person indeterminacy, and the way the laws of physics have to emerge from computations, the physical universe (nor the fundamental reality) cannot be described entirely by a computation. On the contrary it is a sum on an infinity of computations.

If the universe is a computation, then "I" am computable, but then it cannot be a computation (by what I say above, it is not obvious). So with comp, or without comp, the physical universe is not a computation. With comp, the laws of nature are not computable, or have strong non computable components.

DM -> ~DP
DP -> DM,

So DP -> ~DP, so ~DP.



Bruno

This confuses me. When you say the universe is not computable, you mean it is not the process of computing a function. But you think it is generated by a UD. Right? In other words, you are saying what a UD does is *not* a computation.

Brent


No he is saying that the univese is the result of an infinity of computation going through its current state... an infinity of computation is *not computable*, hence digital physics is false. The UD of course runs all programs and is computable, but the UD generates and runs *all* programs, it's not a program that computes the universe.


Yes indeed. I think Brent forgot the first person indeterminacy. The universe is not something computed by the UD. The universe is how the UD is seen from the views of those who are computed by the UD.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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