You have missed the point. When you feel pain in your hand your are feeling it because the physics of specific specialized small regions of the cranial central nervous system are doing things. Yes, they are passing signals back and forth, performing additions, multiplications, and comparisons to thresholds to decide what to do. Everything the neuron is known to do is something a computer can do. It is like comparing a diesel engine to a gasoline engine, they are made slightly differently yet both perform combustion. Think again. What there is, is atoms dancing about. To us, there is regularity. That regularity has some correspondence with a mathematical formalism. The particular formalism is dependent on the spatiotemporal scale of the description. A formalism describes . There is no addition, multiplication or anything else of the sort. The dynamics of computation (on a standard computing platform) of the formalism, and the dynamics of the natural world of the description cannot and never should be claimed identities. They can, and do, depart each other. This includes (1) action potentials mutually resonating with (2) a gigantic EM field system in extremely complex ways. Exactly how and why this specific arrangement of atoms and behaviour delivers it is irrelevant. It is enough to know that it does. More than that it is the ONLY example of natural cognition we have. I fail to see what the EM field has to do with it, but even assuming it did, could we not use what is known regarding EM fields and the laws of physics to build a model which predicted what the EM field based mind would do? If they behaved the same how can one be called intelligent while the other is not? There is electrodynamics of action potentials. There is electrodynamics of a large field system as a result. The two are not related 1:1. Thats ALL THERE IS to a 'natural general intelligence'. If you want to build an 'artificial general intelligence, then like fire, you use action potentials to create a field system like the brain. You do not construct a model of the brain and pretend the model is a brain. The whole point of this argument is that unlike any other time in the history of science, we are expecting the particular physics (that we know delivers cognition) can be totally replaced (by the physics of a computer or even worse, a non-existent Turing machine) , yet still result in cognition. If you believe that computed physics equations is indistinguishable from physics, to the point that a computed model of the physics of cognition is cognition, then why don't you expect a computed model of combustion physics to burst into flames and replace your cooker? You are conflating the inside and outside views of the computer and simulation. If I built an accurate simulation of the food, the cooker, and myself in a computer, then the computer is a fine tool for preparing and cooking food for me to consume. Similarly, if you imagine our universe is already running inside a computer, don't expect a fire you start in this universe to cause any damage to the computing hardware running the simulation of that universe. You are conflating simulation and replication. The simulation (of Thing and environmental container of Thing) is useful for instructing us about the dynamics of the model. Sometimes this happens to correspond well enough with observation of the natural world for us to learn something novel about the natural world. Why can't you go to work in a computed model of a car that spontaneously springs into your life? Why don't you expect to be able to light your room with a computed model of the physics of a lightbulb? Why can't you compute Maxwell's equations and create a power station? The point is I can if I am in the simulation as well. A simulated mind is part of the simulation, and correspondingly would be able to think, just as a fire within a simulation could burn you (if you're in the simulation). Once again I point out that I am not talking about simulation (pretending). I am talking about replication. Making real cognition from the natural components of the only example of it, which is not and never was any sort of computer running a program. Cheers Colin Here's the mantra (a) "COGNITION IS COMPUTATION" Well if so, then why isn't ILLUMINATION BY LIGHT a result of COMPUTATION OF LIGHTBULB PHYSICS? That would be the prediction if (a) were true. A computation of hurricane physics is not a hurricane. But then nobody wants to create a hurricane, nor do we expect the computation to produce one!..... But we do want to literally create cognition...and we do then, for no valid reason, assume that computation delivers it. We are being inconsistent and a fundamental level. We build Pinocchio the computational puppet and kid ourselves it's somehow a boy. Would you say when a computer is performing a calculation, it is really adding or only simulating the adding? Next, consider that addition is the heart of what neurons do to determine their behavior. A computer is not a set of resonating action potential/electromagnetic fields of the kind found in a brain, not matter what the program is. I know this because I am an electrical engineer+neurobiophysicist. You cannot argue that the result is cognition without making a dramatic presupposition/conflation about computing of the kind that creates this mess in the first place. Do you think it is impossible to understand or predict the EM fields created in the brain? This is the logical result of that belief. We have the natural world to work with (atoms and space). That's our computer. Either the (Turing) computational equivalence applies everywhere or it doesn't apply at all. Therefore it doesn't apply at all. We can't have it both ways. The reason results of cognition are accessible through simulation is that the output is information. Thus we can introspect the program and determine what the mind is doing, wants to do, or has decided. If we introspect a simulation of fire, we can see the result of the reaction, but we cannot extract the energy released as part of that simulation for any useful purpose in this (higher level universe), although if you are in the simulation you could. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.