dis-satisfactory not satisfactory. On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 12:56 PM, B Soroud <bsor...@gmail.com> wrote:
> the point is... even if science did support some rudimentary conception of > a gnostic cosmology..... > > whereof teleology... > > it is my claim that if you study Buddhism or Vedanta or Neo-Platonism or > Kaballah or whatever.... they are all ultimately satisfactory and > incoherent. > > So there is no superstructure that is satisfactory and coherent and that > really really makes sense and makes sense of things that any science can > support or subsume. > > We are lost in the land of paradoxes, mysteries, antinomies, neither/nor's > and absurdities. > > > On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 12:47 PM, Constantine Pseudonymous < > bsor...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Bruno, is it possible that there is no "fundamental reality" or >> "primary reality"... and even if there was, and it was non- >> observational or non-experiential.... why would it matter to us? >> >> It seems to me that reality or knowledge always implies a blind >> dualism that reflects the way in which "we" ("I") experience phenomena >> (subject/object, knower/known distinction-absurdity) >> >> we are always looking in front or ahead. We are always looking at. >> >> -It- is always -away-. >> >> If reality is the Other and we are derived from the Other and this >> Other is transcendent or "fundamental".... then what of this "Other" >> and what is its relation to us, or what is our relation to it.... does >> it have any subjectivity and do we have any ultimicity in relation to >> it. >> >> It seems like any reality is assumed to not be us and we are assumed >> to be related to it... therefore it is separate and either conceived >> of as blind and inferior to us, our super conscious and superior to >> us. >> >> and why are we seemingly superior to this other... >> >> Unless you assume we are the One.... then I would tell you that the >> One is absurd. >> >> >> >> >> On Jun 28, 9:38 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> > On 27 Jun 2011, at 21:51, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > On 26.06.2011 22:33 meekerdb said the following: >> > >> On 6/26/2011 12:58 PM, Rex Allen wrote: >> > >>> On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be> >> > >> > > ... >> > >> > >> The idea that our theories are approaching some metaphysical truth is >> > >> essentially just the same as assuming there is some more >> > >> comprehensive and coherent theory. I note that Hawking and Mlodinow >> > >> recently suggested that we might accept a kind of patch-work set of >> > >> theories of the world, rather than insisting on a single coherent >> > >> theory. >> > >> > > Could you please give references to such a statement? In my view, >> > > this is exactly the way to implement efficiently some simulation of >> > > the world. It is unnecessary for example to simulate atoms until >> > > some observer will start researching them. >> > >> > Ah ah, ... but so you can guess that it would be more easy for >> > arithmetic too, in that case. That (a need for patch-work theories in >> > physics) could happen if the partially sharable numbers' 'dreams' >> > don't glue well enough. >> > But we don't know that. It is 'just' an open problem in the frame of >> > comp. Arithmetical evidences and empirical evidence is that the dreams >> > glue pretty well, I would say. >> > I think Hawking and Mlodinov are assuming that the fundamental >> > reality is physical. The fact that the physical needs patch-work set >> > of theories does not entail that the big picture needs that too, as >> > comp (uda) and "formal arithmetical comp" (auda) illustrate precisely. >> > The fact that physicists can arrive to such extremities illustrates >> > perhaps an inadequacy of the metaphysics of Aristotle. >> > >> > Bruno >> > >> > >> > >> > > -- >> > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> > > Groups "Everything List" group. >> > > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com >> . >> > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> > > . >> > > For more options, visit this group athttp:// >> groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> > > . >> > >> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.