On 11 Jul 2011, at 14:33, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 10.07.2011 17:32 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 10 Jul 2011, at 15:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
...
Let's take the color yellow for example. If you build a brain out
of ideal ping pong balls, or digital molecular emulations, does it
perceive yellow from 580nm oscillations of electromagnetism
automatically, or does it see yellow when it's own emulated units
are vibrating on the functionally proportionate scale to itself?
Does the ping pong ball brain see it's own patterns of collisions
as yellow or does yellow = electromagnetic ~580nm and nothing else.
At what point does the yellow come in? Where did it come from? Were
there other options? Can there ever be new colors? From where? What
is the minimum mechanical arrangement required to experience
yellow?
Any mechanical arrangement defining a self-referentially correct
machine automatically leads the mechanical arrangement to distinguish
third person point of view and first person points of view. The
machine already have a theory of qualia, with an explanation of why
qualia and quanta seems different.
Bruno,
Could you please make a reference to a good text for dummies about
that statement? (But please not in French)
I am afraid the only text which explains this in simple way is my
sane04 paper(*). It is in the second part (the interview of the
machine), and it uses Smullyan popular explanation of the logic of
self-reference (G) from his "Forever Undecided" popular book.
Popular attempts to explain Gödel's theorem are often incorrect, and
the whole matter is very delicate. Philosophers, like Lucas, or
physicists, like Penrose, illustrate that it is hard to explain
Gödel's result to non logicians. I'm afraid the time has not yet come
for popular explanation of machine's theology.
Let me try a short attempt. By Gödel's theorem we know that for any
machine, the set of true propositions about the machine is bigger than
the set of the propositions provable by the machine. Now, Gödel
already knew that a machine can prove that very fact about herself,
and so can be "aware" of its own limitations. Such a machine is forced
to discover a vast range of true proposition about her that she cannot
prove, and such a machine can study the logic to which such
propositions are obeying.
Then, it is a technical fact that such logics (of the non provable,
yet discoverable propositions) obeys some theories of qualia which
have been proposed in the literature (by J.L. Bell, for example).
So the machine which introspects itself (the mystical machine) is
bounded to discover the gap between the provable and truth (the G-G*
gap), but also the difference between all the points of view (third
person = provable, first person = provable-and-true, observable with
probability 1 = provable-and-consistent, "feelable" = provable-and-
consistent-and-true, etc.).
When the machine studies the logic of those propositions, she
rediscovers more or less a picture of reality akin to the mystical
rationalists (like Plato, Plotinus, but also Nagasena, and many others).
If you are familiar with the logic G, I might be able to explain more.
If not, read Smullyan's book, perhaps.
All this is new material, and, premature popular version can be
misleading. Elementary logic is just not yet well enough known.
In fact, the UDA *is* the human-popular version of all this. The AUDA
is the proper machine's technical version.
If you read the sane04(*) paper, feel free to ask for any precisions.
Best,
Bruno
(*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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