On Jul 10, 2:20 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.
> The fact that consciousness changes predictably when different
> molecules are introduced to the brain, and that we are able to produce
> different molecules by changing the content of our consciousness
> subjectively suggests to me that it makes sense to give molecules the
> benefit of the doubt.
> >What in the brain would be not Turing emulable
> Let's take the color yellow for example. If you build a brain out of
> ideal ping pong balls, or digital molecular emulations, does it
> perceive yellow from 580nm oscillations of electromagnetism
> automatically, or does it see yellow when it's own emulated units are
> vibrating on the functionally proportionate scale to itself? Does the
> ping pong ball brain see it's own patterns of collisions as yellow or
> does yellow = electromagnetic ~580nm and nothing else. At what point
> does the yellow come in? Where did it come from? Were there other
> options? Can there ever be new colors? From where? What is the minimum
> mechanical arrangement required to experience yellow?
> >You need to speculate
> > on a new physics,
> Yes, I do speculate on a new physics. I think that what we can
> possibly see outside of ourselves is half of what exists. What we
> experience is only a small part of the other half. Physics wouldn't
> change, but it would be seen as the exterior half of a universal
> topology. I did a post this morning that might 
> help:http://s33light.org/post/7453105138

1) if conventional physics gives an adequate causal account,does and
experience is explained
with New Physics, does that make experience epiphenomenal?

2) What is it about the mathematical structures and functions of your
Physics that makes it more apt for describing experience than the
Old Physics?

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