-----Original Message----- From: email@example.com on behalf of Colin Geoffrey Hales Sent: Sun 7/10/2011 4:44 PM To: firstname.lastname@example.org Subject: RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out -----Original Message----- From: email@example.com on behalf of Bruno Marchal Sent: Sat 7/9/2011 10:14 PM To: firstname.lastname@example.org Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out On 09 Jul 2011, at 07:07, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > Down the bottom.... if you dare.... there be dragons... :-) > > -----Original Message----- > From: email@example.com on behalf of Jason Resch > Sent: Sat 7/9/2011 1:23 AM > To: firstname.lastname@example.org > Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out > > On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 1:56 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales <cgha...@unimelb.edu.au > > wrote: > > > Hi,**** > > > > **** > > > > You have missed the point. When you feel pain in your hand your > are feeling > > it because the physics of specific specialized small regions of > the cranial > > central nervous system are doing things. This includes (1) action > potentials > > mutually resonating with (2) a gigantic EM field system in > extremely complex > > ways. *Exactly how and why this specific arrangement of atoms and > > behaviour delivers it is irrelevant. It is enough to know that it > does*. > > More than that it is the ONLY example of natural cognition we > have.**** > > > > **** > > > > The whole point of this argument is that unlike any other time in > the > > history of science, we are expecting the particular physics (that > we know > > delivers cognition) can be totally replaced (by the physics of a > computer > > or even worse, a non-existent Turing machine) , yet still result in > > cognition. **** > > > > > > It's not the "totally" that is the problem. Bruno asks if you can > replace > > a part of a brain with something that does the same computation > (at some > > level) and have no effect on the conscious (or unconscious) life > of that > > person. This certainly seems plausible. But it relies on the > remaining > > world to continue interacting with that person. So in his idea of > replacing > > physics with computation he has to suppose replacing all of the > brain plus > > everything that interacts with the brain. In other words a > simulation of > > the person(s) and the universe. Then within the simulation EM > fields are > > computed and supply computed illumination to computed eyes and > brains. He > > invites us to consider all this computation done by a universal > dovetailer, > > a computer which also computes all possible computable universes > as it > > goes. But to me it seems a great leap from computing what a piece > (or even > > all) of a brain does to computing a whole (quantum) universe. I'm > not at > > all sure that the universe is computable; and it's certainly a > different > > question than whether I would say yes to the doctor. > > > > *This entire scenario has nothing to do with what I am talking > about. > > Bruno is talking about the universe AS abstract computation. > Ontology. I am > > talking about a completely different area: the computation of > descriptions > > of a universe; descriptions compiled by observers within it > called 'laws > > of nature'. *** > > > > ** ** > > > > *This is the main problem. We are speaking at cross purposes. > Computation > > by computers made of bits of our universe is not the same is > describing of a > > universe of ontological primitives interacting. I find the latter > really > > interesting, but completely irrelevant to the task at hand, which > is to > > create artificial cognition using the real world of humans and the > stuff > > they are made of. * > > > > **** > > > > If you believe that computed physics equations is > indistinguishable from > > physics, to the point that a computed model of the physics of > cognition is > > cognition, then why don't you expect a computed model of > combustion physics > > to burst into flames and replace your cooker? Why can't you go to > work in a > > computed model of a car that spontaneously springs into your life? > Why don't > > you expect to be able to light your room with a computed model of > the > > physics of a lightbulb? Why can't you compute Maxwell's equations > and create > > a power station?**** > > > > > > You can within a simulation.**** > > > > ** ** > > > > *At last, someone takes the magical step. This is the problem writ- > large. > > What you are saying, in effect, is that computation about X is > only some > > kind of simulation of X. My whole point is that I do not want a > simulation > > of X. I want an X. Like artificial fire is still fire. Like > artificial light > > is light. Like artificial lightning is lightning. Like artificial > cognition > > is cognition. Like an artificial round rollything (wheel) is a > wheel. .... > > like a million other artificial versions of a natural phenomenon > created by > > humans for millennia.* > > > > * * > > > > *In using a computer, all the original physics is gone. Yet the 100% > > expectation is (apart from yourself, apparently... or.not... we > have found > > the inconsistency at last) that computers will lead to AGI is the > state of > > the game. Yet it involves entirely disposing of the natural > phenomenon that > > we know originates it. It replaces the entire physics with the > physics of a > > computer ... and then expects to get the natural phenomenon out > of it!* > > > > Ultimately physics is just set of well defined rules (algorithms) and > matter and energy is just information. > > It is not unreasonable to imagine that information sits at the > core of > > physics, just as it sits at the core of a computer. > > > > It from bit. Otherwise put, every 'it'-every particle, every > field of > > force, even the space-time continuum itself-derives its function, > its > > meaning, its very existence entirely-even if in some contexts > > indirectly-from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no > questions, > > binary choices, bits. 'It from bit' symbolizes the idea that every > item of > > the physical world has at bottom-a very deep bottom, in most > instances-an > > immaterial source and explanation; that which we call reality > arises in the > > last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions and the > registering of > > equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are > > information-theoretic in origin and that this is a participatory > universe. > > (John Archibald Wheeler 1990: 5) > > > > More and more information is being shown to be a critical property > of the > universe, in entropy, the holographic principle, quantum mechanics, > Shanon's > laws of information carrying capacity, extreme physical information > etc. It > is not unreasonable, therefore, to consider the universe has some > informational basis. > > > The ultimate description of anything is information. Information > cannot be > described in terms of anything else. You might say the map is not the > territory,. but I would argue that a map that is accurate in every > possible > detail is the territory. There would be no way for any observer to > distinguish between the two. You might consider Ockham in the > following > thought experiment: Imagine there are two universes, one is the > physical > universe in which we live, another is informational representation > existing > in math. If observers in the informational version are as conscious > as you > and I (I know you would say they are not but stay with me) then they > would > also consider their universe to exist physically, there is no way > for them > to tell one way or the other. > > Now if an informational universe is shown to exist in math, what is > the > reason for postulating our universe is somehow different? In what > manner is > "physical" different from an "informational" one, what does being > "physical" > mean and what does it add which is not already there in the identical > informational one? Everything that happens in the physical universe > also > happens in the informational one, they have all the same laws, and > the same > evolution through time. What distinguishes the "informational > hydrogen > atom" in the informational universe from the "physical hydrogen > atom" in the > physical universe? I imagine you will say something like "It has to > be > physical to be real", but I have never seen a convincing argument > for this; > perhaps you could provide one? > > Jason > > ============================================================= > Hi again on this fine Saturday when I should be gardening. > > You can 'imagine' whatever you want about the word 'information'. > It's missing the point. > > Here in the _real_ world, where 100% of AGI research is using real > computers (or hardware computation of a model eg FPGA) to implement > an AGI. That is, to implement an actual instance of cognition. The > goal is the equivalent of human cognition. I'll spell it out > properly because it seems to me, after 10 years of intense effort, > that I've finally found a simple achilles heel, where the belief > system is shown to be inconsistent. That is, there is persistence > with a belief in X in spite of empirical evidence that X is false. > Like pulling Pinocchio the puppet's strings and then really > believing it creates a real boy. > > ==================== EL PROOF > ===================================================== > 1) We have only 1 benchmark natural general intelligence (NGI): the > human. > > 2) Specific physics exists in the brain. The physics of cognition. > This is the physics of action potential propagation (AP) resonating > with a large, unified electromagnetic (EM) field system. The > relationship between AP production to EM field production is _not_ > 1:1. More than one EM field is consistent with one set of AP > transmissions. Call it AP/EM physics of cognition. It's what we have. > > 3) In the artificial instantiation of fire by humans, the physics of > combustion is retained. In the artificial instantiation of flight by > humans, the physics of flight is retained. And so forth. Without > exception. (except in AGI!). By extension, the way to artificial > cognition is to retain the physics of cognition. AP/EM physics. > > 4) If computing can literally duplicate human cognition, then by > extension, computing the laws of combustion should create flames. > REAL FLAMES. That is the logical result of a belief that computing > the physics (or worse, an abstraction of it) of cognition leads to > NGI cognition. > That does not follow. Flames are not representational. Some things are Turing emulable, and others are not. > > 5) The computation of the physics of flames has been computed _to > death_ for decades. NO FLAMES resulted. In general, no instance of > computation of a physics model of X ever resulted in X. > False. You can emulate digital computations exactly. You just beg the question. You prove your premise. Bruno > In a very Popperian way, we have experimentally already falsified, > decades ago, a hypothesis that that computation can produce human > cognition. > > Therefore, > > 6) A claim that a computer can deliver human cognition is false. QED. > > > To continue to believe that a Turing-based computation of a model of > cognition is cognition is thus empirically falsified and has been > for a long time. This is GAME OVER for purely computational AGI. Not > in a formal sense, but in a technological investment sense > consistent with every other instance of technological instantiation > of a natural phenomenon. What sort of idiot would you have to be to > invest in a new kind of match, where you try to light your cigarette > with a computation of the physics of combustion ... because that is > exactly what investment in computational AGI is doing. > > The AGI research community has it completely backwards. Using fire > lead to a theory of combustion. NOT the other way around. Ditto for > cognition. We do not have a theory of cognition. We will get one by > building the AP/EM physics of cognition and exploring. Just like > elsewhere, computation of models is useful. But it's NOT an instance > of cognition. It can't be. We've proved it empirically already. The > AGI community is, in some sense, researching cognition. However, > that research cannot be claimed to ever be an actual instance of NGI- > style cognition. Because of that reality, we need to re-frame > expectations and investment directions. > > IMPORTANT NOTE. Your 'it's information' thinking can be completely > right and it changes nothing, because computers are not manipulating > it. They are manipulating human metaphors for information in a > 'physics-independent' way. So you can retain your particular > 'information-centric' view of the universe AND believe that > computers won't create cognition. The two views are quite > compatible. This is all about the correct route to knowledge and > technology. > > Sweet clarity at last. > > I don't know why I didn't see this argument before. I guess I'm a > bit thick. Off to the garden. > > cheers > > Colin > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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