-----Original Message-----
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com on behalf of Colin Geoffrey Hales
Sent: Sun 7/10/2011 4:44 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

-----Original Message-----
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com on behalf of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Sat 7/9/2011 10:14 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

On 09 Jul 2011, at 07:07, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:

> Down the bottom.... if you dare.... there be dragons...   :-)
> -----Original Message-----
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com on behalf of Jason Resch
> Sent: Sat 7/9/2011 1:23 AM
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
> On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 1:56 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales <cgha...@unimelb.edu.au
> > wrote:
> > Hi,****
> >
> >  ****
> >
> > You have missed the point. When you feel pain in your hand your  
> are feeling
> > it because the physics of specific specialized small regions of  
> the cranial
> > central nervous system are doing things. This includes (1) action  
> potentials
> > mutually resonating with (2) a gigantic EM field system in  
> extremely complex
> > ways. *Exactly how and why this specific arrangement of atoms and
> > behaviour delivers it is irrelevant. It is enough to know that it  
> does*.
> > More than that it is the ONLY example of natural cognition we  
> have.****
> >
> >  ****
> >
> > The whole point of this argument is that unlike any other time in  
> the
> > history of science, we are expecting the particular physics (that  
> we know
> > delivers  cognition) can be totally replaced (by the physics of a  
> computer
> > or even worse, a non-existent Turing machine) , yet still result in
> > cognition. ****
> >
> >
> > It's not the "totally" that is the problem.  Bruno asks if you can  
> replace
> > a part of a brain with something that does the same computation  
> (at some
> > level) and have no effect on the conscious (or unconscious) life  
> of that
> > person.  This certainly seems plausible.  But it relies on the  
> remaining
> > world to continue interacting with that person.  So in his idea of  
> replacing
> > physics with computation he has to suppose replacing all of the  
> brain plus
> > everything that interacts with the brain.  In other words a  
> simulation of
> > the person(s) and the universe.  Then within the simulation EM  
> fields are
> > computed and supply computed illumination to computed eyes and  
> brains.  He
> > invites us to consider all this computation done by a universal  
> dovetailer,
> > a computer which also computes all possible computable universes  
> as it
> > goes.  But to me it seems a great leap from computing what a piece  
> (or even
> > all) of a brain does to computing a whole (quantum) universe.  I'm  
> not at
> > all sure that the universe is computable; and it's certainly a  
> different
> > question than whether I would say yes to the doctor.
> >
> > *This entire scenario has nothing to do with what I am talking  
> about.
> > Bruno is talking about the universe AS abstract computation.  
> Ontology. I am
> > talking about a completely different area: the computation of  
> descriptions
> > of a universe; descriptions  compiled  by observers within  it  
> called 'laws
> > of nature'. ***
> >
> > ** **
> >
> > *This is the main problem. We are speaking at cross purposes.  
> Computation
> > by computers made of bits of our universe is not the same is  
> describing of a
> > universe of ontological primitives interacting. I find the latter  
> really
> > interesting, but completely irrelevant to the task at hand, which  
> is to
> > create artificial cognition using the real world of humans and the  
> stuff
> > they are made of. *
> >
> >  ****
> >
> > If you believe that computed physics equations is  
> indistinguishable from
> > physics, to the point that a computed model of the physics of  
> cognition is
> > cognition, then why don't you expect a computed model of  
> combustion physics
> > to burst into flames and replace your cooker? Why can't you go to  
> work in a
> > computed model of a car that spontaneously springs into your life?  
> Why don't
> > you expect to be able to light your room with a computed model of  
> the
> > physics of a lightbulb? Why can't you compute Maxwell's equations  
> and create
> > a power station?****
> >
> >
> > You can within a simulation.****
> >
> > ** **
> >
> > *At last, someone takes the magical step. This is the problem writ- 
> large.
> > What you are saying, in effect, is that computation about X is  
> only some
> > kind of simulation of X. My whole point is that I do not want a  
> simulation
> > of X. I want an X. Like artificial fire is still fire. Like  
> artificial light
> > is light. Like artificial lightning is lightning.  Like artificial  
> cognition
> > is cognition. Like an artificial round rollything (wheel) is a  
> wheel. ....
> > like a million other artificial versions of a natural phenomenon  
> created by
> > humans for millennia.*
> >
> > * *
> >
> > *In using a computer, all the original physics is gone. Yet the 100%
> > expectation is (apart from yourself, apparently... or.not... we  
> have found
> > the inconsistency at last)  that computers will lead to AGI is the  
> state of
> > the game. Yet it involves entirely disposing of the natural  
> phenomenon that
> > we know originates it. It replaces the entire physics with the  
> physics of a
> > computer ... and then expects to get the natural  phenomenon out  
> of it!*
> >
> Ultimately physics is just  set of well defined rules (algorithms) and
> matter and energy is just information.
>     It is not unreasonable to imagine that information sits at the  
> core of
> > physics, just as it sits at the core of a computer.
> >
> >     It from bit. Otherwise put, every 'it'-every particle, every  
> field of
> > force, even the space-time continuum itself-derives its function,  
> its
> > meaning, its very existence entirely-even if in some contexts
> > indirectly-from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no  
> questions,
> > binary choices, bits. 'It from bit' symbolizes the idea that every  
> item of
> > the physical world has at bottom-a very deep bottom, in most  
> instances-an
> > immaterial source and explanation; that which we call reality  
> arises in the
> > last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions and the  
> registering of
> > equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are
> > information-theoretic in origin and that this is a participatory  
> universe.
> > (John Archibald Wheeler 1990: 5)
> >
> More and more information is being shown to be a critical property  
> of the
> universe, in entropy, the holographic principle, quantum mechanics,  
> Shanon's
> laws of information carrying capacity, extreme physical information  
> etc.  It
> is not unreasonable, therefore, to consider the universe has some
> informational basis.
> The ultimate description of anything is information.  Information  
> cannot be
> described in terms of anything else.  You might say the map is not the
> territory,. but I would argue that a map that is accurate in every  
> possible
> detail is the territory.  There would be no way for any observer to
> distinguish between the two.  You might consider Ockham in the  
> following
> thought experiment:  Imagine there are two universes, one is the  
> physical
> universe in which we live, another is informational representation  
> existing
> in math.  If observers in the informational version are as conscious  
> as you
> and I (I know you would say they are not but stay with me) then they  
> would
> also consider their universe to exist physically, there is no way  
> for them
> to tell one way or the other.
> Now if an informational universe is shown to exist in math, what is  
> the
> reason for postulating our universe is somehow different?  In what  
> manner is
> "physical" different from an "informational" one, what does being  
> "physical"
> mean and what does it add which is not already there in the identical
> informational one?  Everything that happens in the physical universe  
> also
> happens in the informational one, they have all the same laws, and  
> the same
> evolution through time.  What distinguishes the "informational  
> hydrogen
> atom" in the informational universe from the "physical hydrogen  
> atom" in the
> physical universe?  I imagine you will say something like "It has to  
> be
> physical to be real", but I have never seen a convincing argument  
> for this;
> perhaps you could provide one?
> Jason
> =============================================================
> Hi again on this fine Saturday when I should be gardening.
> You can 'imagine' whatever you want about the word 'information'.  
> It's missing the point.
> Here in the _real_ world, where 100% of AGI research is using real  
> computers (or hardware computation of a model eg FPGA) to implement  
> an AGI. That is, to implement an actual instance of cognition. The  
> goal is the equivalent of human cognition. I'll spell it out  
> properly because it seems to me, after 10 years of intense effort,  
> that I've finally found a simple achilles heel, where the belief  
> system is shown to be inconsistent. That is, there is persistence  
> with a belief in X in spite of empirical evidence that X is false.  
> Like pulling Pinocchio the puppet's strings and then really  
> believing it creates a real boy.
> ==================== EL PROOF  
> =====================================================
> 1) We have only 1 benchmark natural general intelligence (NGI): the  
> human.
> 2) Specific physics exists in the brain. The physics of cognition.  
> This is the physics of action potential propagation (AP) resonating  
> with a large, unified electromagnetic (EM) field system. The  
> relationship between AP production to EM field production is _not_  
> 1:1. More than one EM field is consistent with one set of AP  
> transmissions. Call it AP/EM physics of cognition. It's what we have.
> 3) In the artificial instantiation of fire by humans, the physics of  
> combustion is retained. In the artificial instantiation of flight by  
> humans, the physics of flight is retained. And so forth. Without  
> exception. (except in AGI!). By extension, the way to artificial  
> cognition is to retain the physics of cognition. AP/EM physics.
> 4) If computing can literally duplicate human cognition, then by  
> extension, computing the laws of combustion should create flames.  
> REAL FLAMES. That is the logical result of a belief that computing  
> the physics (or worse, an abstraction of it) of cognition leads to  
> NGI cognition.

That does not follow. Flames are not representational. Some things are  
Turing emulable, and others are not.

> 5) The computation of the physics of flames has been computed _to  
> death_ for decades. NO FLAMES resulted. In general, no instance of  
> computation of a physics model of X ever resulted in X.
False. You can emulate digital computations exactly. You just beg the  
question. You prove your premise.


> In a very Popperian way, we have experimentally already falsified,  
> decades ago, a hypothesis that that computation can produce human  
> cognition.
> Therefore,
> 6) A claim that a computer can deliver human cognition is false. QED.
> To continue to believe that a Turing-based computation of a model of  
> cognition is cognition is thus empirically falsified and has been  
> for a long time. This is GAME OVER for purely computational AGI. Not  
> in a formal sense, but in a technological investment sense  
> consistent with every other instance of technological instantiation  
> of a natural phenomenon. What sort of idiot would you have to be to  
> invest in a new kind of match, where you try to light your cigarette  
> with a computation of the physics of combustion ... because that is  
> exactly what investment in computational AGI is doing.
> The AGI research community has it completely backwards. Using fire  
> lead to a theory of combustion. NOT the other way around. Ditto for  
> cognition. We do not have a theory of cognition. We will get one by  
> building the AP/EM physics of cognition and exploring. Just like  
> elsewhere, computation of models is useful. But it's NOT an instance  
> of cognition. It can't be. We've proved it empirically already. The  
> AGI community is, in some sense, researching cognition. However,  
> that research cannot be claimed to ever be an actual instance of NGI- 
> style cognition. Because of that reality, we need to re-frame  
> expectations and investment directions.
> IMPORTANT NOTE. Your 'it's information' thinking can be completely  
> right and it changes nothing, because computers are not manipulating  
> it. They are manipulating human metaphors for information in a  
> 'physics-independent' way. So you can retain your particular  
> 'information-centric' view of the universe AND believe that  
> computers won't create cognition. The two views are quite  
> compatible. This is all about the correct route to knowledge and  
> technology.
> Sweet clarity at last.
> I don't know why I didn't see this argument before. I guess I'm a  
> bit thick. Off to the garden.
> cheers
> Colin
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