On 10 Jul 2011, at 09:37, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Hi Bruno et.al.
Once again we have come to grief on the old conflation.
(A) You speak of a universe _AS_ computation (described _as if_ on
some
abstract mega-turing machine)
You confuse perhaps with Schmidhuber's position, or some digital
physicist (DP). But as I have explained many times here that this
position does not work. Computationalism or digital mechanism (DM) is
the idea that "I" am a machine, and by the first person indeterminacy,
and the way the laws of physics have to emerge from computations, the
physical universe (nor the fundamental reality) cannot be described
entirely by a computation. On the contrary it is a sum on an infinity
of computations.
If the universe is a computation, then "I" am computable, but then it
cannot be a computation (by what I say above, it is not obvious). So
with comp, or without comp, the physical universe is not a
computation. With comp, the laws of nature are not computable, or have
strong non computable components.
DM -> ~DP
DP -> DM,
So DP -> ~DP, so ~DP.
Bruno
(B) I speak of computation _OF_ laws of nature, by a computer made of
natural material,
where the laws of nature are those describing how it
appears to an observer within.
Descriptions of (A) are not the same as (B). Only if you conflate (A)
and (B) can you be confused about this. Until you can see the
difference
you will continually find my position difficult. My proof relates to
the real world of computing (B). Your position (A) can be 100% right,
very interesting and 100% irrelevant to the task at hand. Whatever
difficulties you and others have with this, they can be sorted out by
understanding the difference between (A) and (B). Laws of nature in
(A)
are laws of structure. Laws in (B) are laws of appearances (to an
observer). Like F = MA.
This issue I have proved is EMPIRICALLY PROVEN in domain (B). The
argument is OVER.
You can't have it both ways.
Either
(1) (B)-style computing of laws of appearances of the cognition is
LITERALLY cognition....In which case (B)-style computing of laws of
appearance of combustion must also be LITERALLY combustion.
OR
(2) B)-style computing of laws of appearances of the ANYTHING is NOT
LITERALLY ANYTHING, ANYWHERE and NEVER WAS.
This is because computing combustion doesn't produce flames. I could
encode representation in flames. SO WHAT! It's the same bunch of atoms
dancing about... (table of elements). They don't know what
representing
is going on! What magic changes things merely because representing
happens?
At the same time, I would also say that the kind of computing referred
to by (A) _IS_ flame. But that's not a model of flame. It's the flame.
You can 'act as if' the flame is running some kind of non existent
computer, but that does NOT become (B).
Expectation (1) is the universal position of all AGI workers. Now that
presupposition is FALSE. When neuroscience finds this out (I have a
paper in already), the entire AGI community is going to be told they
are
not investing in AGI. They are only doing complex AI with predictable
limits.
Real AGI will be done by replicating the physics of cognition. I
give it
a year or so.
Colin
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