On 07 Jun 2011, at 05:58, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Rex,

Is not what you attribute to Bruno just standard MWI (Many Worlds) thinking?

Many Worlds usually assumes the existence of (a) physical world(s).

The point is that digital mechanism *entails* already a testable form of many-worlds/many-dreams/many-computations. And there is nothing physical at the start. Physicalness is a quite special emerging pattern. Like with Plato, the physical reality is the border/shadow of something else. With comp, the physical reality is the border of arithmetical truth as seen by the (locally) arithmetical creatures. The first person is distributed on that border, preventing any intuitive picture of the relationship between soul and body. In fact each soul has a continuum of distinct bodies. So comp indeed leads to a very specific everything-like theory, which is confirmed (not proved!) by the quantum empiric MW.

Bruno






Richard

On Mon, Jun 6, 2011 at 6:52 PM, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote: On Mon, Jun 6, 2011 at 6:13 PM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au > wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 06, 2011 at 04:42:46PM -0400, Rex Allen wrote:
>>
>> How can any of those questions be approached by conscious entities in
>> a deterministic computational framework?
>>
>> Everything you’ll ever learn, every mistake you’ll ever make, every
>> belief you’ll ever have is already locked in.
>>
>> Your life is “on rails”. Maybe your final destination is good, maybe >> it’s bad - but both the destination and the path to it are static and
>> fixed in Platonia.
>
> This is provably false.

What, exactly, are you claiming is provably false?


> One of Bruno's important results is 3-determinism
> implies 1-indeterminism.

This is sort of anti-climactic after your initial statement.

One of Bruno's important results is that if my future is determined,
in some sense it's not determined "for me" as an individual.


> It is not that hard to get, so would be worth your
> while trying to understand.

I think I understand this already.  The whole teleporting
moscow-washington thing, right?

In Platonia, there are many computational paths that branch out from
the current state that represents "me".

Each of these paths looks like a "possible future" from my subjective
standpoint.

But, they're not possible, they're actual.  In Platonia, they all
exist.  And they do so timelessly...so they're not "futures" they're a
series of "nows".

So, subjectively, I have the "illusion" of an undetermined "future".

But...really, it's determined.  Every one of those paths is
objectively actualized.

So how does this prove what I said false?  All those static "futures"
are mine.  They're all determined.  I'm still on rails...it's just
that the rails split in a rather unintuitive way.

Even if we say that what constitutes "me" is a single unbranched
path...this still doesn't make what I said false.  I'm one of those
paths, I just don't know which.  But ignorance of the future is not
indeterminism.  Ignorance of the future is ignorance of the (fully
determined)
future.

Rex

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