On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

    On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
    <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

        On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

        On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb
        <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

            On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

                    Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course
                    that forces computation to be there.

                The computations are concrete relations.

            If the are concrete then we should be able to point to

        If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to
        them, everything you see and experience is direct evidence
        of the existence of the computation implementing your mind.

        Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything
        that has a concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder
        point to the other branches of the wave function, or an
        eternalist point to the past?  How would an AI or human in a
        virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is
        rendering its environment?

                They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers
                relation can be described by some axiomatic.

            And one can regard the numbers as defined by their
            relations.  So the "fundamental ontology" of numbers is
reduced to a description of relations.

        Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an
        idea of a chair?

            The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of
            tables and chairs.

        Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp,
        the existence of number relations explains the existence of

        That's the question.  It seems that comp requires more than
        the existence of number relations, it requires the existence
        of a UD or equivalent.

    The Fibonacci sequence is, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55,
    89, 144...
    It is defined by the simple number relation Fib(n) = Fib(n-1) +
    Fib(n-2).  This is a simple recursive definition.  You might even
    say the number line has a simple recursive definition, where
    Number(n) = Number(n-1) + 1.  Different recursive definitions
    result in different sequences of numbers (different ways of
    progressing through the integers).  In some of these definitions,
    bits patterns (within the number) may move around in well defined

    There's the rub.  Nothing changes in Platonia.  Nothing "moves
    around" or "computes".  Bit patterns are physical things, like
    101101.  Numbers are not.

Nothing changes in physics either. Block time is the only consistent view given relativity.

Different t ==> different g_ab. That's change in physics. Anyway, GR must be incomplete since it's not compatible with QM.

Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined relations between the bits.

    some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even
    evolve into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to
    reproduce themselves.  Some of these bit patterns may even evolve
    consciousness, as they build brains which attempt to discern and
predict future observations of bit patterns within the number. Let's call this function Universe. There may be bit patterns
    (life forms) in Universe(n) which improve their survival or
    reproductive success by correctly predicting parts of
    Universe(n+x).  There are number relations which define such
    sequences of numbers; you cannot deny their existence without
    denying the Fibonacci sequence or the number line (these are just
    simpler instances of recursive relations).

    I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still
    accept that certain relations are true of them; just like I can
    accept that John Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes.

Numbers, unlike fictional characters, are co-eternal with the universe, if not the cause of the universe.

That assumes numbers exist.

In that sense, they are just as concrete if not more concrete than any physical object. Your view is like that of a being who has spent its whole life in a simulated virtual environment: It believes the virtual reality and items in it are "more real" than the actual computer which implements the virtual environment. The beings only justification for this belief is that he can't access that computer using his senses, nor point is he able to point to it.

That's logically possible and maybe nomologically possible - but there's also not an iota of evidence for it. So my view is *also* like that of a being who has spent his whole life in this material universe. My justification for believing this (to the limited extent I do) is that it is a model consistent with everything known and has been successful all its predictions, from what I'll find in my refrigerator if I look, to the spectra of emissions of galaxies at z=20. The idea that I'm living in a computer simulation predicts everything and nothing.

"A theory that can explain anything fails to explain at all."

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to