On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic definition
and rejecting ostensive ones.
The point is that ostensive definition does not work for justifying an
That seems to be a non-sequitur. How can any kind of definition justify
an ontology? Definitions are about the meaning of words. If I point to
a table and say "Table." I'm defining "table", not justifying an ontology.
That's what the dream argument shows. Being axiomatic does not beg the
question. You can be materialist and develop an axiomatic of primitive
matter. The whole point of an axiomatic approach consists in being as
neutral as possible on ontological commitment.
But what you demanded was a *physical* axiomatic definition. Which
seems to be a demand that the definition be physical, yet not
ostensive. I think that's contradictory.
Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces
computation to be there.
The computations are concrete relations.
If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.
They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be
described by some axiomatic.
And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations. So the
"fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of
relations. The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables
This means only that we *can* agree on simple (but very fertile) basic
number relations. For primitive matter, that does not exist, and that
is why people recourse to ostensive "definition". They knock the
table, and say "you will not tell me that this table does not exist".
The problem, for them, is that I can dream of people knocking tables.
So for the basic fundamental ontology, you just cannot use the
ostensive move (or you have to abandon the dream argument, classical
theory of knowledge, or comp). But this moves seems an ad hoc non-comp
move, if not a rather naive attitude.
What "dream argument"? That all we think of as real could be a dream?
I think that is as worthless as solipism.
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