On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 8:31 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:

>  On 7/23/2011 3:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 3:54 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
>>   On 7/22/2011 10:46 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 3:30 AM, Stephen P. King 
>> <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
>>>   On 7/22/2011 2:11 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 12:44 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net
>>> > wrote:
>>>> On 7/22/2011 1:24 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>> All the relevant parts of relativity which imply block time have been
>>>>> confirmed.  The above is like arguing against gravity because Newton's
>>>>> theory wasn't compatible with the observations of Mercury's orbit.
>>>>>  Hi Jason,
>>>>    Could you be more specific? Exactly which "relevant parts which imply
>>>> block time have been confirmed" and how?
>>> Special relativity, time dilation due to speed, non simultaneity of
>>> events reported by observers in different reference frames, and so on.
>>> And to Brent's point, regarding the conflict between relativity and QM,
>>> that issue is with GR, SR is not in conflict with QM.
>>> This paper explains it well: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2408/
>>> Jason
>>>   Hi Jason,
>>>     I will check that paper, thanks! But here is the thing about the
>>> implications of relativity of simultaneity: Since it prohibits any form of
>>> absolute synchronization of events, this in turn restricts how the entire
>>> space-time manifold can be considered as parceled up into space-like and
>>> time like regions.
>> Imagine that spacetime is a 3 dimensional instead of four dimensional.
>> Now take any object's velocity through that space time, and consider a plane
>> perpendicular to the direction of that velocity.  The content of that plane
>> is considered the "present" for that reference frame.  This is more clear if
>> you consider euclidean space time rather than Minkowski space.  The only
>> difference you need to make to convert spacetime to Euclidean is to imagine
>> that every object's velocity through space time is c.  *Relativity
>> Visualized* is a good book which explains this view, but this site also
>> explains it: http://www.relativitysimplified.com/ .  It enables an
>> intuitive understanding of all the strange effects like time dilation and
>> length contraction.  Since we see only the three dimensional "shadow" of
>> objects, an object with a different velocity is rotated in space time.  It
>> is like having an umbrella pointed straight at the sun vs. it being tilted,
>> if it is tilted its shadow becomes compressed along the direction it is
>> tilted.
>>> In other words, there cannot exist a single Cauchy hypersurface what acts
>>> as the set of initial (or final) conditions for a GR field equation for the
>>> entire universe.
>> The fact that relativity iplies a unique present for every reference frame
>> is one of the main arguments for block time.  How can the car driving past
>> you have a present containing different real objects than yours?  Presentism
>> assumes the present is the set of real objects at a given period of time,
>> but what is real to you now in this moment is different from what is real to
>> me in the same moment if we are moving relative to each other (even if we
>> are at the same location).  See:
>> https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Rietdijk%E2%80%93Putnam_argument
>> The paper I cited also goes on to counter objections made to that
>> argument.
>> Thanks,
>> Jason
>>  --
>> Hi Jason,
> Stephen,
> Thanks for your comments.  I will not reply to everything you mentioned,
> because I think Jesse did a good job of adressing most of the issues you
> raised.
>>      None of those papers address the concern of narratability that I am
>> considering. In fact they all assume narratability. I am pointing out that
>> thinking of time as a dimension has a big problem! It only works if all the
>> events in time are pre-specifiable. This also involves strong determinism
>> which is ruled out by QM. See
>> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/#StaDetPhyThe for a
>> general overview and 
>> tph.tuwien.ac.at/~svozil/publ/1994-calude.pdf<http://tph.tuwien.ac.at/%7Esvozil/publ/1994-calude.pdf>for
>>  a discussion that involves computationalism.
> Determinism and locality are only lost in the collapse theories.  Under MWI
> and similar theories, physics is local and deterministic.
>>     The idea that time is a dimension assumes that the events making up
>> the points of the dimension are not only isomorphic to the positive Reals
>> but also somehow can freely borrow the well order of the reals.
> Imagine space time as an apple.  Now I ask you the question "Which seed
> comes first?"  There is no objective answer, the seed that comes first
> depends entirely on the angle at which you approach the apple.  The same is
> true of events in space time, there conclusion of which event occurred first
> depends entirely on the angle at which one is travelling through space
> time.  Time, under Euclidean relativity is exactly like any spatial
> dimension, the reason it seems different from the other dimensions (we can't
> change direction through it, go backwards, change our velocity through it)
> is because there is a physical law that all objects must always travel at
> the speed of light.  The dimension of time is merely the one parallel to the
> observer's direction at the speed of light.  This is why two objects in
> relative motion to each other have slightly different interpretations of
> what the dimension of time is.  It is why in Feynman diagrams, one can
> rotate or swap dimensions of space or time and the physical interaction
> remains entirely possible.  Since length contraction occurs in the dimension
> of time, from the perspective of an observer their dimension of time is
> 0-length (this is intuitive because if everything has to move at c one
> cannot speed up or slow down to travel freely through the dimension of
> time).
>>  Please do not think that I am trying to knock Special or General
>> Relativity, they both represent time in terms of local readings of clocks
>> and therefore bypass the question that I am considering. The block universe
>> idea assumes a unique and global ordering of events, the actual math of SR
>> and GR do not!
> In the context of the everything, there exist an infinite number of
> different block universes, and an infinite number of them contain you as you
> exist in this moment.  Just as you can be recreated (and brought back to
> life) in a different time or place, using different material, you may also
> be "recreated" in these other universes.  Thus from one second to the next,
> you can travel between these universes, between vast times, between vast
> distances.  You can never be sure where you are or where you will be.  This
> is the reason for the apparent indeterminism in physics.  For details, see
> this paper, which explains how the simple theory that our universe is
> infinitely large, leads directly to the weidness of quantum mechanics:
> http://arxiv.org/abs/1008.1066
> Jason
> --
> Hi Jason,
>     Please see my last response to Jesse.
>     I like that 
> Aguirre<http://arxiv.org/find/quant-ph/1/au:+Aguirre_A/0/1/0/all/0/1>
> ,  Tegmark <http://arxiv.org/find/quant-ph/1/au:+Tegmark_M/0/1/0/all/0/1>and 
> Layzer<http://arxiv.org/find/quant-ph/1/au:+Layzer_D/0/1/0/all/0/1>paper ! I 
> only take exception to its tacit assumption of spacetime
> substantivalism.
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/#PriSpaSub It assumes
> an infinite number of spacetimes instead of just one and so does not address
> the problem that I am trying to point out.
>     I am arguing that spacetime is not a substance what we are somehow
> embedded in but something that emerges from the interactions of many QM
> systems; it is what their observables have in common. I take QM to be a
> theory of observers and GR is a theory of how observations are organized. A
> theory is a explanatory model and its concepts should never be considered as
> objectively existing 'things'. If there is a one-to-one correlation between
> the entities of a theory and entities within our phenomenal experience then
> that is the hallmark of a good theory, but the theory is never the phenomena
> itself.
> Onward!

If you want to formulate block time without reifying spacetime, then just
consider block time a collection of events separated by certain distances
and directions from eachother.  You may be right that ultimately this is all
related to a theory of observation, and I think I can understand what you
mean by relativity explaining the organization of these
events/observations.  In any case, a block universe seems to be a simpler
theory than that of one in which objects become real and become unreal
continuously, and it is consistent with observations.  There is no
scientific justification for presentism that I am aware of.


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