Dear Steohen and Craig:
I would apply my response to Stathis to your 'simulation': you can simulate
whatever you )already) know about the substrate. Our knowledge is sporadic
and skewed - fitted to the so far absorbed and adjusted knowledge we
assumed, so we can 'simulate' incompletely.
Best regards
John Mikes

On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 5:08 PM, Stephen P. King <>wrote:

> On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote:
>> On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>> On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, "Stephen P. King"<>  wrote:
>>>       The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or
>>>> computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that
>>>> it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict
>>>> *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot
>>>> create an approximately accurate  model of a weather system. One has to
>>>> trade off accuracy for feasibility.
>>> I agree that's true, and by that definition, we can certainly make
>>> cybernetic systems which can approximate the appearance of
>>> consciousness in the eyes of most human clients of those systems for
>>> the scope of their intended purpose. To get beyond that level of
>>> accuracy, you may need to get down to the cellular, genetic, or
>>> molecular level, in which case it's not really worth the trouble of re-
>>> inventing life just to get a friendlier sounding voicemail.
>>> Craig
>>>  So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level
>> would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would be much
>> more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally
>> simulating them).   This would be a good reason to say 'no' to the doctor,
>> since even though you could simulate the molecules and their interactions,
>> quantum randomness would prevent you from controlling their interactions
>> with the molecules in the rest of your brain.  Bruno's argument would still
>> go through, but the 'doctor' might have to replace not only your brain but a
>> big chunk of the universe with which it interacts.  However, most people who
>> have read Tegmark's paper understand that the brain must be essentially
>> classical as a computer and so a simulation, even one of molecules, could be
>> quasi-classical, i.e. local.
>> Brent
>>  Hi Brent,
>    I wonder if you would make a friendly wager with me about the veracity
> of Tegmark's claims about the brain being "essentially classical"? I bet $1
> US (payable via Paypal) that he is dead wrong *and* that the proof that the
> brain actively  involves quantum phenomena that are discounted by Tegmark
> will emerge within two years. We already have evidence that the
> photosynthesis process in plants involves quantum coherence, there is an
> experiment being designed now to test the coherence in the retina of the
> human eye.
> coherence-in-a-photosynthetic-**biological-system/<>
>    As to your post here. Craig's point is that the simulated brain, even if
> simulated down to the molecular level, will only be a simulation and 'think
> simulate thoughts'. If said simulated brain has a consiousness it will be
> its own, not that some other brain. A consciousness can no more be copied
> than the state of a QM system.
> Onward!
> Stephen
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