Dear Steohen and Craig: I would apply my response to Stathis to your 'simulation': you can simulate whatever you )already) know about the substrate. Our knowledge is sporadic and skewed - fitted to the so far absorbed and adjusted knowledge we assumed, so we can 'simulate' incompletely. Best regards John Mikes
On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 5:08 PM, Stephen P. King <[email protected]>wrote: > On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >>> On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, "Stephen P. King"<[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or >>>> computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that >>>> it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict >>>> *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot >>>> create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to >>>> trade off accuracy for feasibility. >>>> >>> I agree that's true, and by that definition, we can certainly make >>> cybernetic systems which can approximate the appearance of >>> consciousness in the eyes of most human clients of those systems for >>> the scope of their intended purpose. To get beyond that level of >>> accuracy, you may need to get down to the cellular, genetic, or >>> molecular level, in which case it's not really worth the trouble of re- >>> inventing life just to get a friendlier sounding voicemail. >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level >> would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would be much >> more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally >> simulating them). This would be a good reason to say 'no' to the doctor, >> since even though you could simulate the molecules and their interactions, >> quantum randomness would prevent you from controlling their interactions >> with the molecules in the rest of your brain. Bruno's argument would still >> go through, but the 'doctor' might have to replace not only your brain but a >> big chunk of the universe with which it interacts. However, most people who >> have read Tegmark's paper understand that the brain must be essentially >> classical as a computer and so a simulation, even one of molecules, could be >> quasi-classical, i.e. local. >> >> Brent >> >> Hi Brent, > > I wonder if you would make a friendly wager with me about the veracity > of Tegmark's claims about the brain being "essentially classical"? I bet $1 > US (payable via Paypal) that he is dead wrong *and* that the proof that the > brain actively involves quantum phenomena that are discounted by Tegmark > will emerge within two years. We already have evidence that the > photosynthesis process in plants involves quantum coherence, there is an > experiment being designed now to test the coherence in the retina of the > human eye. > > http://www.ghuth.com/2010/02/**03/another-finding-of-quantum-** > coherence-in-a-photosynthetic-**biological-system/<http://www.ghuth.com/2010/02/03/another-finding-of-quantum-coherence-in-a-photosynthetic-biological-system/> > http://www.ghuth.com/2011/04/**24/quantum-coherence-and-the-**retina/<http://www.ghuth.com/2011/04/24/quantum-coherence-and-the-retina/> > > As to your post here. Craig's point is that the simulated brain, even if > simulated down to the molecular level, will only be a simulation and 'think > simulate thoughts'. If said simulated brain has a consiousness it will be > its own, not that some other brain. A consciousness can no more be copied > than the state of a QM system. > > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com <everything-list%[email protected]>. > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
