On 8/13/2011 5:00 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, Aug 14, 2011 at 12:47 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi<use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:
How could the rest of your brain possibly respond differently if it
receives exactly the same stimulation? Perhaps you mean that it
would be able to tell that there is an artificial device there due
to electric fields and so on; but in that case the artificial device
is not appropriately reproducing the I/O behaviour of the original
The question is what does it mean the same stimulation. I guess that you
mean now only electrical signals. However, it well might be the qualia plays
the role as well.
The artificial device must replicate all the I/O behaviour of the
original neurons at the interface with the rest of the brain. This is
purely a problem for engineers who neither know nor care about qualia.
The question is, given that the engineering problem is solved, would
consciousness necessarily be preserved? I think it would, because
otherwise we would have a partial zombie.
If I understand you correctly, you presume that conscious experience could
be resolved within 'normal science' (there is no Hard Problem). Jeffrey Gray
on the other hand acknowledges the Hard Problem and he believes that a new
scientific theory will be needed to solve it.
In the recent posts I do not propose any theory of consciousness, I am
just interested in whether consciousness would be preserved if I had
my brain replaced with artificial components. If the answer is "yes"
that still does not explain why we are conscious at all or how
consciousness is generated.
"Preserved" is ambiguous. If you mean "unchanged" then I don't think
the argument shows that, since the replacement part has some part of
consciousness associated with it which could be different even though
the interface with the biological part is perfectly replicated for
almost all possible input/output.
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