On 16 Aug 2011, at 08:08, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
On 8/15/2011 7:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
just like you can simulate flight if you simulate the environment
you are flying in.
But do we need to simulate the entire atmosphere in order to
simulate flight, or just the atmosphere in the immediate area around
the surfaces of the plane? Likewise, it seems we could take
shortcuts in simulating the environment surrounding a mind and get
the behavior we are after.
Why simulate? Why not create a robot with sensors so it can
interact the natural environment.
There seems to be another confusion operating here. What makes you
think I am not creating a robot with sensors? What has this got to
do with simulation?
1) Having sensors is not simulation. Humans have sensors...eg
2) The use of sensors does not connect the robot to the
environment in any unique way. The incident photon could have come
across the room or the galaxy. Nobody tells a human which, yet the
brain sorts it out.
3) A robot brain based on replication uses sensors like any
4) What I am saying is that the replication approach will
handle the sensors like a human brain handles sensors.
Of course we don’t have to simulate the entire universe to simulate
flight. The fact is we simulate _some_ of the environment in order
that flight simulation works. It’s a simulation. It’s not flight.
This has nothing to do with the actual problem of real embedded
embodied cognition of an unknown external environment by an AGI. You
don’t know it! You are ‘cognising’ to find out about it. You can’t
simulate it and the sensors don’t give you enough info. If a human
supplies that info then you’re grounding the robot in the human’s
cognition, not supplying the robot with its own cognition.
In replication there is no simulating going on! There is inorganic,
artificially derived natural processes identical to what is going on
in a natural brain. Literally. A brain has action potential comms. A
brain has EM comms. Therefore a replicated brain will have the SAME
action potentials mutually interacting with the same EM fields. The
replicant chips will have an EEG/MEG signature like a human. There
is no computing of anything. There is inorganic version of the
identical processes going on in a real brain.
I hope we’re closer to being on the same page.
OK. But now you clearly depart from Craig's non-comp theory. In your
approach you just make the substitution comp level low, and this from
an intuition which has been explained to be a consequence of the
existence of a substitution level (that is comp).
Congratulations for the PhD, Colin.
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