On 12 Sep 2011, at 22:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
This sounds like a rejection of the mind-brain identity thesis,
which is
what functionalism / computationalism do. (Jason Resch)
It's a rejection of a simplistic version of the mind-brain identity
thesis in favor of my own sense-essence-existence identity thesis.
Which is worst than the mind-brain identity thesis, which does NOT
work with comp, except in the relative way.
If my consciousness remains unchanged in a digital substitution, *my*
consciousness will be ontically attached to an infinity of
computations defined by the arithmetical relations: this explains
where the appearances of physical reality comes from, and is, I think,
the first simple explanations of most of the quantum weirdness (the
appearance of the many-realities, indeterminacy, non cloning of
matter, and non locality, and the math explains the notion of
entanglement).
And the theory of mind is rather natural too, the mind is all what a
machine can discover by introspection. That contains public sharable
pieces, (quanta) and non sharable pieces (qualia).
I mean we can conserve one half of the mind-brain identity thesis
(brain ---> mind), but we have to abandon (mind ---> brain) for (mind
---> infinity of brainS).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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