On 12 Sep 2011, at 22:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:

This sounds like a rejection of the mind-brain identity thesis, which is
what functionalism / computationalism do. (Jason Resch)

It's a rejection of a simplistic version of the mind-brain identity
thesis in favor of my own sense-essence-existence identity thesis.

Which is worst than the mind-brain identity thesis, which does NOT work with comp, except in the relative way. If my consciousness remains unchanged in a digital substitution, *my* consciousness will be ontically attached to an infinity of computations defined by the arithmetical relations: this explains where the appearances of physical reality comes from, and is, I think, the first simple explanations of most of the quantum weirdness (the appearance of the many-realities, indeterminacy, non cloning of matter, and non locality, and the math explains the notion of entanglement).

And the theory of mind is rather natural too, the mind is all what a machine can discover by introspection. That contains public sharable pieces, (quanta) and non sharable pieces (qualia).

I mean we can conserve one half of the mind-brain identity thesis (brain ---> mind), but we have to abandon (mind ---> brain) for (mind ---> infinity of brainS).



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