On 9/15/2011 7:34 PM Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 13 Sep 2011, at 21:45, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
At present, I am just trying to figure out our beliefs that make
the simulation hypothesis possible.
But this is really astonishing, and in quasi-contradiction which what
you say above. We just don't know any phenomena which are not Turing
emulable. As a theorician, but only as a theorician, I can show the
theoretical existence of non simulable phenomena, but that really
exists only in theory, or in mathematics. Worst, most non simulable
phenomena will be non distinguishable from randomness, and if we are
machine, we will never been able to recognize a non Turing emulable
phenomenon as such. It seems that the question is more like "how can
we believe something non Turing emulable could exist in Nature".
Let me repeat your statement: "We just don't know any phenomena which
are not Turing emulable." I am not sure that it is so evident. As I have
written, the simulation hypothesis just does not work in practice. Hence
your statement cannot be deduced just from empirical studies, it is
already based on some beliefs.
Let me quote for example Laughlin (A Different Universe, The Emergent Age)
"The transition to the Age of Emergence brings to an end the myth of the
absolute power of mathematics. This myth is still entrenched in our
culture, unfortunately, a fact revealed routinely in the press and
popular publications promoting the search for ultimate laws as the only
scientific activity worth pursuing, notwithstanding massive and
overwhelming experimental evidence that exactly the opposite is the case."
After all, "Human brain is similar to the Nelder-Mead simplex
method. It often gets stuck in local optima."
That can happen. But I am not sure it can makes sense to doubt about
mechanism. You need to study hard mathematical theories to even
conceive non-comp. Non-comp seems possible in theory, and has an
important role in the epistemology of machines, but in nature and
physics, it simply does not exist. It might even be a reason to doubt
comp, because comp might predict the existence of more non computable
phenomena that what we "see" in nature (basically the personal
outcome of self-superposition).
Also, the UD simulates not just the computable phenomena, but also
the non-computable, yet computable, with respect to oracles, and this
is even more complex to verify for a 'natural' phenomenon.
The winning physical histories/computations are those who are very
long and deep, and are symmetrical and linear at the bottom,
apparently, but this must be extracted from addition and
multiplication, and it is partially done with the gifts of
distinguishing the truth (about a machine), and the many modalities:
the observable, the feelable, the communicable, the provable, the
believable, the knowable, etc (with reasonable modal axiomatics and
their arithmetical realization.
The ideally correct universal machine has a particularly rich and
intriguing theology, which is made refutable, because that theology
contains its physics. So we can compare with nature, and if comp is
false, we can measure our degree of non computationalism.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at