On 9/15/2011 10:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi Evgenii,## Advertising

On 13 Sep 2011, at 21:45, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:Bruno,As I have already mentioned, I am not that far to follow your theorem. I will do itpresumably the next year.Take your time. I am at the step 6 on the dot forum, where things are done slowly,deeply and in a nice atmosphere :)I have been working for the last ten year with engineers and my consideration is so farat the engineering level.All my work has been possible thanks to engineers, not scientist nor philosopher who arestill too much in the "the boss is right" type of philosophy. To be sure there are someexceptions. But usually engineers have a much better common sense and lucidity, thanscientist who seems to want to believe religiously in their theories.After all, if we know something, we should be able to employ it in practice. And ifthis does not work in practice, then how do we know that our knowledge is correct.Working in practice does not mean truth.Said that, I understand the importance of theory and appreciate the work oftheoreticians. After all, if we say A, then we must say B as well. Hence it is on mylist to follow your theorem (but not right now).No problem.At present, I am just trying to figure out our beliefs that make the simulationhypothesis possible.But this is really astonishing, and in quasi-contradiction which what you say above. Wejust don't know any phenomena which are not Turing emulable.

`But isn't that just a selection effect. If it weren't Turing emulable, how would we know`

`that?`

As a theorician, but only as a theorician, I can show the theoretical existence of nonsimulable phenomena, but that really exists only in theory, or in mathematics. Worst,most non simulable phenomena will be non distinguishable from randomness, and if we aremachine, we will never been able to recognize a non Turing emulable phenomenon as such.It seems that the question is more like "how can we believe something non Turingemulable could exist in Nature".

But your argument assumes that arithmetic exists, which is also "only in mathematics".

After all, "Human brain is similar to the Nelder-Mead simplex method. It often getsstuck in local optima."That can happen. But I am not sure it can makes sense to doubt about mechanism. You needto study hard mathematical theories to even conceive non-comp. Non-comp seems possiblein theory, and has an important role in the epistemology of machines, but in nature andphysics, it simply does not exist.

`Yet most people on the 'everything' list assume the universe is infinite and`

`uncomputable. Isn't it implicit in Everett's multiverse (and even explicit in Tegmark's)?`

It might even be a reason to doubt comp, because comp might predict the existence ofmore non computable phenomena that what we "see" in nature (basically the personaloutcome of self-superposition).

`But as you say above, we wouldn't recognize them as non-computable - except perhaps in the`

`sense of random, as in quantum randomness.`

Also, the UD simulates not just the computable phenomena, but also the non-computable,yet computable, with respect to oracles, and this is even more complex to verify for a'natural' phenomenon.The winning physical histories/computations

What do you mean by "winning" and how do you know this? Brent

are those who are very long and deep, and are symmetrical and linear at the bottom,apparently, but this must be extracted from addition and multiplication, and it ispartially done with the gifts of distinguishing the truth (about a machine), and themany modalities: the observable, the feelable, the communicable, the provable, thebelievable, the knowable, etc (with reasonable modal axiomatics and their arithmeticalrealization.The ideally correct universal machine has a particularly rich and intriguing theology,which is made refutable, because that theology contains its physics. So we can comparewith nature, and if comp is false, we can measure our degree of non computationalism.Best,Bruno

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