On 15 Sep 2011, at 20:25, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/15/2011 10:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Evgenii,

On 13 Sep 2011, at 21:45, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


As I have already mentioned, I am not that far to follow your theorem. I will do it presumably the next year.

Take your time. I am at the step 6 on the dot forum, where things are done slowly, deeply and in a nice atmosphere :)

I have been working for the last ten year with engineers and my consideration is so far at the engineering level.

All my work has been possible thanks to engineers, not scientist nor philosopher who are still too much in the "the boss is right" type of philosophy. To be sure there are some exceptions. But usually engineers have a much better common sense and lucidity, than scientist who seems to want to believe religiously in their theories.

After all, if we know something, we should be able to employ it in practice. And if this does not work in practice, then how do we know that our knowledge is correct.

Working in practice does not mean truth.

Said that, I understand the importance of theory and appreciate the work of theoreticians. After all, if we say A, then we must say B as well. Hence it is on my list to follow your theorem (but not right now).

No problem.

At present, I am just trying to figure out our beliefs that make the simulation hypothesis possible.

But this is really astonishing, and in quasi-contradiction which what you say above. We just don't know any phenomena which are not Turing emulable.

But isn't that just a selection effect. If it weren't Turing emulable, how would we know that?

We would not know it, but might infer it, like we infer the randomness in the quantum, or in the iterative self-duplication.

As a theorician, but only as a theorician, I can show the theoretical existence of non simulable phenomena, but that really exists only in theory, or in mathematics. Worst, most non simulable phenomena will be non distinguishable from randomness, and if we are machine, we will never been able to recognize a non Turing emulable phenomenon as such. It seems that the question is more like "how can we believe something non Turing emulable could exist in Nature".

But your argument assumes that arithmetic exists, which is also "only in mathematics".

But arithmetic is simple and instantiated everywhere. I was just saying that in nature we have to imagine ad hoc things to get non computable phenomenon. e^iCt, with C = Chaitin numbers, we have a non computable solution of the wave equation, but it is not a 'natural phenomena', nor even recognizable from e^iRt, with R a random number.

After all, "Human brain is similar to the Nelder-Mead simplex method. It often gets stuck in local optima."

That can happen. But I am not sure it can makes sense to doubt about mechanism. You need to study hard mathematical theories to even conceive non-comp. Non-comp seems possible in theory, and has an important role in the epistemology of machines, but in nature and physics, it simply does not exist.

Yet most people on the 'everything' list assume the universe is infinite and uncomputable.

Not at all. The big whole is taken as simple, like all sets, or all numbers. The UD is simple and Turing emulable, but the internal perspective are not.

Isn't it implicit in Everett's multiverse (and even explicit in Tegmark's)?

Everett universal wave is computable. Tegmark takes the whole of math, but seems unaware that this cannot be a mathematical well defined object, nor to take inyo account relative first person indeterminacies.

It might even be a reason to doubt comp, because comp might predict the existence of more non computable phenomena that what we "see" in nature (basically the personal outcome of self-superposition).

But as you say above, we wouldn't recognize them as non-computable - except perhaps in the sense of random, as in quantum randomness.

If a white rabbit steal your computer, you might be less sure, especially if the sky is full of pink elephants. But yes, you are right, the non computable seems to lurk only in the background, as a multiplier of histories, both in comp and Everett.

Also, the UD simulates not just the computable phenomena, but also the non-computable, yet computable, with respect to oracles, and this is even more complex to verify for a 'natural' phenomenon.

The winning physical histories/computations

What do you mean by "winning" and how do you know this?

By winning, I mean they sustains rich and stable intersubjective agreement among populations of independent universal machines. And I know this by UDA + thinking a bit. By being deep and linear, they maximize the relative stability of the dreams, making them sharable.



are those who are very long and deep, and are symmetrical and linear at the bottom, apparently, but this must be extracted from addition and multiplication, and it is partially done with the gifts of distinguishing the truth (about a machine), and the many modalities: the observable, the feelable, the communicable, the provable, the believable, the knowable, etc (with reasonable modal axiomatics and their arithmetical realization.

The ideally correct universal machine has a particularly rich and intriguing theology, which is made refutable, because that theology contains its physics. So we can compare with nature, and if comp is false, we can measure our degree of non computationalism.



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