On 15 Sep 2011, at 20:25, meekerdb wrote:

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On 9/15/2011 10:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Hi Evgenii, On 13 Sep 2011, at 21:45, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:Bruno,As I have already mentioned, I am not that far to follow yourtheorem. I will do it presumably the next year.Take your time. I am at the step 6 on the dot forum, where thingsare done slowly, deeply and in a nice atmosphere :)I have been working for the last ten year with engineers and myconsideration is so far at the engineering level.All my work has been possible thanks to engineers, not scientistnor philosopher who are still too much in the "the boss is right"type of philosophy. To be sure there are some exceptions. Butusually engineers have a much better common sense and lucidity,than scientist who seems to want to believe religiously in theirtheories.After all, if we know something, we should be able to employ it inpractice. And if this does not work in practice, then how do weknow that our knowledge is correct.Working in practice does not mean truth.Said that, I understand the importance of theory and appreciatethe work of theoreticians. After all, if we say A, then we mustsay B as well. Hence it is on my list to follow your theorem (butnot right now).No problem.At present, I am just trying to figure out our beliefs that makethe simulation hypothesis possible.But this is really astonishing, and in quasi-contradiction whichwhat you say above. We just don't know any phenomena which are notTuring emulable.But isn't that just a selection effect. If it weren't Turingemulable, how would we know that?

`We would not know it, but might infer it, like we infer the randomness`

`in the quantum, or in the iterative self-duplication.`

As a theorician, but only as a theorician, I can show thetheoretical existence of non simulable phenomena, but that reallyexists only in theory, or in mathematics. Worst, most non simulablephenomena will be non distinguishable from randomness, and if weare machine, we will never been able to recognize a non Turingemulable phenomenon as such. It seems that the question is morelike "how can we believe something non Turing emulable could existin Nature".But your argument assumes that arithmetic exists, which is also"only in mathematics".

`But arithmetic is simple and instantiated everywhere. I was just`

`saying that in nature we have to imagine ad hoc things to get non`

`computable phenomenon. e^iCt, with C = Chaitin numbers, we have a non`

`computable solution of the wave equation, but it is not a 'natural`

`phenomena', nor even recognizable from e^iRt, with R a random number.`

After all, "Human brain is similar to the Nelder-Mead simplexmethod. It often gets stuck in local optima."That can happen. But I am not sure it can makes sense to doubtabout mechanism. You need to study hard mathematical theories toeven conceive non-comp. Non-comp seems possible in theory, and hasan important role in the epistemology of machines, but in natureand physics, it simply does not exist.Yet most people on the 'everything' list assume the universe isinfinite and uncomputable.

`Not at all. The big whole is taken as simple, like all sets, or all`

`numbers. The UD is simple and Turing emulable, but the internal`

`perspective are not.`

Isn't it implicit in Everett's multiverse (and even explicit inTegmark's)?

`Everett universal wave is computable. Tegmark takes the whole of math,`

`but seems unaware that this cannot be a mathematical well defined`

`object, nor to take inyo account relative first person indeterminacies.`

It might even be a reason to doubt comp, because comp might predictthe existence of more non computable phenomena that what we "see"in nature (basically the personal outcome of self-superposition).But as you say above, we wouldn't recognize them as non-computable -except perhaps in the sense of random, as in quantum randomness.

`If a white rabbit steal your computer, you might be less sure,`

`especially if the sky is full of pink elephants. But yes, you are`

`right, the non computable seems to lurk only in the background, as a`

`multiplier of histories, both in comp and Everett.`

Also, the UD simulates not just the computable phenomena, but alsothe non-computable, yet computable, with respect to oracles, andthis is even more complex to verify for a 'natural' phenomenon.The winning physical histories/computationsWhat do you mean by "winning" and how do you know this?

`By winning, I mean they sustains rich and stable intersubjective`

`agreement among populations of independent universal machines. And I`

`know this by UDA + thinking a bit. By being deep and linear, they`

`maximize the relative stability of the dreams, making them sharable.`

Bruno

Brentare those who are very long and deep, and are symmetrical andlinear at the bottom, apparently, but this must be extracted fromaddition and multiplication, and it is partially done with thegifts of distinguishing the truth (about a machine), and the manymodalities: the observable, the feelable, the communicable, theprovable, the believable, the knowable, etc (with reasonable modalaxiomatics and their arithmetical realization.The ideally correct universal machine has a particularly rich andintriguing theology, which is made refutable, because that theologycontains its physics. So we can compare with nature, and if comp isfalse, we can measure our degree of non computationalism.Best, Bruno--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.