On 22 Sep 2011, at 20:01, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/22/2011 10:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I think what Bruno calls the 323 principle is questionable.
Can I deduce from this that UDA1-7 is understood. This shows
already that either the universe is "little" or physics is
(already) a branch of computer science (even if there is a physical
It doesn't comport with QM. Bruno gets around this by noting that
computationally a classical computer can emulate a quantum
system. But I think that assumes an *isolated* quantum system.
Because the quantum entanglement is in principle unbounded and so it
would take an infinite classical computer to emulate exactly.
That would only make the comp level *very* low, unless the physical
universe is infinite from the start, and "I" (my 3-I, my body) is that
"universe". A tiny classical universal machine, in a steady growing
universe can emulate a quantum big-bang+expansion, as the UD does
In practice we are always satisfied with good approximations. The
Hilbert space has N dimensions representing the configurations we
calculate. We don't include an N+1st dimension to include
"something else happens"; but it is implicitly there.
All real quantum systems big enough to be quasi-classical systems
are impossible to isolate.
But then you have to assume that your brain is some infinite
quantum system (but then comp is false).
Maybe not infinite but arbitrarily entangled with part of the
universe which is finite but expanding.
So I'm afraid this pushes the substitution level all the way down.
Yes, I'm afraid that will be the case.
I tend to look at that as a reductio; but I'm not sure where the
error is. I think it is in not allowing that one need only
*approximate* the function of the brain module the doctor replaces.
But this plead for comp.
But the idea of digital approximation is fuzzy. The digital
computation itself has no fuzz.
I am not sure I understand. Comp implies always a choice for some
truncation. Once done, it has indeed no fuzz, and that is enough to
chose a classical level of description of "my body", for which the 323-
principle will be applicable. It seems to me.
If it's all the way down, then as Craig notes, there's really no
difference between emulation and duplication.
But then you are, like Craig, assuming that mechanism is false.
This is my point, if we want primitive matter, comp is false. (or
comp implies no primitive matter, or the falsity of physicalism).
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