On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 4:37 AM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > > > 2011/10/16 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >> >> On 16 Oct 2011, at 04:22, Terren Suydam wrote (answering Craig): >> >> Exactly. I think that it can be better understood as a phenomenon >> >> which is not only an emergent property of ensembles of neurons, but >> >> granular properties in the moment of an individual entity's behavior >> >> over time. It has to go both ways otherwise there could be no reason >> >> or mechanism for us to care about anything. >> >> What do you mean by "going both ways"? Causality really does not >> cross levels. All we can say is that higher levels emerge >> from/supervene on lower levels. If that gives you problems in seeing >> how we could have a phenomenological experience of will, then that is >> a failure of imagination on your part. Unless, you can come up with a >> principled argument as to why, for one, "there could be no reason or >> mechanism for us to care about anything," and for another, how >> causality can "go both ways". Rhetoric won't do. I need detailed >> arguments. >> >> and >> On 11 Oct 2011, at 14:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (answering Craig): >> >> Your solution seems to be to hide in a cave of pre-scientific >> >> incuriousity. Content to let our entire lives as we experience them >> >> natively to be sequestered in a never-never land that is neither >> >> physical nor spiritual. Your assumptions paint conscious subjects as >> >> epiphenomenal non-objects, orphaned from reason, science, or any >> >> possibility of understanding. >> >> Further, they deny their own self-invalidation without justification, >> >> so that somehow these thoughts of exclusively deterministic >> >> epistemology are themselves immune from their own critical purview. It >> >> is to say that all thought is 'simply' neurology - except this >> >> thought. This is the one special magic thought which disqualifies all >> >> others. It is a philosophy that appeals to many, for obvious reasons, >> >> as it provides the sense of certainty and safety which we crave. The >> >> truth is that is thought is 'simply' the mirror image of new age >> >> religiosity, but owing more of it's spirit to the Inquisition. >> >> I really can't understand your emotional objection to the idea that >> consciousness may be epiphenomenal and supervenient on mechanistic >> processes. It doesn't worry me or affect my behaviour; why should it? >> >> If consciousness is an epiphenomena, and given that the physical laws will >> be explains in term of coherent appearances in machine's consciousness >> (dreams), eventually both consciousness and matter are epiphenomena. >> As s rebuttal to Craig non-comp stance and ex-nihilo spontaneous will >> causation, the argument is valid. But the phrasing is dubious. Better to use >> "phenomenological" instead of epiphenomena, I think. >> And, I would say, against Terren, that causality can cross level of >> explanation, even if I agree that there is some unaccessible low level, >> which is just the arithmetical law, when assuming comp. But a universal >> machine can emulate a cyclic "causal" relationships, like a universe can >> emulate someone taking an aspirin to act on its brain, and an aspirin can >> indeed act on the brain, which at some high level is a cross level >> relationship, even if at a more lower level, all this is completely >> deterministic. We need this because high level explanation are unavoidable >> (the comp theory force an explanation of both mind and matter in term of >> higher epistemological level). >> I think it is important. The materialist eliminativists do that confusion >> so that consciousness becomes a mere epiphenomena, which is the purgatory >> before elimination. With comp this would eliminate both mind and matter, >> with only the numbers remaining. The moral is that high level phenomena are >> what is important, and can have local role. That is what gives free-will a >> genuine sense in the compatibilistic determinist frame. It is also what >> gives consciousness (phenomenological bet on a reality) a genuine power, >> like a relative self-speeding up. >> Low level phenomena (like quantum wave or arithmetic) can account for a >> high level phenomenon, but usually cannot 'explained' it in any reasonable >> sense of the terms. Nobody will explain a murder by a quantum field. >> Already, nobody will explain deep blue strategy by invoking the computer's >> gate running deep blue programs. > > That's what I wanted to explain to craig... when you run a program on a > computer... the low level of the computer (the transistors of the cpu) are > constraint by the program, it is the high level (the program) that "drives" > the physical states of the CPU. > >> Explanation will be phenomenologically explains by higher order >> phenomenological facts, and sometimes invoking genuine cross level >> causation. Like, he did the murder but is not guilty, he just became mad due >> to a brain tumor, said the lawyer. The judge answered: he is guilty of >> irresponsibility because he got got a brain tumor by attempting to suicide >> by drinking radioactive materials. >> Only from God's point of view, everything is deterministic, and from that >> view, consciousness is, well, just absent. But from the internal views there >> will be real solid material appearances and real conscious experiences. >> Of course, this is only vocabulary. Actually such loops and cross level >> "causality" are well explained by computer sciences, and so we don't need to >> postulate 'material mind' to make the mind acting on matter, and producing >> things like symphony, Mona Lisa and atomic bombs. Biology is full of such >> kind of loop. >> Bruno
Suppose I decide to arrange three stones in a triangle. Do the stones "create" the triangle (upward causation), or does the triangle "constrain" the stones (downward causation)? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
