Dear Bruno,

I still think that we can synchronize our ideas! On 1/25/2012 1:10 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Jan 2012, at 18:04, Stephen P. King wrote:Hi,I am 99% in agreement with Craig here. The 1% difference is aquibble over the math. We have to be careful that we don't reproducethe same slide into sophistry that has happened in physics.I think I agree. I comment Craig below.Onward! Stephen On 1/25/2012 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:On Jan 25, 2:05 am, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:It is not at all camouflaged; Lawrence Krause just wrote a bookcalled "A Universe FromNothing". That the universe came from nothing is suggested bycalculations of the totalenergy of the universe. Theories of the origin of the universehave been developed byAlexander Vilenkin, Stephen Hawking and James Hartle. Of coursethe other view is thatthere cannot have been Nothing and Something is the default. "The most reasonable belief is that we came from nothing, by nothing, and for nothing." --- Quentin SmithI think that we are all familiar with the universe from nothing theories, but the problem is with how nothing is defined. The possibility of creating a universe, or creating anything is not 'nothing', so that any theory of nothingness already fails if the definition of nothing relies on concepts of symmetry and negation, dynamic flux over time, and the potential for physical forces, not to mention living organisms and awareness. An honestly recognized 'nothing' must be in all ways sterile and lacking the potential for existence of any sort, otherwise it's not nothing.I agree too. That is why it is clearer to put *all* our assumptions onthe table. Physical theories of the origin, making it appearing fromphysical nothingness, makes sense only in, usually mathematical,theories of nothingness. It amounts to the fact that the quantumvacuum is unstable, or even more simply, a quantum universaldovetailer. This assumes de facto a particular case of comp, thebelieves in the existence of at least one (Turing) universal system.As you might know, choosing this particular one is treachery, in themind body problem, given that if that is the one, it has to beexplained in term of a special sum on *all* computational historiesindependently of the base (the universal system) chosen at the start.

`The idea of theories of Nothing is that "Everything is`

`indistinguishable from Nothing". This is very different from`

`distinctions between Something and Nothing. I cannot emphasize enough`

`how important the role of belief, as it Bp&p, has and how "belief"`

`automatically induces an entity that is capable of having the belief. We`

`simply cannot divorce the action from the actor while we can divorce the`

`action from any *particular* actor. Your idea that we have to count`

`*all* computational histories is equally important, but note that a`

`choice has to be made. This role, in my thinking, is explained in terms`

`of an infinite ensemble of entities, each capable of making the choice.`

`If we can cover all of their necessary and sufficient properties by`

`considering them as *Löb*ian, good, but I think that we need a tiny bit`

`more structure to involve bisimulations between multiple and separate`

`*Löb*ian entities so that we can extract local notions of time and space.`

Any formalism describing the quantum vaccuum assumes much more thatthe Robinson tiny arithmetical theory for the ontology needed in comp.Nothing physical does not mean nothing conceptual. You have still tooassume the numbers, at the least. So it assumes more and it copiesnature (you can't, with comp, or you lost the big half of everything).

`I would like you to consider that the uniqueness of standard models`

`of arithmetic, such as that defined in the Tennenbaum theorem, as a`

`relative notion. Each and every *Löb*ian entity will always consider`

`themselves as recursive and countable and thus the "standard" of`

`uniqueness. This refelcts the idea that each of us as observers finds`

`ourselves in the center of "the" universe.`

My view is that the default is neither nothing or something but rather Everything.I think there coexist, and are explanativaely dual of each others. Inboth case you need the assumptions needed to make precise what canexist and what cannot exist.

`This is a mistake because it tacitly assumes that a finite theory`

`can exactly model the totality of existence.`

If you have an eternal everything then the universe of somethings and sometimes can be easily explained by there being temporary bundling of everything into isolated wholes, collections of wholes, collections of collections, etc, each with their own share of small share of eternity.OK.

Indeed!

This is what I am trying to say with Bruno about numbers starting from 1 instead of 0. From 1 we can subtract 1 and get 0,So we get 0 after all.

`Right, but we recover 0 *after* the first act of distinguishing. We`

`cannot start with a notion of primitives that assume distinction a priori.`

but from 0, no logical concept of 1 need follow.No logical concept, you are right (although this is not so easy toproof). But you have the *arithmetical* (yes, *not* logical), notionof a number's successor, noted s(x). We assume that all numbers havesuccessors. And we can even define 0 as the only one which is not asuccessor, by assuming Ax(~(0= s(x))) (for all number 0 is differentfrom the successor of that number).having the symbol 0, we can actually name all numbers: by 0, s(0),s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), s(s(s(s(0)))), s(s(s(s(s(0))))), ...

`Yes, but only after making the initial distinction, an act which`

`requires an actor. This is a "chicken and the egg" problem.`

0 is just 0. 0 minus 0 is still 0.Yes. That's correct. And for all numbers x, you have also that x + 0 =x. Worst: for all number x, x*0 = 0.That 0 is a famous number!

`I invite you to take a look at the finitist system of mathematics`

`of Norman J. Wildberger`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rational_trigonometry>.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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