Dear Stephen,

On 25 Jan 2012, at 20:01, Stephen P. King wrote:

Dear Bruno,


    I still think that we can synchronize our ideas!

Well, assuming there is no flaws in UDA, and in AUDA (which assumes comp, but also the classical theory of knowledge, that is the axioms of the modal logic S4 for describing knowledge(*)), then it is in the interest of your theory to synchronize with the theory of the universal machine by the universal machine.
;)

(*)
Kp -> p  (if I know p, p is true)
Kp -> KKp (if I know p, I know that I know p) ; this one not not necessary (and false in the "sensible matter"). K(p->q) -> (Kp->Kq) (If I know that p implies q, and if I know p, then I know q).




On 1/25/2012 1:10 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Jan 2012, at 18:04, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi,

I am 99% in agreement with Craig here. The 1% difference is a quibble over the math. We have to be careful that we don't reproduce the same slide into sophistry that has happened in physics.

I think I agree. I comment Craig below.



Onward!

Stephen

On 1/25/2012 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 25, 2:05 am, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>  wrote:

It is not at all camouflaged; Lawrence Krause just wrote a book called "A Universe From Nothing". That the universe came from nothing is suggested by calculations of the total energy of the universe. Theories of the origin of the universe have been developed by Alexander Vilenkin, Stephen Hawking and James Hartle. Of course the other view is that
there cannot have been Nothing and Something is the default.
"The most reasonable belief is that we came from nothing, by
nothing, and for nothing."
          --- Quentin Smith
I think that we are all familiar with the universe from nothing
theories, but the problem is with how nothing is defined. The
possibility of creating a universe, or creating anything is not
'nothing', so that any theory of nothingness already fails if the
definition of nothing relies on concepts of symmetry and negation,
dynamic flux over time, and the potential for physical forces, not to
mention living organisms and awareness. An honestly recognized
'nothing' must be in all ways sterile and lacking the potential for
existence of any sort, otherwise it's not nothing.

I agree too. That is why it is clearer to put *all* our assumptions on the table. Physical theories of the origin, making it appearing from physical nothingness, makes sense only in, usually mathematical, theories of nothingness. It amounts to the fact that the quantum vacuum is unstable, or even more simply, a quantum universal dovetailer. This assumes de facto a particular case of comp, the believes in the existence of at least one (Turing) universal system. As you might know, choosing this particular one is treachery, in the mind body problem, given that if that is the one, it has to be explained in term of a special sum on *all* computational histories independently of the base (the universal system) chosen at the start.

The idea of theories of Nothing is that "Everything is indistinguishable from Nothing".

That does not make much sense to me. Words like "everything", "nothing", "existence" are theory independent.
"nothing" by itself has no meaning.



This is very different from distinctions between Something and Nothing. I cannot emphasize enough how important the role of belief, as it Bp&p,

as is Bp. (Bp & p is knowledge, obtained by applying Theaetetus' definition (true belief) when "believability" of the ideal rational correct machine, is believing in the modus ponens rule and in a correct description on its own functioning at the right level (even if only serendipitously). This behaves, like Gödel's provability, to the logic of self-reference G and G*.


has and how "belief" automatically induces an entity that is capable of having the belief.

Beliefs are defined by those entities, which you can see as (relative) theorem provers. Let me fix one universal system (like any enough rich describing an initial segment of (N,+,*)) then I can effectively associate digital entities (machine, pieces of computation, machine's discourse) with numbers. Like fixing 0 on a line can help me to relate to points through numbers.

So relatively to a universal numbers, some numbers can develop beliefs. All sort of beliefs. I limit myself to the study of ideally rational machines. The amazing thing is that such machine get mystical, and their discourses and silent are interesting.



We simply cannot divorce the action from the actor while we can divorce the action from any *particular* actor.

Sure.



Your idea that we have to count *all* computational histories is equally important, but note that a choice has to be made. This role, in my thinking, is explained in terms of an infinite ensemble of entities, each capable of making the choice. If we can cover all of their necessary and sufficient properties by considering them as Löbian, good, but I think that we need a tiny bit more structure to involve bisimulations between multiple and separate Löbian entities so that we can extract local notions of time and space.

My approach consists in asking them. I think UDA makes that obligatory. And I don't know other way to allow the neat quanta/qualia distinction, in the unavoidable octalism of the Löbian entities.




Any formalism describing the quantum vaccuum assumes much more that the Robinson tiny arithmetical theory for the ontology needed in comp. Nothing physical does not mean nothing conceptual. You have still too assume the numbers, at the least. So it assumes more and it copies nature (you can't, with comp, or you lost the big half of everything).

I would like you to consider that the uniqueness of standard models of arithmetic, such as that defined in the Tennenbaum theorem, as a relative notion.

?


Each and every Löbian entity will always consider themselves as recursive and countable

Actually Löbian entities are much more general than machines. Most divine (no Turing emulable) self-referentially correct entity still obey to G and G*. Comp implies that you need really go quite close to God to lose Löbianity by adding knowledge. It is far simpler to lose Löbianity by losing knowledge.

Now, you were more deeply wrong, with all my respect. No sound Löbian entity, be it a machine or not, will ever consider themselves as recursive or enumerable. It is a quite strong bet they might do occasionally, but it entails, paradoxically enough perhaps, that, the first person related to the machine, is not really (or not at all) a machine.




and thus the "standard" of uniqueness. This refelcts the idea that each of us as observers finds ourselves in the center of "the" universe.



My view is that the default is neither nothing or something but rather
Everything.

I think there coexist, and are explanativaely dual of each others. In both case you need the assumptions needed to make precise what can exist and what cannot exist.

This is a mistake because it tacitly assumes that a finite theory can exactly model the totality of existence.

It cannot model the totality of the truth about reality, but it can find the simplest realm where those truth can be explained to come from. What I have proved is that if we assume comp, elementary arithmetic is enough. The additive and multiplicative structure of the numbers already enable the provable existence of infinite forum on what is exactly happening.





If you have an eternal everything then the universe of
somethings and sometimes can be easily explained by there being
temporary bundling of everything into isolated wholes, collections of wholes, collections of collections, etc, each with their own share of
small share of eternity.

OK.

    Indeed!




This is what I am trying to say with Bruno about numbers starting from
1 instead of 0. From 1 we can subtract 1 and get 0,

So we get 0 after all.

Right, but we recover 0 *after* the first act of distinguishing. We cannot start with a notion of primitives that assume distinction a priori.

You confuse the level. It is obvious that we assume some distinction ability at the meta-level where we communicate the theory of the beliefs.

- What is zero?
- An invention of the humand mind! (said the naturalist)
- What is the human mind?
- A neural net composed of 10 billions neural cells, and 200 billions glial cells.
- What is 10 billions?






but from 0, no
logical concept of 1 need follow.

No logical concept, you are right (although this is not so easy to proof). But you have the *arithmetical* (yes, *not* logical), notion of a number's successor, noted s(x). We assume that all numbers have successors. And we can even define 0 as the only one which is not a successor, by assuming Ax(~(0= s(x))) (for all number 0 is different from the successor of that number).

having the symbol 0, we can actually name all numbers: by 0, s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), s(s(s(s(0)))), s(s(s(s(s(0))))), ...

Yes, but only after making the initial distinction, an act which requires an actor. This is a "chicken and the egg" problem.

Not at all. The question is only; do you agree with the RA and PA axioms? Then the beauty of RA and PA is that they can justify why, with less than RA or PA, you will not get them. So if you assume less than RA, you lost the existence of the universal machine, which is the main heroin in the arithmetical drama.

There is no chicken and egg problem. I just make clear that I assume elementary arithmetic. (As virtually all scientists and laymen).




0 is just 0. 0 minus 0 is still 0.

Yes. That's correct. And for all numbers x, you have also that x + 0 = x. Worst: for all number x, x*0 = 0.
That 0 is a famous number!

I invite you to take a look at the finitist system of mathematics of Norman J. Wildberger.

Rational trigonometry looks like another choice of Turing universal system. Certainly cute. Quite interesting, but might be a bit distracting too. The comp mind-body problem involves them all. No doubt that some universal systems are more important than others, relatively to some question, but to keep the 1p and the 3p distinction, and the quanta/qualia distinction, we have to extract those relative importance from the "interview" of the universal (Löbian) machine.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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