On Jan 25, 1:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> I agree too. That is why it is clearer to put *all* our assumptions on
> the table. Physical theories of the origin, making it appearing from
> physical nothingness, makes sense only in, usually mathematical,
> theories of nothingness. It amounts to the fact that the quantum
> vacuum is unstable, or even more simply, a quantum universal
> dovetailer. This assumes de facto a particular case of comp, the
> believes in the existence of at  least one (Turing) universal system.
> As you might know, choosing this particular one is treachery, in the
> mind body problem, given that if that is the one, it has to be
> explained in term of a special sum on *all* computational histories
> independently of the base (the universal system) chosen at the start.
> Any formalism describing the quantum vaccuum assumes much more that
> the Robinson tiny arithmetical theory for the ontology needed in comp.
> Nothing physical does not mean nothing conceptual. You have still too
> assume the numbers, at the least. So it assumes more and it copies
> nature (you can't, with comp, or you lost the big half of everything).
> >> My view is that the default is neither nothing or something but
> >> rather
> >> Everything.
> I think there coexist, and are explanativaely dual of each others. In
> both case you need the assumptions needed to make precise what can
> exist and what cannot exist.

Yes, they coexist or coexplain. The word nothing has to discriminate
from some other possibility, which would always be some thing, and
once there is a thing, then that thing is automatically every thing as
well, hah. These contingencies are all part of a something though. If
we look to a nothingness beyond the word though, a true existential
vacuum, then that is all it is and all it can be.

> >> If you have an eternal everything then the universe of
> >> somethings and sometimes can be easily explained by there being
> >> temporary bundling of everything into isolated wholes, collections of
> >> wholes, collections of collections, etc, each with their own share of
> >> small share of eternity.
> OK.
> >> This is what I am trying to say with Bruno about numbers starting
> >> from
> >> 1 instead of 0. From 1 we can subtract 1 and get 0,
> So we get 0 after all.

Sure. Although 0 might be not be a number so much as neutralizing or
clearing of the enumerating motive.

> >> but from 0, no
> >> logical concept of 1 need follow.
> No logical concept, you are right (although this is not so easy to
> proof). But you have the *arithmetical* (yes, *not* logical), notion
> of a number's successor, noted s(x). We assume that all numbers have
> successors. And we can even define 0 as the only one which is not a
> successor, by assuming Ax(~(0= s(x))) (for all number 0 is different
> from the successor of that number).

Yeah, I can't see how 0 could be the successor of any number.

> having the symbol 0, we can actually name all numbers: by 0, s(0),
> s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), s(s(s(s(0)))), s(s(s(s(s(0))))), ...
> >> 0 is just 0. 0 minus 0 is still 0.
> Yes. That's correct. And for all numbers x, you have also that x + 0 =
> x. Worst: for all number x,  x*0 = 0.
> That 0 is a famous number!

Haha. I have always had sort of a dread about x*0. Sort of a
remorseless destructive power there...


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