On Jan 25, 1:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > I agree too. That is why it is clearer to put *all* our assumptions on > the table. Physical theories of the origin, making it appearing from > physical nothingness, makes sense only in, usually mathematical, > theories of nothingness. It amounts to the fact that the quantum > vacuum is unstable, or even more simply, a quantum universal > dovetailer. This assumes de facto a particular case of comp, the > believes in the existence of at least one (Turing) universal system. > As you might know, choosing this particular one is treachery, in the > mind body problem, given that if that is the one, it has to be > explained in term of a special sum on *all* computational histories > independently of the base (the universal system) chosen at the start. > Any formalism describing the quantum vaccuum assumes much more that > the Robinson tiny arithmetical theory for the ontology needed in comp. > Nothing physical does not mean nothing conceptual. You have still too > assume the numbers, at the least. So it assumes more and it copies > nature (you can't, with comp, or you lost the big half of everything). > > > > >> My view is that the default is neither nothing or something but > >> rather > >> Everything. > > I think there coexist, and are explanativaely dual of each others. In > both case you need the assumptions needed to make precise what can > exist and what cannot exist.

Yes, they coexist or coexplain. The word nothing has to discriminate from some other possibility, which would always be some thing, and once there is a thing, then that thing is automatically every thing as well, hah. These contingencies are all part of a something though. If we look to a nothingness beyond the word though, a true existential vacuum, then that is all it is and all it can be. > > >> If you have an eternal everything then the universe of > >> somethings and sometimes can be easily explained by there being > >> temporary bundling of everything into isolated wholes, collections of > >> wholes, collections of collections, etc, each with their own share of > >> small share of eternity. > > OK. > > > > >> This is what I am trying to say with Bruno about numbers starting > >> from > >> 1 instead of 0. From 1 we can subtract 1 and get 0, > > So we get 0 after all. Sure. Although 0 might be not be a number so much as neutralizing or clearing of the enumerating motive. > > >> but from 0, no > >> logical concept of 1 need follow. > > No logical concept, you are right (although this is not so easy to > proof). But you have the *arithmetical* (yes, *not* logical), notion > of a number's successor, noted s(x). We assume that all numbers have > successors. And we can even define 0 as the only one which is not a > successor, by assuming Ax(~(0= s(x))) (for all number 0 is different > from the successor of that number). Yeah, I can't see how 0 could be the successor of any number. > > having the symbol 0, we can actually name all numbers: by 0, s(0), > s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), s(s(s(s(0)))), s(s(s(s(s(0))))), ... > > >> 0 is just 0. 0 minus 0 is still 0. > > Yes. That's correct. And for all numbers x, you have also that x + 0 = > x. Worst: for all number x, x*0 = 0. > That 0 is a famous number! Haha. I have always had sort of a dread about x*0. Sort of a remorseless destructive power there... Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.