On 27 Jan 2012, at 23:01, Pierz wrote:
On Jan 27, 9:52 am, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
On Jan 26, 1:19 am, Pierz <pier...@gmail.com> wrote:
of my own here: no properties can emerge from a complex system that
are not present in primitive form in the parts of that system. There
What about gliders emerging from the rules of Game of Life? There are
no primitive form gliders in the transition table, nor in static
of the grid.
My axiom is clumsy shorthand. Of course there are are no primitive
form pumps in heart cells either (well, maybe there are in the
cellular mechanism, but that is not the point), but pumps are
completely explainable in terms of the properties of the parts, and
there is no mystery whatsoever in going from the one to the other. On
the other hand, nobody has logically connected qualia to the
properties of matter. Of course, complex behaviour in an organism
(including intelligent behaviour) can be seen as an emergent property
of nerve cells and muscles etc, but only in the 3p sense. There is no
line of explanation from 3p to 1p. As for 'gliders', now I'd really be
impressed if actual gliders emerged from a computer program, but the
fact that patterned arrangements of pixels resembling gliders emerge
hardly blows my world apart. The emergence of this type of phenomena
may be unexpected at first, in the sense that the glider wasn't
deliberately programmed to appear, but 'emerged' out of secondary
implications of the program, but, as we used to say in high school,
'whoopie-do'. That hardly constitutes a refutation of my axiom,
because the emergence can easily be traced back to the properties of
programs, computers, screens, etc.
You say below that 'all emergent phenomena are in the eye of the
beholder but that doesn't make them less real', or words to that
effect. Sure - if by emergent phenomena you mean complex patterns that
appear out of iterative processes of a simple system. Nobody is saying
they aren't real. But the crucial point relates to consciousness. Not
complex, intelligent behaviour. Consciousness. So the problem is where
the 'beholder' appears, not anything in his or her eye. By eliding the
distinction between consciousness and intelligent behaviour - or
between 1p and 3p perspectives - you can of course reduce
'consciousness' to an emergent phenomenon, and that seems to be all
anyone who seeks to explain away qualia has ever done.
Not everyone. The approach based on both UDA and self-reference gives
a tremendous importance to the 1p and 3p distinction.
sleight of hand tricked up in a variety of guises, but amounting
always to the same manoeuvre.
You might have to look closer.
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