On Jan 28, 11:28 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 27 Jan 2012, at 23:01, Pierz wrote:
> > On Jan 27, 9:52 am, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
> >> On Jan 26, 1:19 am, Pierz <pier...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>> of my own here: no properties can emerge from a complex system that
> >>> are not present in primitive form in the parts of that system. There
> >> What about gliders emerging from the rules of Game of Life? There are
> >> no primitive form gliders in the transition table, nor in static
> >> cells
> >> of the grid.
> > My axiom is clumsy shorthand. Of course there are are no primitive
> > form pumps in heart cells either (well, maybe there are in the
> > cellular mechanism, but that is not the point), but pumps are
> > completely explainable in terms of the properties of the parts, and
> > there is no mystery whatsoever in going from the one to the other. On
> > the other hand, nobody has logically connected qualia to the
> > properties of matter. Of course, complex behaviour in an organism
> > (including intelligent behaviour) can be seen as an emergent property
> > of nerve cells and muscles etc, but only in the 3p sense. There is no
> > line of explanation from 3p to 1p. As for 'gliders', now I'd really be
> > impressed if actual gliders emerged from a computer program, but the
> > fact that patterned arrangements of pixels resembling gliders emerge
> > hardly blows my world apart. The emergence of this type of phenomena
> > may be unexpected at first, in the sense that the glider wasn't
> > deliberately programmed to appear, but 'emerged' out of secondary
> > implications of the program, but, as we used to say in  high school,
> > 'whoopie-do'. That hardly constitutes a refutation of my axiom,
> > because the emergence can easily be traced back to the properties of
> > programs, computers, screens, etc.
> > You say below that 'all emergent phenomena are in the eye of the
> > beholder but that doesn't make them less real', or words to that
> > effect. Sure - if by emergent phenomena you mean complex patterns that
> > appear out of iterative processes of a simple system. Nobody is saying
> > they aren't real. But the crucial point relates to consciousness. Not
> > complex, intelligent behaviour. Consciousness. So the problem is where
> > the 'beholder' appears, not anything in his or her eye. By eliding the
> > distinction between consciousness and intelligent behaviour - or
> > between 1p and 3p perspectives - you can of course reduce
> > 'consciousness' to an emergent phenomenon, and that seems to be all
> > anyone who seeks to explain away qualia has ever done.
> Not everyone. The approach based on both UDA and self-reference gives
> a tremendous importance to the 1p and 3p distinction.

I said "anyone who seeks to explain away qualia", but I thought you
weren't trying to do that. Not explain away but rather explain. I'm
not sure you have, but I give your attempt more credence than the
typical materialist argument.

> > The same
> > sleight of hand tricked up in a variety of guises, but amounting
> > always to the same manoeuvre.
> You might have to look closer.

I admit not to have tried very hard to struggle through AUDA, but I
plan to try again. When I argue against the UDA, it is not always out
of any unshakable certainty that my objection is correct, but rather
it is my attempt to put into logical form my intuitive reservations.
The process of reading your and others' replies helps me understand
better and decide whether to keep or throw out my internal resistance
on that point. I have come to accept the MGA, for instance, as a
result of that process. I remain unconvinced (let us say agnostic) on
the measure question. (I might add that when I raised this problem,
you dismissed it while vaguely gesturing towards measure theory, but
without giving a really satisfactory response as to how such a measure
might work - the fact that any calculation can have an infinite number
of redundant steps added into it seems to refute the possibility of
any simple additive measure. But in later posts you've conceded it's
an unresolved problem, which you might have admitted in the first
place!) And I am skeptical on the approach to qualia, as noted, but
the above statement is actually not meant to relate to the UDA, which
at least has a theory which includes a place for the 1p.

> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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