# Re: Qualia and mathematics

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On 28 Jan 2012, at 02:33, Craig Weinberg wrote:```
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```On Jan 27, 12:20 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

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But many things about numbers are not arithmetical. Arithmetical truth
```is not arithmetical. Machine's knowledge can be proved to be non
arithmetical.
If you want, arithmetic is enough rich for having a bigger reality
than anything we can describe in 3p terms.
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But all arithmetic truths, knowledge, beliefs, etc are all still
sensemaking experiences. It doesn't matter whether they are arithmetic
or not, as long as they can possibly be detected or made sense of in
any way, even by inference, deduction, emergence, etc, they are still
sense. Not all sense is arithmetic or related to arithmetic in some
way though. Sense can be gestural or intuitive.
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That might be possible. But gesture and intuition can occur in relative computations.
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```There is nothing in the universe
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The term universe is ambiguous.
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Only in theory. I use it in a literal, absolutist way.
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This does not help to understand what you mean by "universe".

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You confuse proving p, which can be explained in arithmetic, and
"proving p & p is true", which can happen to be true for a machine,
but escapes necessarily its language.
The same for consciousness. It cannot be explained in *any* third
person terms. But it can be proved that self-observing machine cannot
avoid the discovery of many things concerning them which are beyond
language.
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I think that are confusing p with a reality rather than a logical idea
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p refers to reality by definition. "p" alone is for "it is the case that p".
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```I have no reason to believe that a machine can observe
itself in anything more than a trivial sense.
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It needs a diagonalization. It can't be completely trivial.

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```It is not a conscious
experience, I would guess that it is something like an accounting of
unaccounted-for function terminations. Proximal boundaries. A
silhouette of the self offering no interiority but an extrapolation of
incomplete 3p data. That isn't consciousness.
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Consciousness is not just self-reference. It is true self-reference. It belongs to the intersection of truth and self-reference.
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```"But I’ll venture an axiom
of my own here: no properties can emerge from a complex system that
are not present in primitive form in the parts of that system. There
is nothing mystical about emergent properties. When the emergent
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property of ‘pumping blood’ arises out of collections of heart cells, that property is a logical extension of the properties of the parts -
```physical properties such as elasticity, electrical conductivity,
volume and so on that belong to the individual cells. But nobody
invoking ‘emergent properties’ to explain consciousness in the brain
has yet explained how consciousness arises as a natural extension of
the known properties of brain cells  - or indeed of matter at all. "
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Pierz, Craig, I disagree. Consciousness can be explained as a non 3p
describable fixed point when machine's observe themselves. This
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provides a key role to consciousness, including the ability to develop
```meanings, to speed decisions, to make decision in absence of
information, etc.
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I disagree. It provides a key role to the function of agency but it
has nothing to do with consciousness and qualia per se. A sleep walker
can navigate to the kitchen for a snack without being conscious.
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Yes. But everyday life is more complex than looking for a snack.

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```Consciousness does nothing to speed decisions, it would only cost
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That's why high animals have larger cortex.

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```and add nothing to the efficiency of unconscious
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So, why do you think we are conscious?

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```Consciousness is not explainable in term of any parts of something,
but as an invariant in universal self-transformation.
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If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, then Peano Arithmetic
```is already conscious.
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Why and how does universal self-transformation equate to
consciousness?
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I did not say that. I said that consciousness is a fixed point for a very peculiar form of self-transformation.
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```Anything that is conscious can also be unconscious. Can
Peano Arithmetic be unconscious too?
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Yes. That's possible if you accept that consciousness is a logical descendent of consistency. It follows then from the fact that consistency entails the consistency of inconsistency (Gödel II). Of course, the reality is more complex, for consciousness is only approximated by the instinctive unconscious) inductive inference of self-consistency.
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```My solution is that both views are correct on their own terms in
their
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own sense and that we should not arbitrarily privilege one view over the other. Our vision is human vision. It is based on retina vision,
```which is based on cellular and molecular visual sense. It is not
just
a mechanism which pushes information around from one place to
another,
each place is a living organism which actively contributes to the
top
level experience - it isn't a passive system.
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```Living organisms - replicators,
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```Life replicates, but replication does not define life. Living
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organisms feel alive and avoid death. Replication does not necessitate
```feeling alive.
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I am OK with this. Yet, replication + while-loop might be enough.
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Should we mourn the untying of our shoelaces each time?
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?

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```are fine things, but I don't see why
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must one confuse replicators with perception. Perception can exist by
```itself merely on the virtue of passing information around and
processing
it. Replicators can also exist due similar reasons, but on a
different
level.
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```Perception has never existed 'by itself'. Perception only occurs in
living organisms who are informed by their experience.
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The whole point is to explain terms like "living", "conscious", etc.
You take them as primitive, so are escaping the issue.
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They aren't primitive, the symmetry is primitive.
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?

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```There is no
independent disembodied 'information' out there. There detection and
response, sense and motive of physical wholes.
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Same for "physical" (and that's not obvious!).
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Do you doubt that if all life were exterminated that planets would
still exist? Where would information be though?
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In the arithmetical relation, which truth are independent of me.
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(I indulge in answering by staying in the frame of my working hypothesis without repeating this).
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```Sorry, but I think it's never going to happen. Consciousness is not
digital.
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If you survive with a digital brain, then consciousness is necessarily
```not digital.
A brain is not a maker of consciousness. It is only a stable pattern
making it possible (or more probable) that a person can manifest
itself relatively to some universal number(s).
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Why not just use adipose tissue instead? That's a more stable pattern.
Why have a vulnerable concentration of this pattern in the head? Our
skeleton would make a much safer place four a person to manifest
itself relatively to some universal number.
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Write a letter to nature for geographical reclamation.

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```Keep in mind that comp makes materialism wrong.
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That's not why it's wrong. I have no problem with materialism being
wrong, I have a problem with experience being reduced to non
experience or non sense.
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This does not happen in comp. On the contrary machines can already explain why that does not happen. Of course you need to believe that arithmetical truth makes sense. But your posts illustrate that you do.
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```The big picture is
completely different. I think that you confuse comp, with its
Aristotelian version where computations seems to be incarnated by
physical primitive materials. Comp + materialism leads to person-
nihilism, so it is important to understand that comp should not be
assumed together with materialism (even weak).
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I don't think that I am confusing it. Comp is perfectly illustrated as
modern investment banking. There is no material, in fact it strangles
the life out of all materials, eviscerating culture and architecture,
all in the name of consolidating digitally abstracted control of
control. This is machine intelligence. The idea of unexperienced
ownership as an end unto itself, forever concentrating data and
exporting debt.
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Only in your reductionist appraisal of comp. That is widespread and dangerous indeed, but you add to the grains of it, imo.
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```We are able to extend and augment our neurological capacities (we
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already are) with neuromorphic devices, but ultimately we need our own
```brain tissue to live in.
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Why? What does that mean?
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It means that without our brain, there is no we.
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That's not correct.

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```We cannot be
simulated anymore than water or fire can be simulated.
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Why? That's a strong affirmation. We have not yet find a phenomenon in nature that cannot be simulated (except the collapse of the wave, which can still be Turing 1-person recoverable).
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```Human
consciousness exists nowhere but through a human brain.
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Not at all. Brain is a construct of human consciousness, which has some local role.
```You are so much Aristotelian.

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```We, unfortunately cannot be digitized,
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You don't know that. But you don't derive it either from what you
assume (which to be franc remains unclear)
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I do derive it, because the brain and the self are two parts of a
whole. You cannot export the selfness into another form, because the
self has no form, it's only experiential content through the interior
of a living brain.
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That's the 1-self, but it is just an interface between truth and relative bodies.
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I think that you have a reductionist conception of machine, which was
perhaps defensible before Gödel 1931 and Turing discovery of the
universal machine, but is no more defensible after.
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I know that you think that, but you don't take into account that I
started with with that. I read Gödel, Escher, Bach around 1980 I
think. Even though I couldn't get too much into the math, I was quite
happy with the implications of it. For the next 25 years I believed
that the universe was made of 'patterns' - pretty close to what your
view is.
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Not really. The physical universe is not made of any patterns. Nor is it made of anything. It is a highly complex structure which appears in first person plural shared dreams. You might, like many, confuse digital physics (which does not work) and comp. "I am a machine" makes it impossible for both my consciousness, and my material body to be Turing emulable. I agree that this is counter- intuitive, and that's why I propose a reasoning, and I prefer that people grasp the reasoning than pondering at infinitum on the results without doing the needed (finite) work.
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```It's only been in the last 7 years that I have found a better
idea. My hypothesis is post-Gödelian symmetry.
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You have to elaborate a lot. You should study first order logical language to be sure no trace of metaphysical implicit baggage is put in your theory; in case you want scientists trying to understand what you say.
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Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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