Hi Evgenyi,
On 04 Feb 2012, at 18:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> Also,
> if your theory is that we (in the 3-sense) are not Turing emulable,
> you have to explain us why, and what it adds to the explanation.
Bruno,
I do not have a theory.
That's OK. Technically, me neither. I am a logician. All what I assert
is that two (weak) theories, mechanism and materialism are incompatible.
I don't hide that my heart invites my brain to listen to what some
rich universal machine can already prove, and guess by themselves,
about themselves.
As for comp, my only note that I have made recently was that if to
look at the current state-of-art of computer architectures and
algorithms, then it is clear that any practical implementation is
out of reach.
Well, OK. We disagree here. AUDA is the illustration that many simple
machine, basically any first order specification of a universal system
(machine, programming language) extended with the corresponding
induction axioms, Those are the one I call the Löbian machine, they
are already as clever as you and me. By lacking our layers of
historical and prehistorical prejudices, they seems even rather wiser,
too. (In my opinion).
AUDA is the theology of the self-introspecting LUM. It gives an
octuple of hypostases (inside views of arithmetic by locally
arithmetical being) which mirrors rather well the discourse of the
Platonists, neoplatonists and mystics in all cultures (as well argued
by Aldous Huxley, for example).
You laptop is one inch close to Löbianity, but why would you want that
humans make Löbian machines when Introspection is not even in the
human curriculum. I begin to think that each time a human become
Löbian, he got banned, exiled, burned, imprizonned, ignored, sent in
asylum, or a perhaps become a big artist, musician or something.
Whether comp is true of false in principle, frankly speaking I have
no idea.
Me neither. Practically, mechanism is more a right (to say yes or no
to the doctor).
I guess that my subconsciousness still believes in primitive
materialism, as consciously I experience a question Why it is bad to
say that math is mind dependent.
Human math is human mind dependent. This does not imply that math, or
a "metaphysically clean" part of math (like arithmetic or computer
science) might not be the "cause/reason" of the stable persistent
beliefs in a physical reality.
The physical reality would be a projective view of arithmetic from
inside.
Yet, I should confess that after following discussions at this list
I see some problems with such a statement and pass doubts back to my
subconsciousness. Let us see what happens.
I still listen to the lectures of Prof Hoenen. Recently I have
finished Theorien der Wahrheit and right now I am at Beweistheorien.
When I am done with Prof Hoenen, as promised I will go through your
The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. Yet, I do not know when
it happens, as it takes more time as I thought originally.
As for computers having emotions, I am a practitioner and I am
working right now closely with engineers. I should say that the
modern market would love electronics with emotions. Just imagine
such a slogan
Smartphone with Emotions* (*scientifically proved)
This will never happen. Never.
More exactly, if this happens, it means you are in front of a con
crackpot. Emotion are ineffable, although a range of the corresponding
behavior is easy to simulate. To have genuine emotion, you need to be
entangled to genuine complex long computation. But their outputs are
easy to simulate.
A friend of mine made a piece of theater with a little robot-dog,
emulating emotions, and the public reacted correspondingly. In comp
there is no philosophical zombies, but there are plenty of local
zombies possible, like cartoon cops on the roads which makes their
effect, or that emotive robot-dog.
But an emotion, by its very nature cannot be scientifically proved.
All what happens is that a person succeeds in being recognize as such
by other persons.
Computers might already be conscious. It might be our lack of civility
which prevents us to listen to them.
But you were probably joking with the "*scientifically proved".
Concerning reality, science never proves. It only suggests
interrogatively. If not, it is pseudo science or pseudo religion.
It would be a killer application. Hence I do not understand why
people here that state "a computer has already emotions" do not
explore such a wonderful opportunity. After all, whether it is comp,
physicalism, monism, dualism or whatever does not matter. What is
really important is to make profit.
Hmm... I am not sure. What is important is to be able to eat when
hungry, and to drink when thirsty and some amount of heat. What is
hoped for is the larger freedom spectrum for the exploratory
opportunities.
Profit might be a tool, hardly a goal by itself.
If profit is the goal, you get the bandits in power. Quickly. Stealing
is locally easy (and globally disastrous).
You can build cute smartphone to attract the kids, but you don't have
to brainwash them with the last theory in fashion. I think.
Bruno
Evgenii
On 04.02.2012 10:17 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 03 Feb 2012, at 21:23, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.02.2012 21:49 meekerdb said the following:
On 2/2/2012 12:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 30, 6:54 pm, meekerdb<[email protected]> wrote:
On 1/30/2012 3:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 30, 6:08 pm, meekerdb<[email protected]> wrote:
On 1/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: So kind of
you to inform us of your unsupported opinion.
I was commenting on your unsupported opinion.
Except that my opinion is supported by the fact that within
the context of chess the machine acts just like a person who
had those emotions. So it had at least the functional
equivalent of those emotions. Whereas your opinion is simple
prejudice.
I agree my opinion would be simple prejudice had we not
already been over this issue a dozen times. My view is that the
whole idea that there can be a 'functional equivalent of
emotions' is completely unsupported. I give examples of
puppets, movies, trashcans that say THANK YOU, voicemail...all
of these things demonstrate that there need not be any
connection at all between function and interior experience.
Except that in every case there is an emotion in your
examples...it's just the emotion of the puppeter, the
screenwriter, the trashcan painter. But in the case of the chess
playing computer, there is no person providing the 'emotion'
because the 'emotion' depends on complex and unforeseeable
events. Hence it is appropriate to attribute the 'emotion' to the
computer/program.
Brent
Craig's position that computers in the present form do not have
emotions is not unique, as emotions belong to consciousness. A
quote from my favorite book
Jeffrey A. Gray, Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem.
The last sentence from the chapter "10.2 Conscious computers?"
p. 128 "Our further discussion here, however, will take it as
established that his can never happen."
Now the last paragraph from the chapter "10.3 Conscious robots?"
p. 130. "So, while we may grant robots the power to form meaningful
categorical representations at a level reached by the unconscious
brain and by the behaviour controlled by the unconscious brain, we
should remain doubtful whether they are likely to experience
conscious percepts. This conclusion should not, however, be
over-interpreted. It does not necessarily imply that human beings
will never be able to build artefacts with conscious experience.
That will depend on how the trick of consciousness is done. If and
when we know the trick, it may be possible to duplicate it. But the
mere provision of behavioural dispositions is unlikely to be up to
the mark."
If we say that computers right now have emotions, then we must be
able exactly define the difference between unconscious and
conscious experience in the computer (for example in that computer
that has won Kasparov). Can you do it?
Yes. It is the point of AUDA. We can do it in the theoretical
framework, once we accept some theory (axiomatic) of knowledge. Also,
if your theory is that we (in the 3-sense) are not Turing emulable,
you have to explain us why, and what it adds to the explanation. With
comp, the trick of both consciousness and matter is not entirely
computable. You have to resist to a reductionist conception of
numbers and machines.
No computers has ever emotion "right now", they have *always* "right
now emotions". With comp, the mind-body link is a bit tricky. Real
consciousness is better seen to be associated to an infinity of
computations instead of one, as we are programmed to do by years of
local evolution.
Hence I personally find this particular Craig's position as
supported.
You might miss the discovery of the universal machine and its
self-reference logic.
Clark is right on this, emotion are easy, despite being able to run
very deep, and to govern us. Esay but not so easy, you need the
sensible matter non communicable hyposases.
The emotion of your laptot is unknown, and unmanifested, because your
laptop has no deep persistant self-reference ability to share with
you. We want a slave, and would be anxious in front of a machine
taking too much independence.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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