On 03.02.2012 22:07 meekerdb said the following:
On 2/3/2012 12:23 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.02.2012 21:49 meekerdb said the following:
On 2/2/2012 12:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 30, 6:54 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 1/30/2012 3:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Jan 30, 6:08 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 1/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: So kind of
you to inform us of your unsupported opinion.
I was commenting on your unsupported opinion.
Except that my opinion is supported by the fact that within
the context of chess the machine acts just like a person who
had those emotions. So it had at least the functional
equivalent of those emotions. Whereas your opinion is simple
I agree my opinion would be simple prejudice had we not
already been over this issue a dozen times. My view is that the
whole idea that there can be a 'functional equivalent of
emotions' is completely unsupported. I give examples of
puppets, movies, trashcans that say THANK YOU, voicemail...all
of these things demonstrate that there need not be any
connection at all between function and interior experience.

Except that in every case there is an emotion in your
examples...it's just the emotion of the puppeter, the
screenwriter, the trashcan painter. But in the case of the chess
playing computer, there is no person providing the 'emotion'
because the 'emotion' depends on complex and unforeseeable
events. Hence it is appropriate to attribute the 'emotion' to the


Craig's position that computers in the present form do not have
emotions is not unique, as emotions belong to consciousness. A
quote from my favorite book

Jeffrey A. Gray, Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem.

The last sentence from the chapter "10.2 Conscious computers?"

p. 128 "Our further discussion here, however, will take it as
established that his can never happen."

Now the last paragraph from the chapter "10.3 Conscious robots?"

p. 130. "So, while we may grant robots the power to form meaningful
 categorical representations at a level reached by the unconscious
 brain and by the behaviour controlled by the unconscious brain, we
 should remain doubtful whether they are likely to experience
conscious percepts. This conclusion should not, however, be
over-interpreted. It does not necessarily imply that human beings
will never be able to build artefacts with conscious experience.
That will depend on how the trick of consciousness is done. If and
when we know the trick, it may be possible to duplicate it. But the
mere provision of behavioural dispositions is unlikely to be up to
the mark."

If we say that computers right now have emotions, then we must be
able exactly define the difference between unconscious and
conscious experience in the computer (for example in that computer
that has won Kasparov). Can you do it?

Can you do it for people? For yourself? No. Experiments show that
people confuse the source of their own emotions. So your requirement
that we be able to "exactly define" is just something you've


I believe that there is at least a small difference. Presumably we know everything about the computer that has played chess. Then it seems that a hypothesis about emotions in that computer could be verified without a problem - hence my notion on "exactly define". On the other hand, consciousness remains to be a hard problem and here "exactly define" does not work.

However, the latter does not mean that consciousness does not exist as a phenomenon. Let us take for example life. I would say that there is not good definition what life is ("exactly define" does not work), yet this does not prevent science to research it. This should be the same for conscious experience.


Hence I personally find this particular Craig's position as


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