On 2/4/2012 9:09 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> Also,
> if your theory is that we (in the 3-sense) are not Turing emulable,
> you have to explain us why, and what it adds to the explanation.


I do not have a theory.

As for comp, my only note that I have made recently was that if to look at the current state-of-art of computer architectures and algorithms, then it is clear that any practical implementation is out of reach.

Whether comp is true of false in principle, frankly speaking I have no idea. I guess that my subconsciousness still believes in primitive materialism, as consciously I experience a question Why it is bad to say that math is mind dependent. Yet, I should confess that after following discussions at this list I see some problems with such a statement and pass doubts back to my subconsciousness. Let us see what happens.

I still listen to the lectures of Prof Hoenen. Recently I have finished Theorien der Wahrheit and right now I am at Beweistheorien. When I am done with Prof Hoenen, as promised I will go through your The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. Yet, I do not know when it happens, as it takes more time as I thought originally.

As for computers having emotions, I am a practitioner and I am working right now closely with engineers. I should say that the modern market would love electronics with emotions. Just imagine such a slogan

Smartphone with Emotions* (*scientifically proved)

It would be a killer application.

So if you miss a turn your driving direction app will get mad and scold you? I you use your calculator to find the square root of 121 it will mock you for forgetting your 8th grade mathematics? Emotions imply having values and being able to act on them -- why would you want your computer to have it's own values and act on them? Don't you want it to just have the values you have, i.e. answer the questions you ask?


Hence I do not understand why people here that state "a computer has already emotions" do not explore such a wonderful opportunity. After all, whether it is comp, physicalism, monism, dualism or whatever does not matter. What is really important is to make profit.


On 04.02.2012 10:17 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 03 Feb 2012, at 21:23, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 02.02.2012 21:49 meekerdb said the following:
On 2/2/2012 12:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 30, 6:54 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 1/30/2012 3:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Jan 30, 6:08 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 1/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: So kind of
you to inform us of your unsupported opinion.
I was commenting on your unsupported opinion.
Except that my opinion is supported by the fact that within
the context of chess the machine acts just like a person who
had those emotions. So it had at least the functional
equivalent of those emotions. Whereas your opinion is simple
I agree my opinion would be simple prejudice had we not
already been over this issue a dozen times. My view is that the
whole idea that there can be a 'functional equivalent of
emotions' is completely unsupported. I give examples of
puppets, movies, trashcans that say THANK YOU, voicemail...all
of these things demonstrate that there need not be any
connection at all between function and interior experience.

Except that in every case there is an emotion in your
examples...it's just the emotion of the puppeter, the
screenwriter, the trashcan painter. But in the case of the chess
playing computer, there is no person providing the 'emotion'
because the 'emotion' depends on complex and unforeseeable
events. Hence it is appropriate to attribute the 'emotion' to the


Craig's position that computers in the present form do not have
emotions is not unique, as emotions belong to consciousness. A
quote from my favorite book

Jeffrey A. Gray, Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem.

The last sentence from the chapter "10.2 Conscious computers?"

p. 128 "Our further discussion here, however, will take it as
established that his can never happen."

Now the last paragraph from the chapter "10.3 Conscious robots?"

p. 130. "So, while we may grant robots the power to form meaningful
 categorical representations at a level reached by the unconscious
 brain and by the behaviour controlled by the unconscious brain, we
 should remain doubtful whether they are likely to experience
conscious percepts. This conclusion should not, however, be
over-interpreted. It does not necessarily imply that human beings
will never be able to build artefacts with conscious experience.
That will depend on how the trick of consciousness is done. If and
when we know the trick, it may be possible to duplicate it. But the
mere provision of behavioural dispositions is unlikely to be up to
the mark."

If we say that computers right now have emotions, then we must be
able exactly define the difference between unconscious and
conscious experience in the computer (for example in that computer
that has won Kasparov). Can you do it?

Yes. It is the point of AUDA. We can do it in the theoretical
framework, once we accept some theory (axiomatic) of knowledge. Also,
if your theory is that we (in the 3-sense) are not Turing emulable,
you have to explain us why, and what it adds to the explanation. With
comp, the trick of both consciousness and matter is not entirely
computable. You have to resist to a reductionist conception of
numbers and machines.

No computers has ever emotion "right now", they have *always* "right
now emotions". With comp, the mind-body link is a bit tricky. Real
consciousness is better seen to be associated to an infinity of
computations instead of one, as we are programmed to do by years of
local evolution.

Hence I personally find this particular Craig's position as

You might miss the discovery of the universal machine and its
self-reference logic.

Clark is right on this, emotion are easy, despite being able to run
very deep, and to govern us. Esay but not so easy, you need the
sensible matter non communicable hyposases.

The emotion of your laptot is unknown, and unmanifested, because your
 laptop has no deep persistant self-reference ability to share with
you. We want a slave, and would be anxious in front of a machine
taking too much independence.



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